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Abstract
A mobile agent is an autonomous program that can migrate under its own control
from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. In other words, the program
can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point, transport itself to another machine,
and then resume execution from the point of suspension. Mobile agents have the
potential to provide a single, general framework in which a wide range of distributed
applications can be implemented eciently and easily. Several challenges must be
faced, however, most notably reducing migration overhead, protecting a machine
from malicious agents (and an agent from malicious machines), and insulating the
agent against network and machine failures. Agent Tcl is a mobile-agent system
under development at Dartmouth College that has evolved from a Tcl-only system
into a multiple-language system that currently supports Tcl, Java, and Scheme. In
this thesis, we examine the motivation behind mobile agents, describe the base Agent
Tcl system and its security mechanisms for protecting a machine against malicious
agents, and analyze the system's current performance. Finally, we discuss the security,
fault-tolerance and performance enhancements that will be necessary for Agent Tcl
and mobile agents in general to realize their full potential.
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A mobile agent is an autonomous program that can migrate under its own control
from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. In other words, the program
can suspend its execution at an arbitrary point, transport itself to another machine,
and resume execution on the new machine from the point at which it left o. On
each machine, it interacts with service agents and other resources to accomplish its
task. In Figure 1.1, for example, an agent has migrated to interact with a search
engine and will migrate again to interact with additional search engines. Once the
agent has the desired information, it will migrate one last time to return to its home
site so that it can present the information to its owner.
Mobile agents have several advantages. By migrating to the location of a needed
resource, such as the search engine in Figure 1.1, an agent can interact with the re-
source without transmitting any intermediate data across the network, signicantly
reducing bandwidth consumption in many applications. Similarly, by migrating to
the location of a user, an agent can respond to user actions rapidly. In either case, the
agent can continue its interaction with the resource or user even if the network con-
nection goes down, making mobile agents particularly attractive in mobile-computing
applications. Mobile agents also allow traditional clients and servers to ooad work
1
Agent
Machine A Machine B
Agent
Searcher
Figure 1.1: The basic idea of migration. Here an agent has migrated so that it
can interact locally with a search engine. It will migrate again to nd additional
information and bring the results back to its owner.
to each other, and to change who ooads to whom according to machine capabili-
ties and current loads. Similarly, mobile agents allow an application to dynamically
deploy its components to arbitrary network sites, and to redeploy those components
in response to changing network conditions. Finally, most distributed applications t
naturally into the mobile-agent model, since mobile agents can migrate sequentially
through a set of machines, send out a wave of child agents that will visit multiple
machines in parallel, remain stationary and interact with resources remotely, or any
combination of these three extremes. Complex, ecient and robust behaviors can
be realized with surprisingly little code, and, in fact, our own experience with un-
dergraduate programmers at Dartmouth suggests that mobile agents are easier to
understand than other distributed computing paradigms.
Although each of these advantages is a reasonable argument for mobile agents,
any specic application can be implemented just as eciently and robustly with more
traditional techniques, such as queued RPC [JTK97], higher-level server operations,
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application-specic query languages, application-specic proxies within the perma-
nent network, automated installation facilities, and active web pages that contain
Java applets. Mobile agents eliminate the need for these other techniques, however,
combining their strengths into a single, general, convenient framework. Distributed
applications can be implemented eciently and easily even if they must exhibit ex-
tremely exible behavior in the face of changing network conditions. For example, a
search application can migrate to a dynamically selected proxy site and do its merg-
ing and ltering there, while a server can continually migrate to new machines to
minimize the average latency between itself and its clients [RASS97].
In short, the true strength of mobile agents is that they are a uniform paradigm for
distributed applications, allowing both data and code to move from machine to ma-
chine. Several key research problems must be solved, however, before a mobile-agent
system can realize the full potential of the mobile-agent paradigm. Such problems
include reducing migration and communication overhead, protecting a machine from
malicious agents (and an agent from malicious machines), limiting an agent's total
resource consumption, insulating an agent against network and machine failures, and
developing the resource discovery, network sensing, navigation, and planning services
that will allow an agent to identify and reach the desired services.
Agent Tcl [Gra97, GKCR97, Gra96, Gra95] is a mobile-agent system that is un-
der development at Dartmouth College to address some of these research problems.
Agent Tcl focuses on ve research areas: (1) performance, (2) support for multiple
languages, (3) cryptographic authentication and restricted execution environments
to protect a machine from malicious agents, (4) economic-based models to limit an
agent's total resource consumption across multiple machines, and (5) networking sens-
ing, navigation and planning services so that an agent can determine the best path
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through the network according to its task and current network conditions. In this
thesis, we are concerned with the base Agent Tcl system, specically its support for
multiple languages, its mechanisms for protecting an agent from malicious machines,
and its performance relative to traditional distributed systems.
Agent Tcl has two main components: (1) a server that runs on each machine, and
(2) an execution environment for each supported agent language. The server accepts
incoming agents, authenticates the identity of the owner, and passes the authenticated
agent to the appropriate execution environment. The server also keeps tracks of the
agents running on its machines and answers queries about their status, allows an
authorized user to suspend, resume and terminate a running agent, and allows agents
to communicate with each other through message passing and direct connections. In
a future version of Agent Tcl, the server will also provide a nonvolatile store for agents
so that an agent can be restarted after a machine failure. As in the Tacoma system
[JvRS95], all other services are provided by agents. Such services include resource
directories, network-sensing tools, higher-level communication protocols such as RPC,
and resource managers. Resource managers guard access to critical system resources
such as the screen, network and disk; specically, the resource managers decide which
actions an agent can perform based on the authenticated identity of the agent's owner.
Each execution environment includes the interpreter that actually executes the
agent, a state-capture module that captures the complete state of the agent when the
agent decides to migrate to a new machine, and a security-enforcement module that
enforces the security policy from the resource managers. In addition, each execution
environment includes a package of stub routines that the agent uses to interact with
the servers and obtain the available agent services, such as migration, communication,
and status queries.
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Agent Tcl is similar to other mobile-agent systems, such as Tacoma [JvRS95],
Ara [PS97], and Telescript [Whi94], but distinguishes itself with (1) its combination
of multiple languages, a simple migration mechanism, and both low- and high-level
communication protocols, (2) its simple but eective security model, and (3) its ex-
tensive support services and tools.
 Multiple languages (Chapter 5). Agent Tcl supports multiple, o-the-shelf
languages, Tcl, Java and Scheme, and allows the straightforward addition of
new languages. The agent programmer can select the language that is most
appropriate for her task.
 Migration (Chapter 5). Agent Tcl reduces migration to a single instruction,
jump, which automatically capture the complete state of the agent and sends the
state image to the new machine. The agent continues from the point of the jump
on the new machine. Although the system programmer must implement the
jump instruction for each supported language, once the instruction is available,
the agent programmers do not need to explicitly collect state information before
migration.
 Communication (Chapter 5). The base Agent Tcl system provides two low-
level communication mechanisms, messaging passing and direct connections (for
bulk data transfer), which work the same regardless of whether the communicat-
ing agents are on the same or dierent machines. Higher-level communication
mechanisms, such as a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanism [NCK96], are
implemented at the agent level on top of the two low-level services. With this
approach, the agent programmer can choose from a range of communication
mechanisms, but the base system remains lightweight.
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 Security (Chapter 6). Agent Tcl protects an individual machine against mali-
cious agents with a simple but powerful security model that cleanly separates
policy and enforcement. Agents are digitally signed during migration so that
their owner can be identied. Resource manager agents use the identity of the
agent's owner to decide which screen, network, disk, etc., accesses are allowed
for that agent. The resource managers use traditional access-control lists to
make their decisions. These lists are read from a conguration le on startup;
then the machine administrator can change the lists interactively at any time
through a graphical management tool. A lightweight enforcement module for
each supported language enforces the decisions of the resource managers. These
enforcement modules ask the resource manager to make a decision when the
agent attempts a resource access for the rst time, and then cache the decision
so that they do not have to keep asking the resource manager. In addition to
these existing mechanisms for protecting an individual machine from malicious
agents, another student is working on economic-based models for limiting an
agent's total resource consumption across multiple machines.
 Support services (Chapter 9). Agent Tcl provides numerous support services,
most notably (1) a debugger that tracks an agent as it moves through the net-
work, monitors its communication with other agents, and provides traditional
debugger features such as breakpoints, watch conditions and line-at-a-time ex-
ecution [HK97], (2) a docking system that allows an agent to transparently
migrate to or from a mobile computer, even if the mobile computer is not cur-
rently connected to the network [GKN+97], (3) hierarchical yellow pages that
provide a keyword-indexed directory of available services [GKN+97], (4) several
network sensing and planning modules that allow an agent to examine the cur-
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rent state of the network and construct an optimal route [GKN+97, Car97], and
(5) a simple Mobile Agent Construct Environment (MACE) that allows a non-
programmer to graphically construct an agent [Sha97]. These services represent
the research of several other students. Although they are discussed further in
Chapter 9, they are not an integral part of this thesis.
A sample Agent Tcl agent is shown in Figure 1.2. This agent, which is written
in Tcl, migrates through a sequence of machines and uses the Unix who command
to nd out which users are logged onto each one. Once it has migrated through all
the machines, it migrates one more time to return to its home machine and present
the user list to its owner. The agent rst uses the agent begin command to register
with the Agent Tcl server on its current machine. The agent then steps through the
list of machines and uses the agent jump command to migrate to each one in turn.
On each machine, the agent's execution continues from the point of the agent jump,
and the agent invokes the Unix who command to get the user list. Once the agent
has migrated through all of the machines, it invokes agent jump one last time to
migrate back to its home machine where it presents the user list to its owner (the
code to display the user list on the screen is not shown in the gure). Finally, the
agent invokes agent end to tell the Agent Tcl server that it has nished. Although
the \who" agent is not the most useful agent, it illustrates the general form of any
agent that migrates sequentially through a set of machines. The exec who can be
replaced with any desired processing. The most important thing to note about the
agent is that it was extremely easy to write; it is just a traditional single-machine
program with an agent jump command at two key points.
Agent Tcl has been used primarily in distributed information-retrieval applica-
tions, including retrieval of technical reports [RGK96], product descriptions and
7
      agent_jump $machine              # jump to each machine
      append output [exec who]        # any local processing
}
agent_jump $agent(home)              # jump back home
# display output window
agent_end                                        # unregister
agent_begin           # register with the local agent server
set output {}
set machineList {muir tenaya ...}
    
A






Figure 1.2: The \who" agent migrates through a set of machines and gures out who
is logged onto each one. Although the \who" agent is not the most useful agent, it
illustrates the general form of any agent that migrates sequentially through a set of
machines. The exec who can be replaced with any desired processing.
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prices [RGK96], medical records [Wu95], and three-dimensional drawings of mechan-
ical parts [CBC96] (Chapter 8). Mobile agents have two advantages in these appli-
cations: (1) the search agent can migrate to the location of the relevant database,
eliminating all intermediate data transfer; (2) the search agent can migrate to a dy-
namically selected proxy site and do its searches, merging and ltering from that
proxy site, allowing it to continue even if the network link to the home machine goes
down and minimizing the amount of data that it brings back to the home machine.
The second advantage is particularly critical if the search is launched from a mobile
computer, which typically has an unreliable, low-bandwidth connection into the net-
work. Agent Tcl has also been used to track purchase orders in a workow application
[CGN96] and in several network management and information-retrieval applications
at non-Dartmouth sites.
Agent Tcl agents allow these applications to minimize their bandwidth consump-
tion and to proceed with their task even if network links go down. On the other
hand, when compared with traditional client/server implementations, the total task
completion time is longer except in low-performance networks. The primary cause is
the high migration overhead in the current Agent Tcl system. This migration over-
head can be reduced signicantly, however, and in combination with several other
straightforward optimizations, this reduction should allow Agent Tcl agents to per-
form just as well as client/server solutions in high-performance networks and much
better in low-performance networks (Chapter 7). Of course, there will always be net-
work conditions under which it is better for an agent to remain stationary and act
like a traditional client, so we have begun to develop some simple formulas that will
help an agent decide when and where to migrate (Chapter 7).
In rest of this thesis, we present the Agent Tcl system in detail. Chapter 2
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discusses the motivation for mobile agents, Chapters 3 and 4 examine other mobile-
agent systems, and Chapters 5 and 6 describe the base Agent Tcl system and its
security mechanisms for protecting a machine from malicious agents. Chapter 6
also includes possible approaches for protecting an agent from malicious machines.
Then, Chapter 7 analyzes the system's current performance and develops some simple
formulas that an agent can use when deciding whether to migrate or remain stationary.
Finally, Chapter 8 looks at several existing and potential applications for Agent Tcl,
Chapter 9 presents the Agent Tcl components that other students are developing
as part of their research, and Chapter 10 considers the security, fault-tolerance and
performance enhancements that will be necessary for Agent Tcl and other mobile-




Mobile agents have several performance advantages where performance can be a mat-
ter of bandwidth, latency, robustness, or simply ease of development.
Bandwidth. In the traditional client/server model [Lew95], the server provides a
xed set of operations that a client invokes from a remote machine. If the server
does not provide an operation that matches the client task exactly, either the client
must make a series of cross-network calls to lower-level operations, or the server
developer must add a new operation to the server. The rst option brings intermediate
data across the network on every call, potentially wasting a signicant amount of
network bandwidth, especially if the intermediate data is not useful beyond the end
of the client task. The second option is an intractable programming task as the
number of distinct clients increases. In addition, it discourages modern software
engineering since the server becomes a collection of complex, specialized routines
rather than simple, general primitives. Mobile agents, on the other hand, do not
waste bandwidth even if the server provides only low-level operations, simply because
an agent can migrate to the server where it performs any desired processing before
returning just the nal result to the client [Whi94]. Agents that do more work avoid
more intermediate messages and conserve more bandwidth.
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Despite this advantage, there are several tradeos that must be considered. First,
although a mobile agent eliminates the transmission of intermediate data, the agent
itself must rst be sent to the server. If the agent is larger than the intermediate data,
it will obviously consume more bandwidth than a traditional client/server implemen-
tation. Second, if the network between the client and server has high bandwidth and
low latency, the amount of intermediate data must be quite large for the mobile agent
to have a shorter completion time, especially when one considers the time needed for
the server to start up the necessary execution environment for the incoming agent.
Finally, the mobile agent uses less processing time at the client but more time at the
server, since the agent performs all intermediate computations at the server and is
typically written in an interpreted language. If the server is low-powered or heavily
loaded, a CPU-intensive agent can easily take longer than the corresponding cross-
network calls. Taken together, these tradeos mean that mobile agents display a
much greater performance advantage as network bandwidth decreases, network load
increases, the amount of intermediate data increases, and server power increases.
Conversely, mobile agents can display a severe performance disadvantage as condi-
tions move in the other direction. Any mobile-agent system must allow an agent to
examine current network and machine conditions and then decide whether to migrate
to a remote resource or remain at the current site and access the resource using the
equivalent of message passing [SS94] or remote procedure call (RPC) [BN84].
Latency. By migrating to the location of a resource, an agent can interact with
the resource much faster than from across the network. Such faster interaction is one
of the main motivations for Java-enabled web browsers. Latency between the user
(i.e., the screen, keyboard and mouse) and a web-based application is much lower if
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part or all of the application is downloaded to the client's machine in the form of a
Java applet, allowing the application to respond much more rapidly to user actions
[CH97]. Mobile agents can be used for the same purpose. Of course, whether latency
is actually important depends entirely on the application, and whether mobile agents
actually reduce the latency depends on the current server load, the network latency,
and the time needed for agent migration relative to the number of operations that
the agent invokes. Clearly a migrating agent that invokes only a single operation will
always have a larger end-to-end latency than the corresponding cross-network call.
Thus, as with bandwidth, the mobile-agent system must allow the agent to examine
current network and machine conditions so that it can decide whether to migrate or
remain stationary.
Mobile computing. A migrating agent does not require a permanent connection
with its home site and can proceed with its task even if the home site is unreachable.
Thus mobile agents are ideally suited for mobile computing in which computers can
be disconnected from the network for long periods of time [Whi94]. For example, a
laptop or other mobile device can send an agent out into the network. The agent will
continue with its work even if the laptop disconnects and will be ready with a result
when the laptop reconnects. Similarly, a service can send an agent onto a laptop to
continue interacting with the user [TLKC95]. In addition to periods of disconnection,
the networks involved in mobile computing (or more precisely the links at the edge of
these networks) are often characterized by low bandwidth and high latency, making
mobile agents even more attractive. By migrating to or from the laptop, the agent
can minimize use of the low-bandwidth, high-latency link.
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Ooading. Mobile agents allow a low-powered client to ooad work to a high-
powered proxy or an overloaded server to ooad work to clients. In the latter case, a
server would send back both data and an agent that performs additional processing
on the data. One example is a server that sends back a data set along with an agent
that can present the data in various ways; the user can view and manipulate the data
without any further contact with the server, reducing server load and allowing much
faster response times to user actions [Kna96]. In such an application, the agent serves
the same purpose as a Java applet, which is downloaded into a Java-enabled browser
so that a Web-based application can present a complex graphical interface without
annoying delays [CH97]. Of course, the same eect can be achieved if the user installs
special client software on their machine. The need for a separate installation step,
however, makes it much more unlikely that a user will try a new Internet service or
use a service that she only needs once [Kna96]. Both mobile agents and Java applets
eliminate the installation step and allow a user to try a service with minimal eort.
Dynamic deployment. Mobile agents allow rapid development, testing and in-
stallation of distributed applications since application components can be deployed
\on-the-y" to arbitrary network sites. In addition, even after it starts execution, the
application can redeploy its components in response to changing network conditions.
Such dynamic redeployment is used in [RASS97] to ensure that an Internet \chat"
server is always located at the network position that minimizes the average latency
between it and its current clients.
Intelligent data [Kna96]. Intelligent (or active) data can be viewed as a special
form of dynamic deployment. Here the messages in some arbitrary messaging system
contain both data and the code that is needed to handle that data on the destination
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machine. Such code might be a viewer for a multimedia data type or a decompression
routine to uncompress compressed data [Kna96]. Including code in the messages
allows the destination machine to handle new data types without user eort and
makes it trivial to introduce better viewers and decompression algorithms. Two
existing systems with such active messages are (1) Safe-Tcl/MIME in which Tcl
scripts are embedded inside MIME-enabled mail messages and executed (inside a
safe execution environment) when the message is received or read [LO95] and (2)
active networks in which packets contain small code fragments that are executed on
each router [TSS+97].
Convenient paradigm. Mobile agents are a convenient paradigm for distributed
applications. First, application components can dynamically deploy themselves
throughout the network as described above. Second, mobile agents hide the communi-
cation channels but not the location of the computation [Whi94]. This makes mobile
agents easier to use than low-level facilities in which the programmer must explicitly
handle communication details, but more exible and powerful than schemes such as
process migration in which the system decides when to move a program based on a
small set of xed criteria. Third, a migrating agent needs to worry about network
failures only during migration; all resource operations are invoked locally to the re-
source. Fourth, many tasks, such as network management, information retrieval and
workow, t naturally into the jump-act-jump model of mobile agents. The agent
migrates to a machine, performs a task, migrates to a second machine, performs a
task that might be dependent on the outcome of the rst task, and so on. Finally, our
own experience with undergraduate programmers at Dartmouth suggests that mobile
agents are easier to understand than many other distributed computing paradigms. It
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has also been suggested that mobile agents move the programmer away from the rigid
client-server model to the more exible peer-peer model in which programs commu-
nicate as peers and act as either clients or servers depending on their current needs
[Coe94]. Although this is perhaps true conceptually, it does not appear to be an
inherent characteristic of mobile agents, but rather a matter of whether the program-
mer chooses to have her agents act as peers. Currently, in most of the mobile-agent
applications of which we are aware, there are clearly identiable client and server
agents, with the client agents migrating to obtain the services of the server agents.
At the same time, most mobile-agent systems provide exible, high-level communi-
cation primitives, making it relatively straightforward to implement peer-peer agents
if desired.
Summary. Although each of the advantages above is a reasonable argument for
mobile agents, it is essential to realize that for any specic application, the same
performance can be realized with other techniques [HCK95]. Such techniques in-
clude queued RPC [JTK97], higher-level server operations, application-specic query
languages, application-specic proxies within the permanent network, automated in-
stallation facilities, and active web pages that contain Java applets. Mobile agents
eliminate the need for these other techniques, however, and allow a wide range of dis-
tributed applications to be implemented easily within the same, general framework
and to exhibit extremely exible behavior in the face of changing network conditions.
For example, consider the technical report agent shown in Figure 2.1. The agent's
task is to search a distributed collection of technical reports for information relevant
to the user's query. The agent rsts asks the user to enter a free-text query. Then,
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Figure 2.1: An example application. Here a mobile agent is searching a distributed
collection of technical reports. The agent rst decides whether to move to a dynam-
ically selected proxy site. Then it decides whether to spawn child agents or simply
interact with the individual document collections from across the network.
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bandwidth, the agent will stay on the home machine. If the connection is unreliable
or of low bandwidth, such as if the home machine is a mobile device, the agent will
jump to a proxy site within the network. This initial jump reduces the use of the
poor-quality link to just the transmission of the agent and the transmission of the
complete result, allowing the agent to proceed with its task even if the link goes down.
The proxy site is dynamically selected according to the current location of the home
machine and the document collections.
Once the agent has migrated to a proxy site if desired, it must interact with the
stationary agents that serve as an interface to the technical report collections. If
these stationary agents provide high-level operations, the agent simply makes RPC-
style calls across the network (using the agent-communication mechanisms). If the
stationary agents provide only low-level operations, the agent sends out child agents
that travel to the document collections and perform the query there, avoiding the
transfer of large amounts of intermediate data. Information about the available search
operations is obtained from the same directory services that provide the location of
the document collections.1 Once the agent has the results from each child agent, it
merges and lters these results, returns to the home machine if necessary, and presents
the results to the user. Although the behavior exhibited by this agent is complex, it is
actually quite easy to implement; the decisions whether to jump and create children
involve little more than two if statements that check the information returned from
the network monitor on the home machine and the directory services. It is hard
to imagine any other technique that would allow us to provide an equally exible
implementation with the same small amount of work. More importantly, as long
as migration and the agent language are both fast enough, the agent's performance
1Chapter 9 discusses the directory services that are used in Agent Tcl.
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should be comparable to or better than that of any other technique, regardless of
the network conditions and without any application-specic support from the search
engines or proxy sites.
It is the \as long as" in the previous sentence that brings us to one of the key
challenges facing a mobile-agent system. Although migration does not need to be as
fast as a single RPC call, it must be a low-latency operation. In addition, to support
compute-intensive agents, the mobile-agent system must include languages that are
nearly as fast as compiled C. As we will see in the performance analysis section,
although Agent Tcl does not meet these performance goals yet, there is reason to
hope that it can. In other words, there is reason to hope that Agent Tcl and mobile
agents in general can realize their full potential and serve as an ecient, general




The popular denition of an agent is an intelligent software servant that either (1)
relieves the user of a routine, burdensome task such as appointment scheduling or (2)
lters the overwhelming amount of online information so that the user sees only the
information that is relevant to her current needs [Haf95, Rog95]. This denition|
due to its broadness and its ability to capture the imagination|has made \agent" a
buzzword within both the academic and commercial worlds. Applications are often
described as \agent-based" solely to draw attention or increase sales. For example,
No Hands Software once described its MagnetTM program as the \rst intelligent
agent for the Macintosh" even though it was essentially a le-nder [Fon93]. This
inappropriate use of the term makes it more dicult to separate hype from actual
research, but there appear to be ve legitimate research areas in which the term
\agent" is used|articial intelligence and robotics, personal assistants, distributed
information retrieval, software interoperation and mobile agents.
First, we briey consider the other kinds of agents to underscore the dierences
between non-mobile and mobile agents and to illustrate potential applications for
mobile agents.
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3.1 Other kinds of agents
3.1.1 Articial intelligence and robotics
Here an agent is an entity that perceives its environment with sensors and acts on
its environment with eectors [RN95]. Such an agent can be either hardware with
physical sensors and eectors or software with simulated sensors and eectors. This
denition of an agent is used to provide a unied framework for articial intelligence,
to discuss software artifacts from a robotics viewpoint, and of course to discuss phys-
ical robots. This denition is not considered further except to note that it subsumes
the denitions below.
3.1.2 Personal assistants
Here an agent is a program that relieves the user of a routine, burdensome task such
as appointment scheduling or e-mail disposition. These agents are distinguished from
traditional utilities by (1) their use of machine learning so that they can adapt to
user habits and preferences [Mae94] or (2) their use of automated reasoning so that
they can make complex inferences about the work environment [Rie94].
Maes presents a series of agents that start with a minimum amount of domain
knowledge and learn how to perform the task by observing and interacting with the
user and other agents [Mae94]. The mail agent, for example, uses memory-based
reasoning to lter electronic mail. It remembers every situation-action pair that
occurs when the user lters her mail manually. When a new situation occurs, the
agent predicts what action should be taken by comparing the new situation with
the nearest memorized neighbors. Depending on its condence in the prediction, the
agent will perform the action itself, suggest the action to the user, or do nothing.
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In addition to learning from example, the agent accepts directives from the user and
solicits suggestions from other mail agents.
Riecken has developed a more complex system called M that uses ve inference
engines1 to automatically group the documents that are presented during the course
of a virtual multimedia conference [Rie94]. The inference engines infer relationships
among the documents based on the actions that the users apply to them. For example,
if two documents are placed close together within the virtual conference room, the
spatial engine might conclude that the documents deal with the same subject. The
engines post their conclusions to a dynamic set of blackboards and use the conclusions
of the other engines to continue the reasoning process. Eventually one theory about
document relationships emerges as the most likely.
A mobile-agent system should be able to support these applications in a dis-
tributed setting. At a minimum this means that mobile agents should be able to
easily access external resources that provide learning and reasoning capabilities.
3.1.3 Distributed information retrieval
Here an agent is a program that searches multiple information resources for the an-
swer to a user query. Typically the resources contain large volumes of data and are
distributed across a network of heterogeneous machines. In addition, the agents are
characterized by (1) the use of knowledge-intensive techniques to avoid manual in-
tervention or brute-force search and, in some cases, (2) the concurrent execution of
multiple subsearches and communication of partial results from one subsearch to the
others. The partial results from one subsearch are used to narrow the scope of other
subsearches.
1functional, structural, causal, spatial and temporal
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Etzioni and Weld present a softbot that accepts a request and then develops a
plan that satises the request using available Internet resources [EW94]. Softbot
stands for \software robot" and arises from the articial intelligence denition above.
In this case, the sensors are Internet resources such as archie, gopher and netnd,
and the eectors are resources such as ftp, telnet and mail. The softbot encodes its
knowledge of these resources as declarative logic. It accepts requests expressed in
a subset of rst-order logic and performs a standard backtracking search to develop
an appropriate plan. The example softbot in [EW94] uses a combination of Internet
resources to resolve underspecied e-mail addresses when sending messages.
Vesser has written a succession of papers that develop a model for distributed
searching. One of the more recent is [OPL94], which recasts the model in terms of
agents. In the model a search involving multiple distributed resources is performed
by a collection of cooperating agents. Each agent is responsible for searching one
resource and communicating partial search results to the other agents so that the
other agents can refocus their search. The standard example is a vacation planner that
searches multiple databases| weather, car rental, hotel and \places of interest"|to
plan an appropriate vacation for the user. Each agent searches its assigned resource
independently but uses partial results from the other agents to adjust its search
criteria when needed. For example, the place agent might assume good weather
initially, but then redo portions of its search when the weather agent tells it that bad
weather is forecast for a particular area. Eventually the agents arrive at a consistent
vacation plan.
These examples do not demand a particular implementation. Indeed the search
could run entirely at a single site and simply invoke the necessary remote services.
Mobile agents allow a straightforward and ecient implementation, however; mobile
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agents could be dispatched to each resource site and then could communicate partial
results and redo their searches without the involvement of the home site (and the
corresponding network trac).
3.1.4 Software interoperation
Here an agent is a program that communicates correctly in a universal communi-
cation language. Since all agents use the same communication language, an agent
can interoperate with any other agent, regardless of their underlying implementation.
This denition of an agent is closely related to agent-based software engineering in
which applications are implemented as a collection of autonomous, cooperating peers.
There are two approaches to agent-based interoperation|procedural and declarative.
In the procedural approach, agents exchange procedural directives. The recipient
agent executes the directives to perform some task on behalf of the sender. Most ex-
isting systems that use the procedural approach are based around high-level scripting
languages. An application is sent a script that guides the application through the de-
sired task. Notable examples of the script-based approach include Tcl, AppleScript,
Hewlett-Packard's NewWave environment and the Autonomous Knowledge Agents
(AKA) project [GK94, Joh93].
Genesereth [GK94] points out several disadvantages of the procedural approach.
Writing procedures might require information about the recipient that is not available
to the sender; procedures only compute in one direction; and procedures are dicult
to merge. Instead Genesereth argues for the declarative approach in which agents
exchange declarative statements. The recipient performs an inference process to de-
rive results from the sender's declarative statements. These declarative statements are
written in the Agent Communication Language (ACL). ACL has three components|
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a vocabulary, an inner language called the Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF), and
an outer language called the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML)
[GK94]. The vocabulary is a dictionary of words specic to the application area.
Each word has an English denition and a set of formal annotations written in KIF.
KIF is a prex version of rst-order predicate calculus that can express data, proce-
dures, and relationships among the data. The atoms of KIF are the words from the
vocabulary. A KQML expression consists of a directive followed by one or more KIF
expressions. Directives include telling an agent that a KIF expression is true, asking
an agent if a KIF expression is true, and so on.
Agents that use KQML can communicate with each other directly, but this places
the burden of interoperation squarely on the programmer. Instead Genesereth pro-
poses a federated architecture in which facilitators handle interoperation [GSS94].
Essentially each agent is assigned a facilitator. An agent communicates only with
its facilitator, but facilitators communicate with each other. Each agent posts its
capabilities and application-specic facts to its facilitator. When an agent needs in-
formation, it sends a request to its facilitator. The facilitator uses backward inference
to nd an answer to the request; typically the facilitator will invoke the services of
other agents during this process. The advantage of the facilitator approach is that
each agent communicates with single system agent that appears to handle all requests
itself. The main concern with the facilitator approach is scalability, i.e. the size of the
shared vocabulary, the cost of the inference process, and the size of the facilitator's
knowledge base. The rst problem is addressed by allowing agents to use dierent
vocabularies and providing translation features; the second and third problems are
addressed by limiting the amount and kind of information that each facilitator stores
internally.
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The federated approach is similar to directory assistance, distributed object man-
agers and automatic brokers. Directory assistance allows a program to nd a desired
service. Distributed object managers provide transparent access to a distributed col-
lection of objects; messages are automatically routed to the destination object even if
the sender does not know the object's network location. Automatic brokers provide
both functions by rst identifying an appropriate recipient for a message and then
forwarding the message. An example of directory assistance is the X.500 protocol; dis-
tributed object managers include CORBA, DSOM, OLE and OpenDoc; automatic
brokers include ToolTalk and the Publish and Subscribe Service on the Macintosh
[GK94]. The federated approach is distinguished by the amount of processing done
in the facilitator; each facilitator performs backward inference rather than simple
pattern matching. [GK94].
It is unclear whether the procedural or declarative approach is better. The pro-
cedural approach is suggested when the sender is requesting a task that the recipient
does not know how to perform in its entirety. The declarative approach is suggested
for knowledge-intensive applications in which planning and inference are required.
Mobile agents represent a hybrid approach. The mobile agents are procedures that
migrate to a remote machine so that they can execute at the location of the data, but
they do not have to communicate with procedural directives. The communication
facilities in most mobile-agent systems are exible enough to support any communi-
cation protocol, including the exchange of declarative statements. In addition, agents
can make use of external services that provide planning and inference capabilities.
There is no need to build declarative logic into the agent language.
One of these services|directory assistance, distributed object managers, auto-
matic brokers or federated inference engines|will be essential in a mobile agent
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system so that an agent can (1) nd agents that perform a needed task and (2)
communicate with agents without knowing their current network location. Since mo-
bile agents are mobile, keeping track of recipient locations without system support
would be a nearly intractable programming challenge even if all the agents came
from the same application and communicated only among themselves. Whichever
solution is adopted, it must be extended so that it performs eectively in a highly
dynamic environment. Mobile agents come into existence, change network location
and terminate continuously. These changes must be visible to other agents.
3.2 Mobile agents
A mobile agent is an autonomous program that can migrate under its own control
from machine to machine in a heterogeneous network. The history of mobile agents is
complex. Here we examine the clear forerunners to mobile agents and discuss existing
mobile-agent systems.
3.2.1 Message passing
The message-passing model provides two communication primitives: send, which
sends a message to a destination process, and receive, which receives the message.
In client/server computing, the client sends a request message to the server; the
server receives the message, handles the request and sends back a response. The
send and receive primitives can be blocking or nonblocking and synchronous or
asynchronous. Blocking means that the primitives do not return control to the caller
until the message has been successfully sent or received; nonblocking means that the
primitives return immediately. Synchronous means that the send primitive does not
return until the recipient issues a corresponding receive; asynchronous means that
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the send primitive returns as soon as the message arrives on the destination machine.
Message passing is powerful and exible, but requires the programmer to handle
low-level details, such as keeping track of which response goes with which request,
converting data between client and server formats, determining the address of the
server, and handling communication and system errors [SS94].
3.2.2 Remote procedure call (RPC)
Remote procedure call (RPC) [BN84] relieves the programmer of these details. RPC
allows a program on the client to invoke a procedure on the server using the standard
procedure call mechanism. Most RPC implementations use stub procedures [BN84,
SS94]. A client that makes a remote procedure call is actually calling a local stub.
This client stub puts the procedure name and parameters into a message and sends
the message to the remote machine. A server stub on the remote machine receives the
message, extracts the procedure name and parameters, and invokes the appropriate
procedure. The server stub waits for the procedure to nish and then sends a message
containing the result to the client stub. The client stub returns the result to the client.
The original RPC implementations blocked the client until the server returned the
result. Current RPC extensions either allow concurrent invocation of procedures on
multiple servers or make RPC asynchronous [SS94]. These variations are more exible
but make programming more dicult.
Other disadvantages of traditional RPC were described in [GG88]. It is dicult to
send incremental results from the server to the client; implementations are commonly
optimized for short results rather than bulk data transfer; and there is no way to
pass pointers or procedure references to the server. This last limitation obviates
any protocol that requires the server to invoke a client-specied procedure on the
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client machine. [GG88] addresses these problems by allowing procedure references to
be passed as arguments and introducing the pipe abstraction. A pipe is a connection
between the client and the remote procedure that exists for the duration of the remote
procedure call; incremental results and bulk data are transferred along the pipe.
3.2.3 Remote evaluation
The main problem with RPC is that the client is limited to the operations provided
at the server. Since the server often does not provide an operation that meets the
client's needs exactly, the client must make several remote procedure calls, bringing
intermediate data across the network on every call. If the intermediate data is not
useful beyond the end of the client's task, a signicant amount of network bandwidth
has been wasted. To address this problem, researchers have turned to remote eval-
uation in which a subprogram is sent from the client to the server. The subprogram
executes on the server and returns its result to the client.
Falcone [Fal87] describes a system in which clients and servers program each other
using a variant of Lisp called the Network Command Language (NCL). Each server
provides a library of NCL functions. A client that requires a service sends an NCL
expression to the appropriate server. The expression can use any functions provided
at the server or sent as part of the expression. The server evaluates the expression and
returns the result to the client. The result is an NCL expression itself and can perform
arbitrarily complex processing on the client. The NCL expression can invoke multiple
functions on either the client or server and thus avoid the overhead of multiple remote
procedure calls.
Remote evaluation (REV) is similar to NCL in that a procedure can be sent to a
remote server for evaluation [SG90]. REV, however, uses client and server stubs in
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much the same way as RPC and can be used with any language. All that is needed
for a new language is stub generators and linking facilities so that the procedure can
invoke the operations provided at the server. The procedure can be transmitted as
source, intermediate or compiled code. The choice of transmission format depends on
the language, the desired level of security and the heterogeneity of the network. Sta-
mos and Giord identify four security concerns|authentication, availability, secrecy
and integrity. Authentication and availability consist of verifying the identity of the
client and preventing denial of service attacks and can be addressed with standard
techniques [SG90]. Secrecy and integrity consist of preventing unauthorized access
to and destruction of server information and require more complex solutions. Sta-
mos and Giord present three solutions|separate address spaces for each procedure,
careful interpretation in a single address space, and digital signatures with a single
address space. The rst and third solutions support compiled code while the second
and third avoid the overhead of multiple address spaces. Digital signatures are an
open research area in which a program is compiled by a trusted third party. The third
party checks the program for security violations and applies a cryptographic signa-
ture to the compiled code if no security violations are present. The server knows that
certain security checks have been performed already if it receives a digitally signed
procedure. The advantage of REV over NCL is that REV can be incorporated into
any programming language, allowing the programmer to use the most appropriate
language for the application. On the other hand, NCL is symmetric since procedures
can be sent from the client to the server and from the server to the client.
The procedures in NCL and REV must be self-contained. All functions and vari-
ables referenced in the procedure must be provided at the server or included in the
procedure, making the semantics of a passed procedure dierent than that of a lo-
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cal procedure. Specically, the passed procedure cannot access functions and global
variables dened in the caller. The developers of REV and NCL were primarily con-
cerned with moving computation to a remote machine and imposed this limitation
to simplify the implementation. SUPRA-RPC (SUbprogram PaRAmeters in Remote
Procedure Calls), on the other hand, seeks to allow normal procedure call seman-
tics for both local and passed procedures [Sto94]. Essentially SUPRA-RPC extends
REV with additional stubs that are invoked whenever the procedure references an
out-of-scope variable or function. The server makes a callback to the client to handle
the out-of-scope reference. SUPRA-RPC implementations exist for C, C++ and Lisp,
but the C and C++ implementations work only in a homogeneous environment, since
compiled code is passed from machine to machine.
There are several schemes that can be viewed as a domain-specic form of re-
mote evaluation. Postscript programs are often sent to remote printers and displays.
Scripting systems such as Apple Script allow scripts to be sent from one applica-
tion to another [Joh93]. MIME/Safe-Tcl allows Tcl scripts to be embedded in e-mail
messages; the scripts are executed automatically when the message is received or
viewed [LO95]. The IBM Intelligent Communications Network uses Intelligent Ob-
jects that contain both data and procedures and can be sent from one application
to another; the recipient application can execute the embedded procedures [Rei94].
The Decode-Encode language (DEL) allowed an emulator for one terminal type to be
transparently downloaded into a dierent terminal type [Rul69]. The Wit and Wit
2 systems send interface code from a Unix server onto a palmtop device to minimize
use of a poor-quality wireless link [Wat95]. Some database systems allow a user to
dene complex SQL commands and store these commands on a server; the stored
commands are executed at the server end during a user transaction [BP88]. The
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Bayou lesystem allows a mobile computer to cache les and then continue access-
ing these cached les while disconnected; when the laptop reconnects, it sends a code
fragment to the lesystem server to reconcile its le changes with the permanent copy
of the le [TTP+95].
3.2.4 Java applets, Java servlets, Java RMI and JavaOS
Java applets are Java programs that are associated with a World Wide Web (WWW)
page [CW97]. When a user views the page with a Java-enabled browser, the program
is downloaded automatically and executed on the user's machine. By executing on
the browser's machine, the program can present a complex, graphical interface and
react rapidly to user actions, since there are no network delays. Untrusted applets are
executed in a secure Java interpreter so that they can not access or destroy sensitive
information. The Metis thin-client framework can be viewed as a generalization of
Java applets; here an arbitrary client downloads an application front-end written in
Java, which then nds and interacts with one or more network services to realize the
complete application [ZPMD97]. Other systems support applets that are written in
other languages. The Grail web browser2 from CNRI, for example, executes applets
written in Python, while the Tcl plugin3 from Sun Microsystems executes applets
written in Tcl/Tk.
Java servlets are Java programs that can be dynamically loaded into an executing
Java-enabled web server, such as Sun Microsystem's Web Java Server 1.0 [Cha96].
Java servlets allow rapid introduction of new server functionality and are more ecient
than CGI scripts, since there is no startup overhead on each access. Like untrusted




not access or destroy sensitive information.
The Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) subsystem allows Java objects on dif-
ferent machines to invoke each other's methods [WRW96, RWWB96]. It also provides
state serialization and unserialization facilities for transferring a Java object from one
machine to another. Most Java-based distributed systems, including mobile-agent
systems in which the agents are written in Java, use RMI for communication.
Finally, JavaOS is a lightweight operating system that executes Java programs
directly [Mad96]. It is targeted towards mass-market devices such as set-top boxes,
telephones and network computers, which have limited storage facilities and need to
download applications from the network as needed.
3.2.5 Inferno
Inferno is a lightweight, networked operating system from Lucent Technologies that
is also targeted towards mass-market devices such as set-top boxes, telephones and
network computers [Luc96]. Inferno is Lucent's answer to Java and JavaOS.4 An
Inferno application consists of a set of modules written in a C-like language called
Limbo; the modules are compiled into the bytecodes for a RISC-like virtual machine
and then downloaded on demand to an Inferno platform. Once downloaded, the
modules are compiled \on-the-y" into native code; execution speed is within a factor
of two of natively compiled code. Limbo is not a safe language so modules are digitally
signed by trusted authorities. Like most operating systems, however, Inferno itself
prevents unauthorized access to system resources.
4The Inferno development group would disagree with this statement since they view Inferno as




Mobile agents extend REV and applets by allowing a program to (1) move through a
sequence of machines, carrying its current state along with it, and (2) communicate
easily with other such moving programs. The recent popularity of mobile code has
led to an explosion in the number of mobile-agent systems. Here we describe a few
representative systems in detail and mention other systems briey.
Kali Scheme [CJK95]. Kali Scheme is an extension of Scheme 48 [KR95],
which is an ecient, multi-threaded Scheme implementation based around a bytecode
interpreter. Kali Scheme provides a distributed set of address spaces in which the
threads execute. New threads can be spawned in either local or remote address spaces,
and an existing thread can be migrated from one address space to another, continuing
in the new address space from the point at which it left o. When spawning a new
thread, Kali Scheme transmits the closure that contains the desired computation;
when migrating an existing thread, Kali Scheme transmits the current continuation
of that thread. Since continuations can be extremely large, Kali Scheme divides the
continuation into frames and initially transmits only the rst few frames to the target
address space. Other frames are fetched from the source machine if and when needed.
In addition to migration, Kali Scheme allows two threads to exchange arbitrary data
objects, and allows a thread to refer to a data object in a dierent address space via
a proxy object. Kali Scheme does not address security issues, since these issues are
orthogonal to the author's main goal of providing distributed-computing abstractions
within a higher-order language such as Scheme. Kali Scheme's main weakness is
that the implementation is Scheme specic (and, in fact, is contained entirely within
the Scheme 48 virtual machine itself), preventing any straightforward extension to
additional languages.
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Messengers [TDiMMH94, DiMMTH95, Tsc94]. A messenger is a message
that contains both data and code. A server on each host accepts incoming messengers
and executes each messenger's code within its own thread. Colocated messengers
communicate with each other through a shared dictionary of key/value pairs and
synchronize their actions through process queues.5 A messenger can spawn new mes-
sengers and can move through the network by transmitting itself from one machine
to another. When moving to a new machine, the messenger restarts execution at a
specied entry point in its code, and must decide what to do next based on its current
state. A messenger's code can be written in either M or Scheme; M is similar to
Postscript except that it has migration and communication commands rather than
graphics commands. Messengers are a lightweight mobile-code mechanism and are
intended for use in communication protocols and distributed operating systems; in
both cases, the protocol and operating system components are dynamically deployed,
rather than pre-installed. The Messengers system does not address most security
issues, but the Messengers group is working on market-based approaches for fairly
allocating resources among competing messengers [Tsc97].
Obliq [Car95, BC95, BN97]. Obliq is an interpreted, lexically scoped, object-
oriented language. An Obliq object is a collection of named elds that contain meth-
ods, aliases and values. An object can be created at a remote site, cloned onto a
remote site, or migrated with a combination of cloning and redirection. Implement-
ing mobile agents on top of these mobile objects is straightforward. An agent consists
of a user-dened procedure that takes a briefcase as its argument; the briefcase con-
tains the objects that the procedure needs to perform its task. The agent migrates
5Only the messenger at the head of the queue is allowed to execute. All other messengers in the
queue are blocked until the rst messenger puts itself onto the end of the queue.
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by moving its procedure and current briefcase to the target machine; the target ma-
chine invokes the procedure, which examines the briefcase to decide what to do next.
Obliq includes an interface toolkit called Visual Obliq that a migrating agent uses
to interact with a user. When the agent migrates, the current state of its displayed
interface is captured and recreated exactly on the target machine; although this is an
interesting feature, its usefulness is unclear, since it is dicult to imagine an appli-
cation in which the agent could not easily recreate the display itself. Obliq does not
address security issues.
Omniware [LSW95, ATLLW96]. Omniware code is written in C++ (or any
other language for which an appropriate compiler exists), compiled for a RISC-like
virtual machine, and later sent to a destination machine where it is converted into
native code. Software fault isolation, which essentially adds a range check to every
memory access, prevents the native code from corrupting the execution environment
[WLAG93]. With this arrangement, Omniware provides portable, secure code that is
only 25 percent slower than natively compiled C/C++ on average [LSW95]. There-
fore, although Omniware is not a general mobile-agent system itself, it or a similar
execution environment is likely to nd its way into most mobile-agent systems so that
these systems can support compute-intensive applications. Omniware could even be
the only execution environment, since the interpreters for agents written in other lan-
guages could be compiled for the Omniware virtual machine and sent as needed to
the destination machines [LSW95].
Sumatra [RASS97, RAS96]. Sumatra is an extension to Java [CW97] that
supports both distributed objects and mobile code. One or more instances of the
Sumatra execution engine run on each machine.6 Each engine hosts one or more
6The Sumatra execution engine is just the extended Java interpreter.
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threads and their objects. Each object can be either independent or part of a partic-
ular object group. A program can move an object group (along with the associated
Java bytecodes) from one engine to another, invoke the methods of an object in a
dierent engine7, create a new thread in a dierent engine, and migrate an executing
thread from one engine to another. When migrating an object group, every local
reference to a group object is converted into a proxy reference that will transparently
redirect method invocations to the actual object. When migrating a thread, Suma-
tra captures and transfers the Java stack along will all non-group objects that are
reachable from the stack; references to group objects are turned into proxy references
on the target machine.8 Sumatra's most notable feature, and its main research fo-
cus, is a set of distributed resource monitors that measure network latency, network
bandwidth and machine load; an agent queries these resource monitors and combines
current network conditions with its own knowledge of its task to decide if and when
to migrate objects and threads. Sumatra does not provide any security mechanisms
aside from those already present in Java. Similar to Kali Scheme, its main weakness
is that the implementation is Java-specic (and in fact is contained entirely within
the Java virtual machine), once again preventing any straightforward extension to
additional languages.
Tacoma [JvRS95, JvRS96, MvRSS96, Knu95], Tacoma Too [Sch97a],
and security automata [Sch97b] . Tacoma (Troms and COrnell Moving Agents)
is a mobile-agent system that supports numerous agent languages, including Tcl,
Scheme, Perl, Python, Java and C. Each agent and machine has a briefcase or le
7Sumatra was developed before Java's Remote Method Invocation (RMI) package became avail-
able. Thus Sumatra has its own remote invocation facility.
8The idea is that an object group might be providing a service to multiple client threads; the
service should remain stationary even though its client threads are moving from machine to machine.
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cabinet of folders that contain both data and procedures. Aside from folders and
their containers, the single abstraction in Tacoma is the meet operation, which an
agent uses to request a service from another agent. During the meet operation,
the requesting agent passes a briefcase to the target agent; this briefcase contains
the arguments for the request. The target agent returns a folder of results to the
requesting agent if necessary. All other services in Tacoma are provided by other
agents. For example, an agent migrates to a remote machine by passing a briefcase
containing its code and state to the tac firewall agent on the remote machine.
The agent does not continue execution from the point at which it left o; instead the
tac firewall agent restarts the incoming agent by calling some specied entry point.
Although this migration mechanism requires more programmer eort, both to capture
the desired state information and to ensure that the appropriate task is performed
on each machine, there is no need to have state-capture routines built into the agent
languages themselves. In combination with the simplicity of the meet abstraction, the
ability to use unmodied interpreters allows the rapid integration of new languages
into Tacoma. Important features of Tacoma are \rear-guard" agents, electronic cash,
brokers, and its use of the Horus toolkit for reliable group communication. A rear-
guard agent is left behind whenever an agent migrates to a new machine; this rear
guard restarts the agent if the agent \vanishes" due to a machine failure [JvRS95].
Electronic cash is used to pay for services and to prevent runaway agents.9 In addition,
agents can be digitally signed and encrypted, and the tac firewall agent can be
instructed to reject agents that came from unauthorized users. Broker agents provide
directory services. Most of these features are not available in the public release.
9Runaway agents are impossible since an agent cannot continue once its nancial reserves are
exhausted.
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Tacoma Too is a version of Tacoma that is based around the ML language [Sch97a].
Tacoma Too has the samemeet abstraction as Tacoma and is being used in a prototype
active network. An oshoot of the Tacoma Too project is concerned with securely
executing Java agents using software fault isolation and security automata [Sch97b]. A
security automata enforces a security policy and is similar to a nite-state automata.
Transitions between states correspond to agent actions. A security exception is raised
if an agent attempts an action for which the current state has no outgoing transition.
For example, suppose that an agent is allowed to communicate with its home machine
only if it has not read from a certain le. Then the initial state in the security
automata would have two transitions: (1) communicating with the home machine,
which simply loops back to the initial state, and (2) reading from the le, which leads
to a second state. The second state would have one transition: (1) reading from the
le, which simply loops back to the second state. Thus, if an agent reads from the le
and then attempts to communicate with the home machine, the security automata
will raise a security exception, since the second state has no outgoing transition for
communicating with the home machine. Tacoma Too is also exploring various forms
of proof-carrying code [Sch97b].
Telescript [Whi94, Whi95b, Whi95a, Whi96] and Odyssey [Gen97]. Tele-
script, later marketed as part of the Tabriz web-server package, was the rst commer-
cial mobile-agent system. It was developed at General Magic, Inc., and was primarily
used in the AT&T PersonaLink network. In Telescript, each network site is divided
into one or more virtual places, much like the address spaces of Kali Scheme and the
multiple execution engines of Sumatra. Telescript agents are written in an impera-
tive, object-oriented language that is similar to both Java and C++; this language is
compiled into virtual-machine bytecodes. A Telescript agent uses the go command to
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migrate from one place to another, continuing execution from the point at which it
left o. An agent can interact with other agents in two ways. The agent canmeet with
an agent that is in the same place; the two agents receive references to each other's
objects and communicate by invoking each other's methods. In addition, an agent
can connect to a remote agent; the two agents pass objects along the connection.
Each network site runs a Telescript server that maintains the places at the site
and executes incoming agents. The engine continuously writes the internal state
of executing agents to nonvolatile store so that the agents can be restored after a
node failure. The engine also provides two security mechanisms. First, each agent
carries cryptographic credentials that the place uses to authenticate the identity of
the agent's owner. Second, each agent carries a set of permits that give it the right
to use certain Telescript instructions and certain amounts of available resources. One
permit, for example, might specify a maximum agent lifetime or a maximum amount
of disk space. Each engine and place impose their own permits on incoming agents
to prevent these agents from taking malicious action. Agents that attempt to violate
the conditions of their permits are terminated immediately [Whi94]. Despite the fact
that until recently Telescript was one of the most secure, fault-tolerant, and ecient
mobile-agent systems, is has been withdrawn from the market, mainly because it was
overwhelmed by the rapid spread of Java. The AT&T PersonaLink network is also
defunct.
Odyssey is General Magic's replacement for Telescript. It is essentially the same
system except that it is implemented entirely in Java. One notable exception is that
Odyssey does not have the go instruction, since Java does not provide facilities for
capturing an executing program's complete state, making it impossible to implement
the go instruction without modifying the Java virtual machine. General Magic decided
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that a modied virtual machine would prevent the widespread acceptance and use of
Odyssey. Thus, although an Odyssey agent does carry all of its objects along with
it, it must either restart execution on the destination machine or follow an itinerary
in which specic methods are executed at specic destinations. In the rst case, the
agent examines the current state of its objects to decide what to do next. In the
latter case, the agent system automatically invokes the correct method; the agent
species its itinerary before its rst migration and can modify the itinerary at any
time. Like Sumatra, Odyssey is intimately tied to the Java language with no clear
way to integrate additional languages. General Magic is not selling Odyssey; instead
they are using it as a key internal component of their new personal messaging service.
Other Java-based systems. The IBM Aglets system [LO97] is one of the more
complete commercial oerings. It provides authentication and access control, a glob-
ally unique namespace, whiteboards and message passing, and a simple management
environment. IBM Aglets is extremely similar to the Odyssey system, and, in fact,
the developer of IBM Aglets now works in the Odyssey group at General Magic.
The Liquid Software project [HMPP96] has two goals: (1) use mobile agents to
eciently solve large-scale information-retrieval problems and (2) develop a \gigabit"
compiler that can verify and compile an intermediate code representation as fast
as it arrives over the network, producing ecient, secure native code while hiding
the compilation latency. To explore potential solutions, the project members are
building a prototype system that runs on top of the Scout operating system and
uses Java bytecodes as the intermediate code representation. The prototype will also
address security issues and the granularity of the interface between the agents and
the underlying operating system.
The evolving Mobile Objects and Agents (MOA) system is a CORBA-based sys-
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tem in which both static and active Java objects10 can move from one machine to
another [CMB96, MBZM96]. CORBA is a distributed-object manager that already
provides object naming, object location and remote invocation [YD96]. MOA builds
on CORBA to provide object persistence, a hierarchical object cache, and a location-
independent name service that uses URL's. In addition, MOA conforms to the new
Mobile Agent Facility (MAF) standard [MAF97]. MOA is currently used in the Dis-
tributed Client project in which an application is partitioned into client-side and
network-side components; these components cooperate when the network is available
but continue operation even when the network is disconnected, presenting previously
retrieved data to the user and nding additional data to send back to the user as soon
as the network reconnects [MBZM96]. MOA will eventually enforce access restric-
tions according to the mobile object's owner, its current requirements, and possibly
its past migration history.
FTP Software's CyberAgents provided a visual editor, a visual agent manager,
some debugging tools, OLE and HTML support, and extensive logging and report-
generation facilities [FTP96]. FTP Software no longer sells CyberAgents, but a ver-
sion of CyberAgents that uses the TRAC language (rather than Java) is used in some
of FTP Software's network management tools [Gre97a].
Other Java-based systems include Mole [SBH96, BHR+97], Concordia [Mit97a,
WPW+97], Voyager [Voy97], and Wasp [Fun97]. The Mole project is focusing on
security mechanisms for protecting an agent from a malicious machine, while the
Wasp project is concerned with integrating mobile agents with Web servers. Voyager
and Concordia are commercial systems. Concordia is similar to Odyssey and IBM
Aglets, while Voyager combined mobile code with a full-featured Object Request
10An active object is an object with its own thread of control.
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Broker (ORB).
Other systems. There are many other mobile-agent systems, most of which
provide minimal security. Ara agents are written in Tcl or C++ (which is compiled
into an interpreted bytecode called MACE) and can migrate at any point during
their execution; Ara allows an agent to checkpoint its state to disk and enforces
limits on CPU time and memory usage, but does not yet protect resources such as
the lesystem and network [PS97, Pei96]. The Ara group is currently implementing
additional security mechanisms (such as digital signatures and access restrictions for
all system resources) and adding support for the Java language.
Tripathi and Karnik propose a mobile-agent system that uses CORBA as its low-
est layer [TK93]. The proposed Distributed Internet Execution Environment (Dixie)
will combine the Prospero le system, the Tk toolkit, and interpreters for several
languages into a virtual operating system that accepts and executes applications sent
from other hosts [Gai94]; little implementation work had been done at the time of
this writing, however. The Frankfurt Mobile Agents Infrastructure (MAIN) [LDD95]
allows agents written in Tcl to migrate and communicate using the standard HTTP
protocol; their agent server is a modied HTTP server.
Intelligent routers are written in an interpreted expression language called MPL.1
and can migrate from machine to machine with a moveto instruction; a version of the
router system that runs on homogeneous machines uses ISIS to detect and recover
from node failures and other faults [WVF89, Voo91]. IBM Itinerant Agents is a
proposed system that focuses on knowledge-based routing of service requests and
security issues [CGH+95]; it is not under active development and has given way to the
more recent IBM Aglets system [LO97]. LogicWare [Log96] supports collaborative
applications through an active object space; this object space can include mobile
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agents called Mubots that move from machine to machine in response to changing
network conditions and the location of the participants.
Agents in the MESSENGERS11 system are written in C, compiled into machine-
independent assembly code, and then interpreted at each node; the agents construct
a logical network on top of the physical network as they execute [BFD96]. Mobile
Service Agents (MSA) are written in an extended version of the functional program-
ming language Facile; an MSA agent spawns a new agent by submitting a closure
containing data and one or more functions [TLKC95, Kna96].
The Rover toolkit combines relocatable objects,12 queued remote-procedure-calls
(QRPC) and stable logging of object state to support fault recovery; although Rover
is primarily used in disconnected or partially connected client-server computing, it
can be used with some eort as a more general mobile-agent system [JdT+95, JTK97,
JK96]. The Smart Messages system [HCS97] associates one or more reactive planners
with each application-level message; the reactive planners are activated whenever the
message is queued somewhere within the network and allow the message to control
its own routing, ltering and error recovery.
SodaBot agents are written in a very high-level language called SodaBotl that pro-
vides threads, an interface toolkit, location-independent communication primitives,
and both automatic code distribution and an explicit hop operation; SodaBot agents
execute in a restricted execution environment that limits the agent's total lifetime and
prevents unauthorized access to the lesystem and external programs [Coe94]. The
Tube is similar to Kali Scheme in that agents are written in Scheme, execute inside
multithreaded servers, and create new agents and migrate from machine to machine
11The MESSENGERS system is not the same as the Messengers system that was described in
more detail above. They were developed independently at dierent universities.
12The methods in a Rover object are implemented in the Tcl scripting language for portability.
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by transferring a closure or continuation respectively; in addition, the Tube uses a
safe Scheme interpreter and includes noticeboards, a user-interface toolkit, a service
registry, an event system, continuous media streams, and a unique form of RPC in
which the server sends the client stubs to the client [HBB96].
WAVE represents the ultimate extension of the mobile-agent paradigm with ev-
ery application implemented as a \wave" of extremely compact, lightweight agents
that recursively spread themselves through a virtual network13; although WAVE is
syntactically awkward and demands a highly recursive programming style, it has
been used eectively in several applications, including distributed simulation, net-
work management, and distributed database retrieval [Sap96]. [KK94] implements a
simple mobile-agent system in which the agents are written in a scripting language
similar to AWK and migrate from machine to machine with a moveto instruction;
this system was the forerunner to Agent Tcl here at Dartmouth.
3.3 Safe languages
Finally, there are several interpreted languages where either the language itself or
specic interpreters provide security features that are attractive in mobile-agent sys-
tems; these security features range from restricted namespaces to bytecode verica-
tion. Such languages include Java [CH97], Scheme 48 [KR95], Tcl [Ous94, OLW97],
Lua [dIC96], and Python [Lut96], as well as Obliq [Car95] and Telescript [Whi94],
which were specically designed for mobile objects or agents. Except for Lua, all of
these languages are used in at least one mobile-agent system.
13As in the MESSENGERS system, the virtual network is mapped onto a physical network with
one or more virtual nodes per physical node. This mapping makes it easy to run the same application




Existing mobile-agent systems can be compared along several axes.
Research versus commercial. Aside from Telescript [Whi94], most mobile-agent
systems were strictly research projects until about two years ago. Since then, the
number of commercial systems has increased dramatically and now includes Odyssey
[Gen97], IBM Aglets [LO97], Concordia [WPW+97], Voyager [Voy97] and Omniware
[LSW95]. As the reader might expect, commercial systems provide much better
administration and development tools than research systems. In addition, all com-
mercial systems provide sucient security mechanisms to protect a machine from
malicious agents. Otherwise the system could not be used in an open network en-
vironment and would never achieve commercial success. Research systems usually
ignore administration, auditing and development tools, and often ignore security if
security is orthogonal to the main research interest (such as the use of a high-order
language in distributed computing [CJK95]). Agent Tcl is entirely a research project,
but does provide sucient security mechanisms to protect a machine from malicious
agents and also includes a full-featured debugger and a simple visual programming en-
vironment. Aside from the debugger and visual programming environment, however,
there are no administration or development tools.
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Languages. Nearly all mobile-agent systems use imperative languages, most no-
tably C/C++ [LSW95, JvRS95, PS97, BFD96], Java [Gen97, LO97, RASS97, HMPP96,
CMB96, SBH96], and various scripting languages [JvRS95, PS97, JdT+95, Coe94].
Functional languages such as Scheme are used only in a few research systems [CJK95,
HBB96, TLKC95]. Java is the most popular imperative language and is used in every
commercial system and several research systems. There are three reasons for Java's
popularity: (1) its virtual machine architecture makes programs both portable and
ecient, (2) its existing security features allow the safe execution of untrusted code,
and (3) it enjoys unprecedented market penetration, mainly due to its use in active
web pages. Agent Tcl supports both imperative and functional languages, namely
Java, Tcl and Scheme, allowing the programmer to pick the language that is most
appropriate for his task.
Interpreters versus native code. Currently, for reasons of portability and secu-
rity, nearly all mobile-agent systems either interpret their languages directly, or com-
pile their languages into bytecodes for some virtual machine and then interpret the
bytecodes. Agent Tcl is no exception. Tcl is interpreted directly; Java and Scheme are
both compiled into bytecodes for a virtual machine.1 Due to the widespread recogni-
tion that agents must execute at near-native speed to be competitive with traditional
distributed-computing techniques in certain applications, however, several researchers
are experimenting with \on-the-y" compilation. The agent is initially compiled into
some intermediate code representation but then is compiled into native code on each
machine that it visits, either as soon as it arrives [LSW95, HMPP96] or while it is
executing [HMPP96]. When the entire agent is compiled upon arrival, software fault
isolation (SFI) is typically used to prevent the native code from corrupting the execu-
1Agent Tcl uses Scheme 48, an implementation of Scheme based around a virtual machine[KR95].
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tion environment and violating security constraints [LSW95]. Software-fault-isolated
native code runs only 25 percent slower than natively compiled code [LSW95]; more-
over \gigabit" compilers will be able to compile the agent as fast as it arrives over
the network, completely hiding the compilation time [HMPP96]. Although Agent Tcl
will eventually use \on-the-y" compilation, either with Java or some other language,
we have no immediate implementation plans, preferring instead to do a much more
extensive round of performance analysis rst.
Migration. Dierent mobile-agent systems provide dierent migrationmechanisms.
Two distinct migration models can be identied:
 jump. The system provides a primitive operation called jump that automatically
captures the executing agent's complete state and sends this state to a new
machine; the new machine restores the state and the agent continues execution
from the exact point of the jump. [Whi94]. Systems that use the jump migration
model include Agent Tcl, Kali Scheme [CJK95], and Telescript [Whi94].
 known entry point. The system moves the variables and methods of the agent to
the new machine, and then restarts agent execution at some specied method
[LO97]. With an object-oriented language, the typical system automatically
captures the complete state of all existing objects [LO97]; with other languages,
the typical system requires the programmer to explicitly assemble a package
of variables and methods [JvRS95]. To ease the burden on the programmer,
many systems allow the agent to follow a pre-established itinerary, which spec-
ies a list of machines and the method that should be executed on each one
[LO97, Gen97]. All commercial systems use the known entry point model with
an itinerary, simply because all commercial systems use Java, which cannot
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support the jump model without modications to the standard virtual ma-
chine. Every system that supports the jump model also supports the known
entry point model.
In addition to these two migration models, many systems that use object-oriented
languages allow an agent to move an individual object to a remote machine and then
invoke that object's methods; the object does not have its own thread of control
[LO97, Gen97, Car95, RASS97].
Which of the two migration models is best remains unclear. The jump model
is more convenient for the end programmer since she does not have to explicitly
check the current state and gure out what to do next at each entry point. At the
same time, the jump model requires more eort from the system developer, since the
complete state of an agent must be captured. Modifying interpreters to support this
complete state capture is time-consuming and unattractive in a commercial setting.
The ultimate success of the jump model likely rests on whether the developers of
popular mobile-agent languages such as Tcl and Java can be convinced to add the
necessary state capture routines to their interpreters. Agent Tcl uses modied Tcl,
Scheme and Java interpreters and supports both migration models.
Communication. Communication mechanisms break down in two ways: low-level
versus high-level, and location-dependent versus location-independent. For example,
IBM Aglets provides messages, byte streams, and remote method invocation [LO97],
while Tacoma provides the single meet operation [JvRS95]. Tacoma requires a sender
to know the current machine of the recipient [JvRS95], while IBM Aglets provides
a globally unique namespace [LO97]. There has been wide disagreement over which
communication mechanisms are best for mobile agents. Our viewpoint is simple:
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low-level mechanisms are too low-level for many agents, forcing the programmer to
reinvent the desired protocol, while high-level mechanisms are too high-level for many
others, forcing the programmer to either accept unnecessary overhead or communicate
outside the agent framework. Thus, Agent Tcl provides bytestreams, message passing,
and location-independent addresses at its lowest level. Higher-level protocols are
implemented at the agent level; currently Agent Tcl implements an RPC protocol
and a simple speech-act protocol that will be replaced with KQML.
Security. Existing mobile-agent systems focus on protecting an individual machine
from malicious agents (or a group of machines that are under single administrative
control) [Whi94, Gen97, PS97]. Typically the agent's owner or sending machine dig-
itally signs the agent; the receiving machine veries the digital signature, accepts
or rejects the agent based on its signature, assigns access restrictions to the agent
based on its signature and migration history, and then executes the agent in a se-
cure execution environment that enforces the restrictions. Aside from encrypting an
agent in transit and allowing an agent to authenticate the destination machine before
migrating, most existing systems do not provide any protection for the agent or for
a group of machines that are not under single administrative control.2 One notable
exception is Tacoma which uses rear guard agents to regenerate agents that suddenly
disappear, various replication and voting schemes to handle malicious machines that
provide incorrect information, and electronic cash to prevent an agent from living
forever [JvRS95, MvRSS96]; these mechanisms are only a fraction of a complete so-
lution. Agent Tcl is in the same state as other mobile-agent systems, successfully
2A machine might insert new code into an agent, modify the agent's state, terminate the agent,
or reroute the agent to a new destination; an agent might migrate forever between two machines or
send one child agent to every machine on the Internet.
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protecting a machine from malicious agents, but not yet protecting an agent from
malicious machines or a group of machines that are not under unied control.
Fault tolerance. Most systems provide only a nonvolatile store so that agents
can live past machine failure [Whi94]. Tacoma, however, provides rear guard agents
that restart vanished agents [JvRS95]. In addition, the same voting and replication
schemes that allow Tacoma to partially handle malicious machines also allow agents to
continue with their task even if one or more copies of a desired service are unavailable.
Fault tolerance was not addressed in the initial phase of the Agent Tcl project, and
Agent Tcl currently provides no fault-tolerance mechanisms, although a nonvolatile
store is slowly being integrated.
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Chapter 5
Implementation { Base system
5.1 Overview
Agent Tcl has four main goals:
 Reduce migration to a single instruction, jump, and allow this instruction to
occur at arbitrary points. The instruction should capture the complete state
of the agent and transparently send this state to the destination machine. The
programmer should not have to explicitly collect state information, and the
system should hide all transmission details, even if the destination machine is
a mobile computer that is temporarily disconnected or has changed its network
address.
 Provide communication mechanisms that are exible, ecient and low-level,
but that hide all transmission details, including whether the agents are on the
same or dierent machines. These mechanisms should be on the level of mes-
sage queues or byte streams. Higher-level mechanisms, such as remote method
invocation (RMI), whiteboards and KQML, should not be implemented in the
base system itself, but rather at the agent-level on top of the lower-level mech-
anisms. This layered approach allows cooperating agents to use the communi-
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cation mechanism that is most appropriate for their task, either one of the base
mechanisms or a higher-level mechanism available through a communication-
services agent. Providing only a higher-level mechanism in the base system
would force many agents to t their communication into an inappropriate pro-
tocol or to communicate outside of the agent framework, which impose se-
vere eciency and portability penalties respectively.1 At the same time, if a
higher-level mechanism such as RMI is used heavily, it can be moved into the
base system alongside the lower-level mechanisms. For example, all Java-only
mobile-agent systems provide RMI in the base system, since it is one of the
most eective ways for object-oriented Java programs to communicate.
 Use a high-level scripting language as the main agent language and TCP/IP as
the main transport mechanism, but support multiple languages and transport
mechanisms, and allow the straightforward addition of a new language or trans-
port mechanism. Multiple languages are particularly important since, although
a high-level scripting language such as Tcl is appropriate for many agents, it is
ill-suited for agents that require large amounts of code or that perform speed-
critical tasks.
 Provide eective security and fault-tolerance in the uncertain world of the In-
ternet.
1It is surprising how many projects not only make this mistake but go out of their way to criticize
those systems that do provide lower-level mechanisms. The mistake and criticism seems to arise from
considering only a limited set of applications and from the misconception that providing only lower-
level mechanisms in the base system means that all agents must use those lower-level mechanisms
directly.
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The overall goal is an ecient, robust and secure mobile-agent system that will
allow the programmer to select the most appropriate language for her task and rapidly
develop even large-scale distributed applications.
The architecture of Agent Tcl is shown in Figure 5.1. The architecture builds on
the server model of Telescript [Whi94], the multiple languages of Ara [Pei96], and
the transport mechanisms of two predecessor systems at Dartmouth [Har95, KK94].
The architecture has ve levels. The lowest level is an API for the available transport
mechanisms. The second level is a server that runs at each network site. The server
performs the following tasks:
 Status and administration. The server keeps track of the agents that are running
on its machine and answers queries about their status. The server also allows
an authorized user to suspend, resume and terminate a running agent.2
 Migration. The server accepts each incoming agent, authenticates the identity
of its owner, and passes the authenticated agent to the appropriate interpreter.
The server selects the best transport mechanism for each outgoing agent.
 Communication. The server provides a two-level namespace for agents and
allows agents to send messages to each other within this namespace. The rst
level of the namespace is the network location of the agent; the second level is a
location-unique integer that the server picks for the agent or a location-unique
symbolic name that the agent picks for itself. Location-independent namespaces
are provided at the agent level. A message is an arbitrary sequence of bytes
with no predened syntax or semantics except for two types of distinguished
2The suspend and resume operations have not been fully implemented. The next section discusses















Figure 5.1: The architecture of Agent Tcl. The ve levels consist of an API for the
available transport mechanisms, a server that accepts incoming agents and mediates
agent communication, a language-independent core, an interpreter for each supported
language, and the agents themselves.
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messages. An event message provides asynchronous notication of an important
occurrence while a connection message requests or rejects the establishment of
a meeting. A meeting is a named message stream between agents and is more
convenient and ecient than message passing (since the programmer can watch
for messages on a particular stream and the server often can hand control of the
stream to the interpreter). The server buers incoming messages, selects the
best transport mechanism for outgoing messages, and creates a named message
stream once a connection request has been accepted.
 Nonvolatile store. The server provides access to a nonvolatile store so that
agents can back up their internal state as desired. The server will restore the
agents from the nonvolatile store in the event of machine failure.3
As in Tacoma all other services are provided by agents. Such services include re-
source directories, network sensing, location-independent naming, higher-level com-
munication, and access control. The most important service agents in the imple-
mented system are resource manager agents that guard access to critical system re-
sources such as the screen, network and disk. These resource managers are discussed
in the security chapter.
The third level of the Agent Tcl architecture is a language-independent core that
connects each agent to the server. The core provides the following operations (in
cooperation with the server):
 begin and end. An agent calls the begin operation to register with the server
and the end operation to unregister. The agent can use the other agent opera-
tions only while it is registered.
3The nonvolatile store has not been fully implemented. The next section discusses the current
status of the Agent Tcl implementation.
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 jump. An agent calls the jump operation to migrate to a new machine. The
jump operation captures the complete state of the executing agent and sends
the state image to the new machine. The server on the new machine loads
the state image into the appropriate execution environment and resumes agent
execution from the point of the jump. The copy of the agent on the original
machine terminates as soon as the state image is delivered successfully to the
new machine.
 fork. The fork operation is the same as the jump operation except that it
clones the agent onto the new machine. Both copies of the agent continue
execution from the point of the fork operation.
 submit. The submit operation creates a new agent on the local or a remote
machine. The new agent is specied as a collection of language-specic objects.
A new Tcl agent, for example, is specied as an initial script and a set of Tcl
variables and procedures. A new Java agent is specied as a set of Java objects
with the method of one object designated as the agent's entry point. In all
cases, the submit operation sends the new agent to the destination machine
where it is loaded into the appropriate interpreter and executed.
name. The agent uses the name operation to register a unique symbolic name
with the local server.
send and receive. The send and receive operations allow agents to send
and receive messages. The recipient is identied by the machine on which
it is executing along with either the unique integer that its server assigned
to it or the unique symbolic name that it requested for itself with the name
operation. The send operation is asynchronous and simply delivers the message
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to the recipient's server; the server buers the message until the recipient calls
the receive operation. The send and receive operations have two variants:
one which sends a normal message and one which sends a high-priority event
message. In both cases, if an agent wants to receive messages only from certain
source agents, it can set a message mask so that only messages from those source
agents can be received. Messages from other agents are buered until the agent
resets or changes the message mask.
 meet. An agent uses the meet operation to request a meeting with another
agent. The recipient is specied in the same manner as when sending a message,
the machine plus either the unique integer or unique symbolic name. The
meet operation itself blocks until the recipient either accepts or rejects the
meeting, but the core provide several additional operations that allow an agent
to establish the meeting asynchronously.
 status. The status operation returns information about the other agents that
are executing on the local machine. It returns either a list of all agents or the
owner, sending machine, etc., for a specic agent.
 notify. The notify operation asks the server to notify the agent when some
other agent comes into existence or terminates. The notication takes the form
of a high-priority event message.
 select. The select operation allows the agent to wait for an incoming mes-
sage (either coming through the server or across a meeting) or for input on an
arbitrary le descriptor.
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 suspend, resume and force. An authorized agent uses these routines to sus-
pend, resume and terminate other agents.4
 checkpoint. An agent uses the checkpoint operation to backup its current state
to nonvolatile store.5
All of these operations are subject to authorization checks and resource limits.
These checks and limits are discussed in the security chapter. In addition, all oper-
ations that involve a remote machine, such as send and jump, block until either an
agent-specied timeout expires or the remote machine returns an acknowledgment.
Nonblocking versions of the operations are certainly useful in some agents and will
eventually be implemented; the nonblocking versions will use the standard technique
of returning a redeemable future. The core also includes a cryptographically-secure
random number generator that is used in the encryption subsystem and made avail-
able at the agent level for use in electronic-cash protocols, agent-specic encryption
and so on. Finally, if the language supports event-driven programming, the core can
be told to generate events in response to incoming messages. These events are dis-
patched during the language's event loop. Typically, an agent that uses an event loop
would not use the select operation.
The fourth level of the Agent Tcl architecture consists of one interpreter for each
supported language. We say interpreter since it is expected that most of the languages
will be interpreted due to portability and security constraints (although \just-in-
time" compilation is feasible for languages such as Java, and Omniware uses software
4The suspend and resume operations have not been fully implemented. The next section discusses
the current status of the Agent Tcl implementation.
5The checkpoint operation has not been fully implemented. The next section discusses the
current status of the Agent Tcl implementation.
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fault isolation to securely execute native code [LSW95]). Each interpreter has four
components: the interpreter itself, a security module that prevents unauthorized
access to system resources such as the le system, a state module that captures and
restores the internal state of an executing agent, and a set of stub routines that
provide access to the generic core. Adding a new language to Agent Tcl consists of
writing the security module, the state-capture module and the stub routines. The
security module does not determine access restrictions but instead ensures that an
agent does not bypass the resource managers or violate the restrictions imposed by the
resource managers. The state-capture module must provide two functions for use in
the generic core. The rst, captureState, takes an interpreter instance and constructs
a machine-independent byte sequence that represents its internal state. The second,
restoreState, takes the byte sequence and restores the internal state.
Ara, which also supports multiple languages, additionally requires each interpreter
to implement a set of scheduling operations and to allocate memory and access sys-
tems resources through functions dened in the core [PS97]. Agent Tcl does not need
the scheduling operations since it executes each agent within its own process and
relies on the underlying Unix system to schedule the processes. We hope to avoid
these scheduling operations even when we make Agent Tcl multi-threaded. In addi-
tion, instead of providing memory allocation and system access functions in the core,
Agent Tcl requires each language to implements its own security enforcement module.
Although this approach requires more coding work, the enforcement modules for our
chosen languages can be implemented without any modications to the standard lan-
guage interpreters.6 Thus, the only modications to the standard interpreters in the
6For example, the most recent version of Tcl includes Safe Tcl, which allows security checks
to be associated with dangerous commands. Similarly, Java provides a security manager class that
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current system are the addition of the state-capture routines, making it much easier
to migrate from one interpreter version to the next. For this reason, especially with
only three supported languages, we do not feel that it is worthwhile to take the Ara
approach and route all memory allocation and system access calls through the core.
As Agent Tcl matures and supports more languages, however, we will need to adopt
the Ara solution so that we do not have to reimplement the enforcement module for
each language, something that is quite time-consuming.
The top level of the Agent Tcl architecture consists of the agents themselves.
5.2 Current status
Agent Tcl currently supports three languages, Tcl, Java, and Scheme, but has not
been completely implemented.
 The Java and Scheme security modules and the Scheme state-capture module
are not complete.
 TCP/IP is the only transport mechanism.
 The nonvolatile store and the checkpoint operation have not been imple-
mented. The nonvolatile store and other fault-tolerance issues are discussed
in the future work chapter.
 The suspend and resume operations have not been implemented.
The rest of the architecture has been fully implemented. In addition, several
service agents exist, including the resource managers, a docking system that allows
performs security checks before every system access. These existing, builtin mechanisms are sucient
to implement Agent Tcl's current security model. Advantages and limitations of the current security
model are discussed further in the security chapter.
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agents to transparently migrate between mobile computers, a yellow pages directory
that allows an agent to nd an appropriate service agent through keyword search
or interface matching, a network-sensing agent that tracks current network latency,
bandwidth and connection status, and an RPC agent (and library) that allows agents
to communicate with each other with the equivalent of RPC calls. In the rest of this
chapter, we describe the Tcl, Java and Scheme subsystems. The next chapter covers
the resource managers and the other security mechanisms. Chapter 8 discusses the
other service agents mentioned above.
5.3 Agent Tcl
5.3.1 Tcl
Tcl is a high-level scripting language that was developed in 1987 and has enjoyed
enormous popularity [Wel95]. A sample Tcl program is shown in Figure 5.2. Tcl
has several advantages as a mobile-agent language. Tcl is easy to learn and use due
to its elegant simplicity and an imperative style that is immediately familiar to any
programmer. Tcl is interpreted so it is highly portable and relatively easy to make
secure. Tcl can be embedded in other applications, which allows these applications
to implement part of their functionality with mobile Tcl agents. Finally, Tcl can
be extended with user-dened commands, which makes it easy to tightly integrate
agent functionality with the rest of the language and allows a resource to provide a
package of Tcl commands that an agent uses to access the resource. A package of
Tcl commands is more ecient than encapsulating the resource within an agent and
is an attractive alternative in certain applications.
Tcl has several disadvantages. Since Tcl is a high-level interpreted language, it
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proc factorial n {
set product 1
for {set i 2} {$i <= n} {incr i} {





set fac [factorial $n]
Figure 5.2: A Tcl script that computes the factorial of a given number n
is much slower than native machine code. In addition, Tcl provides no code mod-
ularization aside from procedures, which makes it dicult to write and debug large
scripts. These disadvantages have not been a hindrance so far since mobile agents
tend to involve high-level resource access wrapped with straightforward control logic,
a situation for which Tcl is uniquely suited. A mobile Tcl agent is usually short
even if it performs a complex task, and is often more than ecient enough when
compared to resource and network latencies. In addition, several groups are working
on structured-programming extensions to Tcl and on faster Tcl interpreters [Sah94].
Tcl is clearly not suitable for every mobile-agent application, however, such as per-
forming search operations against large, distributed collections of numerical data. For
this reason, Java was added to the system as discussed below. Java is much more
structured than Tcl and has the potential to run within a small factor of native speed
through \just-in-time" compilation. We expect, however, that Tcl will continue to
be the main agent language and that Java (or an even faster execution environment
such as Omniware) will be used only for speed-critical agents.
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5.3.2 State capture
The main disadvantage of Tcl is that it provides no facilities for capturing the com-
plete internal state of an executing script. Such facilities are essential for providing
transparent migration at arbitrary points. Adding these facilities to Tcl was straight-
forward but required the modication of the Tcl core. The basic problem is that the
Tcl core evaluates a script by making recursive calls to Tcl Eval. The handler for the
while command, for example, recursively calls Tcl Eval to evaluate the body of the
loop. Thus a portion of the script's state is on the C runtime stack and is not easily
accessible. Our solution adds an explicit stack to the Tcl core. We split the command
handlers into one or more subhandlers where there is one subhandler for each code
section before or after a call to Tcl Eval. Each call to Tcl Eval is replaced with
a push onto the stack. Tcl Eval iterates until the stack is empty and always calls
the current subhandler for the command at the top of the stack. The subhandlers
are responsible for specifying when the command has nished and should be popped.
Figure 5.3 illustrates this process for the while command.
It is important to note that our modied Tcl core is fully compatible with the
standard Tcl core. A command procedure that makes a recursive call to Tcl Eval
will work correctly on top of the modied core; it will just be impossible to capture
the script's complete state when that command procedure is on the invocation stack.
This means that existing Tcl extensions will work without modication (as long as
the extension does not use the tclInt.h header le). An extension has to be modied
only if the developer wants an agent to be able to carry the extension's state from
machine to machine. In this case, the developer must make the same changes as
for the while command and must provide callback routines for state capture and
restoration.
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WHILE_EXPRESSION while expr body WHILE_EXPRESSION
if (expr)
     
else
          set flag to NEXT_COMMAND
          set flag to WHILE_BODY





if (error in body)
          set flag to NEXT_COMMAND
          set flag to WHILE_EXPRESSION
else
evaluate and pop body
Flag
Figure 5.3: An example of how the stack works. The command stack is on the left
and the two subhandlers for the while command are on the right. A subhandler
sets the NEXT COMMAND ag when the while command has nished and should be
popped. (The actual implementation duplicates the WHILE EXPRESSION code inside
WHILE BODY to avoid an extra iteration through the evaluation loop.)
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The explicit stack is simpler and more exible than the Ara solution, in which the
C runtime stack must be captured in a portable way, and in which the same version
of the Tcl interpreters must be present on both the source and destination machines
[Pei96]. On the other hand, the explicit stack is less ecient. Our modied Tcl
core runs Tcl programs approximately 10 percent slower than the standard Tcl core,
whereas Ara's modied Tcl core imposes no signicant overhead. It appears that
our performance penalty can be reduced signicantly with additional optimization,
however, and it would also be possible to include both the standard and modied Tcl
cores within the same interpreter so that an agent could run on top of the standard,
faster core if it did not want to migrate in mid-execution.
Once the explicit stack was available, it became trivial to write procedures that
save and restore the internal state of a Tcl script. These two procedures are the
heart of the state-capture module for the Tcl interpreter. They capture and restore
the stack, the procedure call frames, and all dened variables and procedures. Such
things as open les and linked variables are currently ignored.7
The advantages of Tcl are strong and the disadvantages are either easily overcome
or are unimportant in many agents. Thus Tcl was chosen as the main language for
the Agent Tcl system. The same advantages have led to the use of Tcl in other
mobile-agent systems such as Tacoma [JvRS95] and Ara [Pei96].
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set query {mobile agents}
set machines {muir tenaya tioga tuolomne}
agent_begin # register with the agent system
foreach machine $machines {
agent_jump $machine
agent_send "$machine query_engine" 0 $query




Figure 5.4: An example Tcl agent that migrates through a sequence of machines and
interacts with a search engine on each machine. A real agent would record the results
from each search engine and present the results to its owner once it returned to the
home machine. The agent array is a global array that is automatically available inside
any Tcl agent; it contains information about the agent's current and home machines.
The 0 in the agent send call is the message code.
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5.3.3 Interface to the agent system
The interface between a Tcl agent and the agent system is a modied version of Tcl 7.5
and a Tcl extension. The modied version of Tcl 7.5 provides the explicit stack and
the state-capture routines. The extension provides the commands that an agent uses
to migrate, communicate, and create child agents. The most important commands are
agent begin, agent submit, agent jump, agent send, agent receive, agent meet,
agent accept, and agent end. Internally each command is just a stub that calls the
corresponding operation in Agent Tcl's language-independent core (which is written
in C++ and used for all agent languages). The core operations contact an agent
server, transfer an agent, message or request, and wait for a response. If an error
occurs in the core operation, the stub will throw a Tcl exception. The agent can
catch these exceptions and take appropriate action. The main dierence between the
current implementation and the planned architecture is that when migrating, creating
a child agent, or sending a message, the current implementation bypasses the local
server and interacts directly with the destination server over TCP/IP. This approach
was adopted to simplify the initial implementation and will change as additional
transport mechanisms are added.
An agent is simply a Tcl script that runs on top of the modied version of Tcl
7.5. The agent uses the agent begin command to register with a server and ob-
tain an identication within the two-level namespace. The identication consists of
the IP address of the server, a unique integer, and a unique symbolic name that
7An error occurs if the agent opens a le or creates a linked variable, migrates to a new machine,
and then tries to use the le or linked variable. This \delayed" error can lead to confusion. Instead
the jump command should (optionally) fail if the current state image contains objects that cannot
be transferred.
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the agent species later with the agent name command. The integer and symbolic
name are unique on the agent's current machine, but are not globally unique. The
agent submit command is used to create a child agent on a particular machine. The
agent submit command accepts a Tcl script, optionally encrypts and digitally signs
the script, and sends the script to the destination server. The server authenticates
this agent, selects an integer identier for the agent, and starts a Tcl interpreter in
which to execute the agent. If the agent wants a symbolic name as well as an integer
identier, it can call agent name once it starts executing. The agent jump command
migrates an agent to a particular machine. The agent jump command captures the
internal state of the agent, optionally encrypts and digitally signs the state image,
and sends the state image to the destination server. The server authenticates this
agent, selects a new integer identier for the agent, and starts a Tcl interpreter. The
Tcl interpreter restores the state image and resumes agent execution at the statement
immediately after the agent jump. The agent loses its symbolic name when it jumps
and must reacquire the name using the agent name command if desired.
The agent send and agent receive commands are used to send and receive mes-
sages. The agent meet and agent accept commands are used to establish a meeting
between agents. Meetings are named message streams, and although they are not
required for communication, they are more ecient and convenient than independent
messages. The source agent uses agent meet to send a connection request to the des-
tination agent. The destination agent uses agent accept to receive the connection
request and send either an acceptance or rejection. An acceptance includes a TCP/IP
port number to which the source agent connects. The protocol works even if both
agents use agent meet. The agent with the lower IP address and integer identier
selects the port and the other agent connects to that port. A exible RPC mechanism
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has been built on top of the direct connection mechanism [NCK96]. The server will
take on more of the responsibility for establishing a direct connection as additional
transport mechanisms are added.
Agent Tcl also includes a (slightly) modied version of Tk 4.1 so that an agent can
present a graphical interface and interact with the user of its current machine. Event
handlers can be associated with incoming messages and with direct connections.
A sample Tcl agent is shown in Figure 5.4. The agent rst registers with the agent
system (agent begin) and then migrates through a sequence of machine (agent jump).
On each machine, the agent sends a query to a stationary search agent (agent send),
and then waits for the search agent to send back the results (agent receive). Once
the agent has obtained results from all the search agents, it migrates one last time
to return to its home machine (agent jump), and then tells the agent systems that it
has nished (agent end). A tutorial on writing Tcl agents can be found in Appendix
C.
5.4 Agent Java
Agent Java is partially complete. Agents can send and receive messages and migrate
from machine to machine, but cannot change the message mask or establish meetings
with other agents. Bill Bleier and Joshua Mills have done much of the implementation
work.8
8Bill Bleier and Joshua Mills are both undergraduates in the computer science department and
have spent two semesters each working on Agent Java.
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5.4.1 Java
Java is an object-oriented language that is syntactically similar to C++ except that
there are no structures or unions, no functions, no multiple implementation inher-
itance, no operator overloading, no automatic type casts, and no pointers [GM95,
Sun97b, CH97]. A sample Java program is shown in Figure 5.5. Memory in Java
is garbage-collected so there is no delete operator. Java is multi-threaded and in-
cludes thread synchronization primitives at the language level. Most importantly, a
Java program is typically compiled into bytecodes for a stack-based virtual machine,
namely the Java Virtual Machine [Sun97c]. The program is then executed with an
ecient, low-level interpreter. The use of bytecodes and an interpreter has two pow-
erful advantages. First, a bytecode-compiled Java program is highly portable and can
run unchanged on any machine that provides the Java interpreter, reducing devel-
opment costs signicantly and making applications such as active Web pages much
easier. Second, since the bytecodes are dened to have a statically predictable eect
on the type state of the stack, it is possible to run a compiled Java program through
a pre-execution verication process [Sun97a]. At the end of this verication process,
which also relies on the fact that Java does not provide features such as pointers
that can be used to forge access to subobjects, it is known that the program always
access objects as their actual type, always calls methods with the correct number and
types of arguments, and does not overow the operator stack. In combination with
a class loader that prevents the program from replacing a system class with its own
denition, and a security manager that can check for and deny unauthorized access to
system classes, the verication process allows a machine to safely run a Java program




public static int factorial (int n) {
int product = 1;
for (int i = 2; i <= n; ++i) {




public static void main (String args[]) {
int n = 10;
int fac = factorial (n);
}
}
Figure 5.5: A Java program that computes the factorial of a given number n
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Java has several advantages as a mobile-agent language. Since Java programs
are compiled into low-level, interpreted bytecodes (which some Java interpreters then
compile \on-the-y" into native machine code), Java is much faster than Tcl but
shares Tcl's high portability. Second, Java is far more suitable for large agents since
it provides code modularization via classes. Third, Java has become one of the most
popular languages ever, leading to a fast-growing body of Java-literate programmers
who would be able to write ecient Java agents with minimal learning time. Finally,
since Java is targeted towards mobile-code applications, the Java language and run-
time environment already include a range of security features that make it relatively
easy to securely integrate Java into a mobile-agent system. The main disadvantage of
Java is that although Java is simpler than C++, it still has a long learning curve and
development cycle relative to Tcl, making it unattractive for smaller mobile agents.
Although the size of a \typical" mobile agent is not yet clear, it does appear that
most mobile agents are small enough for Tcl to be an eective language choice from a
code maintenance standpoint. Java would be used only in speed-critical applications
for which Tcl is simply too slow.
5.4.2 State capture
Release 1.1 of Sun's Java Development Kit (JDK) includes an object serialization
or pickling facility [RWWB96, WRW96]. This facility allows a program to create a
serialized representation of the state of a Java object. This bytestream can be stored
on disk or transmitted to a remote machine. The bytestream can then be used to
recreate an equivalent object. For security reasons, the object serialization facility
includes a cryptographic \ngerprint" of the object's complete type in the bytestream,
allows a class to exclude sensitive data elds from the serialization process, and allows
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a class to provide its own pickling methods that either (1) pack, unpack and verify any
desired subset of the object's state or (2) throw an exception if the class is sensitive
enough that it should not be pickled at all.
All commercial Java-based mobile-agent systems, such as IBM Aglets [LO97,
Ven97], General Magic's Odyssey [Gen97] and Mitsubishi's Concordia [WPW+97],
rely on this object serialization facility. Since the current serialization facility cannot
capture the state of an executing thread, and since modications to the Java vir-
tual machine would severely limit acceptance of a commercial product, none of the
three systems provide a jump operation. Instead, when an agent wants to migrate,
it species some subset of its objects. These objects are serialized, sent to the des-
tination machine along with their class denitions and then unserialized. To restart
execution of the agent, the agent server on the destination machine calls a known
entry method within one of the transferred objects. This method checks the current
state of the objects to decide what to do next. Academic systems are not concerned
with commercial acceptance and so are free to modify the Java virtual machine. The
Sumatra system [RASS97] modies release 1.0.2 of Sun's Java Development Kit so
that it is possible to capture the complete state of an executing Java thread. The
basic modication is the addition of a type stack that is parallel to the existing stack
and maintains additional type information about the objects that are on the stack.
To capture and restore the state of the thread, the Sumatra serialization routines
pickle and unpickle the normal stack, the type stack, every object that is reachable
from the stack (i.e., every object that is reachable from the thread), and the class
denitions for those objects. A jump method, exactly analogous to the Agent Tcl
agent jump command, is built on top of these two serialization routines. Since one of
the subgoals of the Agent Tcl project is to compare the jump command with other,
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more programmer-intensive migration techniques, we made the same modications
to the Java virtual machine as Sumatra so that we could provide a jump command in
Agent Java.9 Sumatra and Agent Java do not actually use Sun's object serialization
facilities since the source code for these facilities was not available until recently.10
Instead, both systems use their own serialization facility, which is more ecient than
Sun's, but uses a less compact representation for the serialized objects.
5.4.3 Interface to the agent system
The interface between a Java agent and the agent system is the Agent class, which is
shown in Figure 5.6. Since the same C++ core is used for all three agent languages,
the Agent class is simply an interface to pre-existing C++ code. Thus nearly all of
its methods are native methods whose implementation is written in C++. All of
these native methods are essentially stubs that convert the Java arguments into C++
arguments, invoke the corresponding operation in the C++ core, and then convert the
C++ result into a Java result. The native methods throw Java runtime exceptions if
an error occurs within the C++ core. The agent can catch these runtime exceptions
and take appropriate action. Although it will eventually be interesting to reimplement
the C++ core in Java, both to make the agent system more portable and to allow the
agent system to be downloaded into a Java-enabled web browser, it is not worthwhile
to undertake such a large porting eort at this time. Thus the Agent class and its use
of native methods to interface with the C++ core will not change in the near future.
The constructor and nalizer for the Agent class call two native methods called
9We actually use some of the Sumatra code, which the Sumatra group graciously made available
to us.
10Source code for Sun's JDK 1.1 had only been available for a few weeks at the time of this writing.
Both Sumatra and Agent Java use JDK 1.0.2.
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public class Agent {
private int handle;
private native int createNativeAgent ();
private native void deleteNativeAgent ();
public Agent() {
handle = createNativeAgent ();
}
protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
deleteNativeAgent ();
}
public native void begin (String machine, double seconds);
public native void end (double seconds);
public native void send
(AgentId destId, Message message, double seconds);
public native ReceivedMessage receive (double seconds);
...
public native AgentId submit
(String machine, AgentBody body, ClassList list, double seconds);
public native void jump
(String machine, ClassList list, double seconds);
...
}
Figure 5.6: The Agent class is the main interface between a Java program and the
Agent Tcl system.
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public class AgentBody {




Figure 5.7: A subclass of the AgentBody class is passed to the submit method. The
subclass encapsulates the code and objects that will make up the submitted agent.
createNativeAgent and deleteNativeAgent. The createNativeAgent method cre-
ates an instance of the C++ agent class dened in the C++ core and returns a handle
to that instance. All other native methods use this handle to identify the C++ agent
instance on which to operate. The deleteNativeAgent method deletes the C++
instance when the Java instance is garbage-collected. All of the other methods in the
Agent class correspond exactly to the commands provided to Tcl agents. To register
with the agent system, for example, a Java agent creates an instance of the Agent
class and then invokes the begin method on that instance. When the agent nishes,
it invokes the end method on the same instance. This use of the Agent class is shown
in the example Java agent in Figure 5.8. A stationary Java program, i.e., a Java pro-
gram that never migrates, can create and use multiple instances of the Agent class,
either within the same or dierent threads. Thus, a stationary Java program can
appear as multiple agents within the agent system. Although the wisdom of this ap-
proach is still under consideration, it does appear to be useful in those Java programs
that act as servers for other agents. A child agent created with the submit method
or an agent that has migrated with the jump method cannot create any instances of
the Agent class, but instead can use only the single instance that the agent system
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(transparently) passes to it upon its creation or arrival. This instance connects the
agent with the server on its current machine.
Once the agent has registered with the agent system using the begin method,
it can use the other methods in the Agent class. The send and receive meth-
ods, for example, are used to send and receive messages. The AgentId argument
to send species the recipient agent; the Message argument contains the message.
The ReceivedMessage return value from receive contains both a Message and Agen-
tId instance; the Message instance contains the incoming message, and the AgentId
instance identies the source agent. The ReceivedMessage instance also contains a
security vector that indicates whether the source agent's owner and machine could
be authenticated. Most of the other methods of the Agent class are not shown in
Figure 5.6. There is one method for each Agent Tcl command and generally the
methods take the same arguments and return the same results; several methods in-
volve additional supporting classes such as the Meeting class that controls a meeting
endpoint (although the interface to the underlying C++ meeting routines is not yet
complete as noted at the start of the section). One notable dierence between Agent
Tcl and Agent Java is that Agent Java does not allow an agent to impose a wall or
CPU time restriction on itself, primarily because it not clear yet how to handle the
restriction violation within Java. Agent Java does enforce the same machine-imposed
restrictions, however, terminating the agent if it exceeds its maximum allowance of
wall or CPU time.
The two remainingmethods shown in Figure 5.6 are the submit and jumpmethods,
which require special consideration. The submit method, like the agent submit
command in Agent Tcl, creates a child agent. The parent agent must rst create




public static void main(String args[]) {
String[] machines = new String[4];
machines[0] = "muir" ; machines[1] = "tenaya";
machines[2] = "tenaya"; machines[3] = "tuolomne";
String query = "mobile agent";
Agent agent = new Agent();
AgentId aid = agent.begin (agent.getLocalMachine(), 10.0);
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i += 1) {
agent.jump (machines[i], 10.0);
AgentId engineId = new AgentId (machines[i], "query_engine");
Message request = new Message (0, query);
agent.send (engineId, request, 10.0);






Figure 5.8: A simple Java agent that migrates through a sequence of machines and
interacts with a search engine on each machine. A real agent would record the results
from each search engine and present the results to its owner once it returned to the
home machine. The 10.0 in some of the method calls species a timeout of 10 seconds;
the 0 passed to the Message constructor is the message code.
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subclass encapsulates the data and methods that will make up the new child agent.
This subclass can contain arbitrary methods and data elements, but must override
the run method that is dened in the AgentBody superclass. The agent initializes
the subclass instance as desired, and then passes the instance to the submit method
as the AgentBody argument. The submit method serializes the subclass instance
and all associated class denitions, and then sends the serialized bytestream to the
destination machine. The Agent Tcl system on the destination machine unserializes
the bytestream and then invokes the run method to start up the new child agent.
An Agent instance that connects the new agent to its local server is passed to the
run method as an argument; the new agent is not allowed to create any additional
instances of the Agent class.
There are two important things to note about this creation process. First, the
new child agent can achieve a rough approximation to true migration by continually
submitting the same AgentBody instance to the next machine in sequence and then
immediately exiting on the current machine. Second, although it can be argued that
the two classes Agent and AgentBody should be more closely related from a semantics
viewpoint, their current \nonrelationship" seems to be the best alternative. The basic
problem is that conceptually an AgentBody does not become an Agent until it has
been submitted to the destination machine. There does not appear to be any way to
adequately reect this fact within a static class hierarchy. In any event, use of the
current AgentBody class is straightforward and should not be a burden to the agent
programmer.
The jump command serializes the stack of the calling thread, all objects reachable
from the stack, and all associated class denitions (as discussed in the state capture
section above). The serialized bytestream is transmitted to and restored on the given
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destination machine where the agent continues execution from the point of the jump.
All Agent instances within the agent are transparently updated to refer to a single
new Agent instance, namely an Agent instance that connects the agent to its new
agent server. In addition, as with submit, the agent will not be allowed to create any
new Agent instances. It is important to note that the the jump method moves only the
single calling thread onto the destination machine; all other threads are terminated
at the time of migration. Similarly the fork method clones only the calling thread.
Although this choice has proven reasonable so far, it will be important to see if it
remains reasonable as larger and more complex Java agents are written. A related
issue is that there is currently no tight relationship between the Agent instance and
some specic thread. Any thread that has a reference to the Agent instance can call
the jump or fork method, and it is that thread that will end up on the destination
machine.
Unlike Java-enabled web browsers, Agent Java cannot fetch class denitions from
the home machine. And, unlike Sumatra, Agent Java does not provide remote objects
whose methods can be invoked through local stubs.11 Thus all objects and class
denitions that the agent might use must be transmitted during the initial submit,
jump or fork. The necessary objects can be captured easily, namely by serializing
all objects reachable from the AgentBody instance or all objects reachable from the
thread stack. Class are more complex, however, since an agent will not necessarily
have any instances of a needed class at the time of the submit, jump or fork. Thus
all three methods currently take a ClassList argument that species by name any
11One of the main reasons for not allowing remote objects is that it is a communication mechanism
that only Java agents can use. One of our primary design decisions is to support multiple agent
languages and language-independent communication mechanisms.
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class denitions that should be sent along with the agent, even if the agent currently
contains no instances of those classes. The ClassList class provides several methods
for inspecting and changing its list of classes. We intend to eventually eliminate the
ClassList argument and have the Agent Java system determine automatically which
classes are used inside the agent. One way to automatically determine the class list
is the dynamic linking technique of [AS97] which, given an incoming agent and the
set of libraries available at the current machine, determines if there are any unbound
references before the agent starts executing.
5.5 Agent Scheme
Agent Scheme is partially complete. Agents can currently send and receive messages,
but cannot migrate from machine to machine or establish meetings with other agents.
Dartmouth undergraduates Ahsan Kabir and David Gondek have done most of the
implementation work so far.
5.5.1 Scheme
Scheme is a statically scoped and properly tail-recursive dialect of Lisp [Dyb87, CR91].
Although Scheme supports several programming paradigms, such as imperative and
message passing, it is oriented towards and most commonly used for functional pro-
gramming as illustrated in Figure 5.9. Scheme provides rst-class procedures and
lambda expressions, supports both closures and continuations, evaluates both the
operator and operand positions of a procedure call, and expresses iteration with pro-
cedure calls only [MIT97b].
The are four reasons to select Scheme as a mobile-agent language. First, since






(* n (factorial (- n 1))))))
(factorial 10)
Figure 5.9: A Scheme program that computes the factorial of a given number n.
articial intelligence research, it opens up mobile-agent programming to a much wider
community and allows the more convenient expression of agents that plan or learn.
Second, there are several existing Scheme interpreters that support the full language,
but that are still lightweight and extremely ecient, most notably Scheme 48 which is
based around a virtual machine [KR95]. Third, since Scheme is a type-safe language
and is lexically scoped, it already provides the initial layer of security that is needed
when executing untrusted agents [CJK95]. Finally, there has already been work on
moving ongoing Scheme computations from one machine to another [CJK95].
5.5.2 State capture
We selected Scheme 48 as the Scheme interpreter for Agent Tcl due to its eciency,
easy portability and its ability to interface with native C/C++ libraries. Unfortu-
nately, although Scheme 48 provides full support for both closures and continuations,
which respectively contain exactly the state information that is needed when creating
a child agent (submit) or migrating an existing agent (jump), it does not provide any
support for serializing (and later restoring) a given closure or continuation. In the
case of migration, it is possible to capture the necessary state information with the
capture-state function shown in Figure 5.10. This function, however, actually cap-
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( define (capture-state filename) (
call-with-current-continuation (
lambda (p)





Figure 5.10: A naive state capture routine for Scheme 48. This routine has two
problems. First, it writes the state image out to disk rather than to an arbitrary
bytestream. Second, the state image contains the entire interpreter heap rather than
just the continuation p. Fixing these problems requires additions to the Scheme 48
virtual machine.
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tures the state of the entire heap of the Scheme 48 virtual machine, leading to a state
image that is both extremely large and much larger than necessary. Even for the
simplest Scheme program, the state image will typically be several hundred kilobytes,
making this state-capture implementation impractical.
Instead of capturing the entire heap, we need to capture only the desired contin-
uation or closure. This improved state capture requires additions to the Scheme 48
virtual machine. Fortunately, Kali Scheme [CJK95] has already made these additions.
Kali Scheme is derived from Scheme 48 and allows either a closure or a executing
thread (in the form of the thread's continuation) to be transferred from one machine
to another. Kali Scheme also provides remote object proxies and cross-machine com-
munication primitives in the lowest levels of the Scheme 48 virtual machine, neither of
which are needed in the Agent Tcl system. Our current task is to extract the state-
capture routines from Kali Scheme, so that we can create a version of Scheme 48
that supports the necessary state capture without also including Kali Scheme's other
distributed-computing facilities. Although this task is conceptually straightforward,
it is time-consuming and will likely take several more months of part-time undergrad-
uate eort.
5.5.3 Interface to the agent system
Agent Scheme uses the same generic C++ core as Agent Tcl and Agent Java and
provides a set of Scheme functions that interact with this core. In general, these
Scheme functions correspond exactly to the commands in Agent Tcl, taking the same
arguments and returning the same results. The exceptions are agent begin and
agent end, which must be called as a pair (with the code for the agent in between).
Since this pair of calls is somewhat inconsistent with the functional programming
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(define (queryAgent machine query) (
(agent_let ((agent-local-machine) 10.0 agentId)





(define query "mobile agent")
(queryAgent machine query)
Figure 5.11: A simple Scheme agent that interacts with a search engine on a remote
machine. The 10.0 in the agent let, agent send, and agent receive calls species
a timeout of 10 seconds; the agentId in the agent let call is the local variable in
which the agent's identication is stored; the 0 in the agent send call is the message
code. Agent Scheme does not yet support migration, so the more complex Tcl and
Java agents above do not have a corresponding Scheme implementation.
paradigm, we instead encapsulate agent begin and agent end inside an agent let
macro. This macro is equivalent to the standard Scheme let, except that it auto-
matically calls agent begin before executing the let body, and automatically calls
agent end after executing the let body. In other words, agent let automatically
turns its body into an agent, and stores the identication of the new agent in a vari-
able specied in the agent let call, making this identication information accessible
in the body.
A sample Scheme agent is shown in Figure 5.11. Since the migration facilities
of Agent Scheme are incomplete, the sample agent does not migrate from machine
to machine like the Tcl and Java agents, but instead remains stationary and sim-
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ply interacts with a local search engine. The agent uses the agent let macro to
register (and unregister) with the agent system and then uses the agent send and





A mobile agent is a program that moves from machine to machine and executes on
each. Neither the agent nor the machines are necessarily trustworthy. The agent
might try to access or destroy privileged information or consume more than its share
of some resource. The machines might try to pull sensitive information out of the
agent or change the behavior of the agent by removing, modifying or adding to its data
and code. A mobile-agent system that does not detect and prevent such malicious
actions can never be used in real applications. In an open network environment,
intentional attacks on both machines and agents will start as soon as the system is
deployed, and even in a closed network environment with trusted users, there is still
the danger of misprogrammed agents, which can do signicant damage accidentally.
Security is perhaps the most critical issue in a mobile-agent system and can be divided
into four interrelated problems:
 Protect the machine. The machine should be able to authenticate the agent's
owner, assign resource limits based on this authentication, and prevent any
violation of the resource limits. To prevent both the theft or damage of sensitive
information and denial-of-service attacks, the resource limits must include access
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rights (reading a certain le), maximum consumptions (total CPU time), and
maximum consumptions per unit time (total CPU time per unit time).
 Protect other agents. An agent should not be able to interfere with another
agent or steal that agent's resources. This problem can be viewed as a sub-
problem of protecting the machine, since as long as an agent cannot subvert
the agent communication mechanisms and cannot consume or hold excessive
system resources, it will be unable to aect another agent unless that agent
chooses to communicate with it.
 Protect the agent. A machine should not be able to tamper with an agent
or pull sensitive information out of the agent without the agent's cooperation.
Unfortunately, without hardware support, it is impossible to prevent a machine
from doing whatever it wants with an agent that is currently executing on
that machine. Instead we must try to detect tampering as soon as the agent
migrates from a malicious machine back onto an honest machine, and then
terminate or x the agent if tampering has occurred. In addition, we must
ensure that (1) sensitive information never passes through an untrusted machine
in an unencrypted form, (2) the information is meaningless without cooperation
from a trusted site, or (3) that theft of the information is not catastrophic and
can be detected via an audit trail.
 Protect a group of machines. An agent might consume excessive resources in the
network as a whole even if it consumes few resources at each machine. Obvious
examples are an agent that roams through the network forever or an agent that
creates two child agents on dierent machines, each of which creates two child
agents in turn, and so on. An agent and its children should eventually be unable
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to obtain any resources anywhere and be terminated. If the network machines
are under single administrative control, solutions are relatively straightforward;
if the machines are not, solutions are much more complex.
All of these problems have been considered in the mobile-agent literature [LO95,
CGH+95, TV96, PS97], but only the rst two have seen signicant implementation
work. These same two problems are addressed in the current implementation of
Agent Tcl using PGP [KPS95], Safe Tcl [LO95, OLW97] and Java security managers
[CH97]. First we present the current implementation and then potential solutions for
the remaining two security problems.
6.1 Protecting the machine (and other agents)
Protecting the machine involves two tasks:
 Authentication. Verify the identity of an agent's owner.
 Authorization and enforcement. Assign resource limits to the agent based on
this identity and enforce those resource limits.
Agent Tcl, like other mobile-agent systems, handles these two tasks with public-
key cryptography and secure execution environments that perform authorization
checks before each resource access.
6.1.1 Authentication
Each Agent Tcl server distinguishes between two kinds of agents: owned and anony-
mous. An owned agent is an agent whose owner could be authenticated and is on the
server's list of authorized users. An anonymous agent is an agent whose owner could
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not be authenticated or is not on the server's list of authorized users. Each server
can be congured to either accept or reject anonymous agents. If a server accepts an
anonymous agent, it gives the agent an extremely restrictive set of resource limits.
RSA public-key cryptography is used to authenticate an agent's owner. Each
owner and machine in Agent Tcl has a public-private key pair. The server can au-
thenticate the owner if (1) the agent is digitally signed with the owner's public key or
(2) the agent is digitally signed with the sending machine's key, the server trusts the
sending machine, and the sending machine was able to authenticate the owner itself.
In the second case, the sending machine would have authenticated the owner in one of
the same two ways: (1) the agent was signed by the owner or (2) the agent was signed
by one of the sending machine's trusted machines (and that trusted machine was able
to authenticate the owner itself). Thus, trust is transitive, and trust relationships
must be established carefully. Typically machines under single administrative control
would trust each other and no one else.
Agent Tcl uses Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for its digital signatures and encryp-
tion. PGP is a standalone program that allows the secure transmission of electronic
mail and is in widespread use despite controversies over patents and export restric-
tions [KPS95]. PGP encrypts a le or mail message using the IDEA algorithm and
a randomly chosen secret key, encrypts the secret key using the RSA public-key al-
gorithm and the recipient's public key, and then sends the encrypted key and le to
the recipient. PGP optionally adds a digital signature by computing an MD5 cryp-
tographic hash of the le or mail message and encrypting the hash value with the
sender's private key. Although PGP is oriented towards interactive use, it can be
used in an agent system with minimal eort. In the current implementation, Agent
Tcl runs PGP as a separate process, saves the data to be encrypted into a le, asks
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the PGP process to encrypt the le, and then transfers the encrypted le to the desti-
nation server. This approach is much less ecient than tightly integrating PGP with
the rest of the system, but is simpler and more exible, especially since it becomes
trivial to create an Agent Tcl distribution that does not include PGP or that uses
dierent encryption software [Way95].
An agent chooses whether to use encryption and signatures when it migrates or
sends a message to another agent. If the agent is not concerned with interception
during migration, it turns o encryption. If the agent is not concerned with tampering
during migration and can accomplish its task as an anonymous agent, it turns o
signatures. When sending a message, the agent makes the same decisions, except that
it turns o signatures only if the recipient does not need to verify the sender's identity.
Turning o either encryption or signatures is a signicant performance gain due to
the slowness of public-key cryptography, and thus most agents will turn o encryption
and signatures whenever the needed resources and the network environment allow it.
In the rest of this section, we assume that the agent does not want to be an anonymous
agent and does not want to send anonymous messages, and thus has digital signatures
turned on.
When an agent registers with its home server using the begin command (Figure
6.1), the registration request is digitally signed with the owner's private key, optionally
encrypted with the destination server's public key, and sent to the server. The server
veries the digital signature, checks whether the owner is allowed to register an agent
on its machine, and then accepts or rejects the request. If the agent and the server are
on dierent machines, all further requests that the agent makes of the server must be
protected to prevent tampering and masquerade attacks.1 Ideally, the system would







Figure 6.1: Encryption for the begin command. When an agent uses the begin
command to register with the server on its home machine, the registration request is
signed with the owner's private key (S) and optionally encrypted with the receiving
machine's public key (E).
generate a secret session key, known only to the agent and the server, and then use this
session key to encrypt the requests [KPS95]. PGP does not provide direct access to its
internal secret-key routines, however, making it impossible to generate and use session
keys without modifying PGP. Therefore, the current implementation of Agent Tcl
handles the additional requests in the same manner as the initial registration request,
digitally signing them with the owner's private key. Since public-key algorithms are
much slower than secret-key algorithms, we will switch to secret sessions keys once
we replace PGP with a more exible encryption library. When the agent and the
server are on the same machine (which is the predominant case), there is no need
for a session key, since it is impossible to intercept or tamper with the additional
requests or to masquerade as the registered agent.2 Thus all additional requests are
transmitted in the clear.
2The server uses dierent communication channels for local agents and can tell without cryptog-















Figure 6.2: Encryption for the jump command. On the rst jump, the agent is signed
with the owner's private key (S1). On the second and later jumps, the agent is signed
with the sending machine's private key (S2), and the sending machine sets a ag
(F) to indicate whether it was able to authenticate the agent's owner itself; if the
target machine trusts the sending machine, and the sending machine reports that it
was able to authenticate the agent's owner, the target machine considers the owner
authenticated.
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When an agent migrates for the rst time with the jump command, the state
image is digitally signed with the owner's private key, optionally encrypted with
the destination server's public key, and sent to the destination server. The server
veries the digital signature, checks whether the owner is allowed to send agents
to its machine, and accepts or rejects the incoming agent. This process is shown
in Figure 6.2. Of course, once the agent has migrated, the owner's private key is
no longer available. Therefore, for all subsequent migrations, the agent is digitally
signed with the private key of the sending server. If the destination server trusts the
sending server, and the sending server was able to authenticate the owner itself, the
destination server considers the owner authenticated and gives the agent the full set
of resource limits for that owner. If the destination server does not trust the sending
server, or the sending server could not authenticate the owner itself, the destination
server considers the agent to have no owner and will either (1) accept the agent as
an anonymous agent or (2) reject the agent if it is not allowed to accept anonymous
agents. Typically, Agent Tcl servers are congured so that machines under single
administrative control trust each other but no one else.3 Thus, if an agent migrates
from its home machine into a set of mutually trusting machines (and then stays within
that set), each machine will be able to directly (or indirectly) authenticate the owner,
and will give the agent the full set of access permissions for that owner. Once the agent
leaves the set of machines, however, it becomes anonymous, and remains anonymous
even when it comes back, since the untrusted machines might have modied the agent
in a malicious way. While the agent is on a particular machine, it will make requests
of that machine's server. As in the case when an agent registers with a server on










Figure 6.3: Encryption for the send command. If the agent has not left its home
machine, the message is signed with the owner's private key (S1). If the agent has
left its home machine, the message is signed with the sending machine's key (S2), and
the sending machine sets a ag (F) to indicate whether it was able to authenticate
the agent's owner itself; if the target machine trusts the sending machine, and the
sending machine reports that it was able to authenticate the agent's owner, the target
machine considers the owner authenticated.
the same machine, however, no encryption or digital signatures are needed for these
requests.
When a new child agent is created on a dierent machine (with the fork or submit
command), or when a message is sent to an agent on a dierent machine (with the
send command), the same strategy is used as with jump. The message or child agent
is signed with the owner's key if the sending agent is still on its home machine, and
with the machine's key if the sending agent has already migrated (Figure 6.3). The
recipient server will believe the owner's identity if it trusts the sending server. When
receiving a message, the recipient agent gets both the message and a security vector.
The security vector species the owner of the sending agent, whether the owner
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could be authenticated, the sending machine, whether the sending machine could be
authenticated, whether the message was encrypted, and whether the sending agent is
on the same machine. The recipient agent, which might be controlling access to some
resource such as a database, bases its own security decisions on this security vector.
When a new agent is created on the same machine, or a message is sent to an agent
on the same machine, no encryption or digital signatures are required. The new agent
inherits the security information of its parent. The recipient of the message gets the
same ve-element security vector.
This authentication scheme has ve weaknesses. First, and most serious, once an
agent leaves its home group of trusted machines, it becomes anonymous as soon as
it migrates again. Having the agent become anonymous is essential in the current
system since a malicious machine can modify an agent arbitrarily (or lie about the
identity of its owner). Thus, when dealing with machines that do not trust each
other, an application that needs the full access rights of its owner to accomplish its
task cannot send out a single agent that migrates through the machines, since the
agent will become anonymous on the second jump. Instead the application must
send an agent to the rst machine, wait for the results, send a new agent to the
second machine, and so on. Although this problem does not prevent an application
from accomplishing its task, it places an additional burden on the programmer, and
reintroduces some of the network trac that mobile agents are meant to avoid. At
the same time, it is important to note that many applications operate entirely within
a set of trusted machines, and that many others, especially in the Internet, can be
accomplished with anonymous agents. Solving the multi-hop authentication problem
revolves around detecting malicious modications to an agent. Then, condent that
certain kinds of malicious modications (such as modications to the static code) will
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always be detected, a machine can assign access rights that fall somewhere between
those of an anonymous agent and those of the actual owner. Detecting malicious
modications is discussed below.
The remaining four problems are less serious and have clear solutions. First,
PGP is extremely slow, especially since Agent Tcl executes PGP as a separate pro-
cess. PGP must be replaced with a faster encryption library. Second, PGP does
not provide access to its internal encryption routines, making it impossible to gener-
ate session keys for ongoing communication. The replacement library must support
both public-key and secret-key cryptography. Once the system can generate session
keys, it should use session keys rather than public/private keys whenever possible
due to the speed advantage of secret-key cryptography, For example, two servers that
are communicating extensively might generate a shared session key, even if dierent
agents are responsible for each communication. Third, Agent Tcl does not include
an automatic distribution mechanism for the public keys. Each server must already
know the public keys of all authorized users so that it can authenticate incoming
agents (agents signed with an unknown public key become anonymous). A modest
key-distribution or certication mechanism must be added to Agent Tcl to reduce
the burden on the system administrator. Finally, the system is vulnerable to replay
attacks in which an attacker replays a migrating agent or a message sent to an agent
on a dierent machine. Here a server could have a distinct series of sequence numbers
for each server with which it is in contact.
6.1.2 Authorization and enforcement
Once the identity of an agent's owner has been determined, the system must assign
access restrictions to the agent (authorization) and ensure that the agent does not
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violate these restrictions (enforcement). In other words, the system must guard access
to all available resources. We divide resources into two types. Indirect resources can
be accessed only through another agent. Builtin resources are directly accessible
through language primitives (or libraries) for reasons of eciency or convenience or
simply by denition. Builtin resources include the screen, the lesystem, memory,
real time, CPU time, and the agent servers themselves.4
For indirect resources, the agent that controls the resource enforces its own access
restrictions, rejecting or allowing requests from other agents based on the security
vector attached to the incoming communication. Typically, the resource agent would
simply check each request against an access list, although one request could return
capabilities for use in later requests. Care must be taken with capabilities, however,
since a migrating agent will carry its capabilities along with it, possibly through ma-
licious machines. One reasonable solution is to allow an agent to obtain a capability
only if it is on the same machine as the resource, and include sucient identica-
tion information in the capability so that it becomes invalid as soon as the agent
leaves5; this solution makes it impossible for valid capabilities to exist on other ma-
chines, preventing theft and eliminating severe administrative problems. Agent Tcl
will eventually provide both access-list and capability libraries for use in resource
4The agent servers are accessed through the agent commands, such as begin, jump and send.
All agent commands use server CPU cycles; several use server memory; and several require network
access.
5For example, the capability could include the agent's id and the time at which it arrived on the
local machine. The agent will get a dierent timestamp (and usually id) if it leaves and returns,
making it impossible to reuse the capability after a migration. In addition, since the ids are locally
unique, no other agent can ever have the same combination of id and timestamp, making it impossible
to transfer the capability to another agent.
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agents; currently each resource agent must provide its own implementation.
For builtin resources, the agent servers enforce several absolute access policies. For
example, an agent can terminate another agent only if its owner is the system admin-
istrator or if it has the same owner as the other agent. The name operation reserves
certain symbolic names for certain agent owners, preventing an arbitrary agent from
masquerading as a service agent (such as a yellow page agent that provides directory
services). The notify operation requires the server to remember which agent asked
for the notication, taking up server memory. Thus, the server has a per-agent limit
on the number of outstanding notications; the limit is small for visiting agents, but
large for agents that belong to the machine's owner or administrator, since notica-
tions are the most ecient and convenient way to implement monitoring tools that
track which agents are currently on the machine.6 There are similar access policies
for the other agent operations. In particular, most operations can be congured to
reject requests from remote machines. In a typical conguration, for example, the
begin operation rejects any request from a remote machine, allowing only agents on
the local machine to register with the server. The begin operation also imposes a limit
on the total number of agents and the total number of anonymous agents executing
on the machine at one time. The specic limits and access restrictions are specied
in a server conguration le.
For all other builtin resources, security is maintained using the language-specic
security (or enforcement) module and a set of resource manager agents. When an
agent requests access to a builtin resource, either implicitly or explicitly, the secu-
rity module forwards the request to the appropriate resource manager. The resource
6Or, more precisely, notications will be the most convenient way once an agent can request
notications for a wider range of events.
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manager, which is just a stationary agent, checks an access list, decides whether the
request should be allowed, and returns the decision to the security module. The secu-
rity module then enforces the decision (and also caches the decision when appropriate
to minimize the load on the resource managers). This approach provides a clean sep-
aration between security policy and enforcement, with the same resource managers
making security decisions for all agents, regardless of their implementation language.
There are six resource managers in the current system.
 Consumables. The consumables manager handles those resources where, even
though they never run out, each agent should be given only a limited amount
to prevent system overload. Currently these resources are wall time, CPU time,
number of child agents, maximum depth of the parent-child hierarchy, and num-
ber of migrations. Limits on these resources are enforced across groups of mu-
tually trusting machine. When making its decision, the consumables manager
takes into account how much resource the agent has used on the other machines
within the group.7 Since access to these resources is either implicit (CPU time)
or takes place through the generic agent core (migration), enforcement actu-
ally takes place in the core, with the language-specic security module simply
setting the new limits after the manager returns its decision. In addition, in
contrast with the other builtin resources, the agent starts with a small allowance
and must explicitly ask the manager for more. Notably absent from this set of
consumable resources are memory and CPU time per unit time (as well as agent
operations per unit time since an agent might be able to overwhelm the local
server without using much CPU time). Thus, a visiting agent can currently
7Migrating agents include a vector that species how much of each resource they have used so
far.
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mount denial-of-service attacks against other agents by allocating all available
virtual memory, sitting in a computationally-intensive loop, or ooding the lo-
cal server with requests. Fixing the memory problem is trivial for Java and
Scheme 48, which already have their own memory-allocation routines that en-
force a maximum heap size, but more complex for Tcl, which calls the standard
malloc and free routines directly. A solution for Tcl that works on all platforms
might be impossible without changing its memory allocation routines. Fixing
CPU time is more dicult since we are currently relying on the underlying Unix
system for scheduling; scheduling mechanisms must be added to Agent Tcl so
that it can timeslice the agents itself.
 Filesystem. The lesystem manager controls read and write access to les and
directories. It also imposes a maximum size on writable les so that an agent
cannot ll up the lesystem. The manager controls access only to the entire
le. Record-based access control is simply too ne-grained for a mobile-agent
system. If record-based access control is required, the le should be hidden
behind a stationary service agent. The main weakness of the current lesystem
manager is that it does not impose a limit on disk accesses per unit time, making
it possible for an agent to thrash the local disk. As with CPU time per unit
time, the ideal solution is a scheduler that would allocate disk access \slots"
among the agents that require disk access.
 Libraries The libraries manager determines which libraries of Tcl functions,
Scheme functions or Java classes each agent can load.
 Programs The programs manager determines which external programs each
agent can execute. Since an external program is not subject to the same se-
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curity checks as the agents themselves, execute permissions are given only to
those owners whose agents can be trusted to use the program properly. Typi-
cally, then, an agent belonging to the system administrator is allowed to execute
any program, a service agent is allowed to execute only the programs that it
needs to provide the service, and all other agents are not allowed to execute
any programs. If an external program provides functionality that is useful for
all agents, it can be hidden behind a stationary service agent that performs the
necessary security checks.
 Network. The network manager decides which agents are allowed to directly
access low-level TCP/IP and UDP network services. It does not attempt to
limit certain agents to certain ports or certain remote machines; it either grants
complete access or no access at all. Thus, as with external programs, network
access is usually only given to the system administrator and specic service
agents. Eventually, all agents should be allowed to access certain network ser-
vices such as Sun RPC, especially when they are on a dedicated proxy site.
Then, if a resource is not on an agent-enabled machine, an agent can migrate as
close as possible to that machine and interact with the resource using standard
cross-network calls [MAF97]. In addition, most agent commands can generate
network trac, particularly the commands that send messages and establish
meetings. To prevent an agent from ooding the network, the network manager
and enforcement modules must impose a maximum transmission rate. Ideally,
as with CPU time and disk access, a maximum transmission rate would be set
for all agents as a group, and transmission \slots" would be scheduled among
the agents that are trying to transmit packets.
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 Screen. Like network access, screen access is controlled at the coarsest level: an
agent can do either anything or nothing. Therefore, in the current system, it
is unreasonable to give an anonymous agent any screen access, since the agent
might immediately create a window that covered the entire screen and grab the
global focus. Here we are planning a two-part solution: (1) allow an individual
agent to ask the user for screen access through some central control panel, and
(2) provide the agent with a window that mimics a full screen. In the latter
case, the agent could do anything it wanted on the virtual screen, but could not
move or resize that virtual screen itself.
Of course, a machine can have other hardware devices to which an agent might
need access, such as a microphone, speaker, camera or printer. Many of these devices,
such as a printer, can be eciently hidden behind a stationary service agent; this
stationary service agent performs any desired security checks before proceeding with
a request. Other devices, such as a microphone, might need to be accessible through
a library for eciency. In this case, resource managers for the devices must be added
to the system.
Each resource manager has a conguration le that species the access rights and
limits for a particular owner. The manager simply loads this access list on startup
and then checks the owner of each requesting agent against the list. Of course,
the manager also takes into account whether the owner could be authenticated and
whether the requesting agent is on the same machine. Anonymous agents are given
limited access rights (mainly read access to certain libraries and initialization les),
and remote agents are given no access rights.
The enforcement module is dierent for each language.
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Tcl. The Tcl enforcement module is implemented with Safe Tcl. Safe Tcl is a
Tcl extension that is designed to allow the safe execution of untrusted Tcl scripts
[LO95, OLW97]. Safe Tcl provides two interpreters. One interpreter is a \trusted"
interpreter that has access to the standard Tcl/Tk commands. The other interpreter
is an \untrusted" interpreter in which all dangerous commands have been replaced
with links to secure versions in the trusted interpreter. The untrusted script executes
in the untrusted interpreter. Dangerous commands include obvious things such as
opening or writing to a le, creating a network connection, and creating a toplevel
window. Dangerous commands also include more subtle things such as ringing the
bell, raising and lowering a window, and maximizing a window so that it covers the
entire screen. Some of these subtle security risks do not actually involve damage to
the machine or access to privileged information, but instead involve serious annoyance
for the machine's owner.
Agent Tcl uses the generalization of Safe Tcl that appears in the Tcl 7.5 core
[LO95]. Agent Tcl creates a trusted and untrusted interpreter for each incoming
agent. The agent executes in the untrusted interpreter. All dangerous commands
have been removed from the untrusted interpreter and replaced with links to se-
cure versions in the trusted interpreter. The secure version contacts the appropriate
resource manager and allows or rejects the operation depending on the resource man-
ager's response. The secure version also caches the resource manager's response on
an internal access list so that it does not have to contact the resource manager again
when the same operation is performed later. For example, if the agent issues the Tcl
command exec ls, the exec procedure in the trusted interpreter checks the internal
program access list. If permission to execute ls has already been granted, the com-
mand proceeds. If permission to execute ls has already been denied, the command
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throws a security exception. Otherwise the command contacts the program resource
manager, adds the response to the program access list, and then either proceeds or
throws the security exception.
An agent can also explicitly ask a resource manager for access permissions with the
require command. The require command takes the symbolic name of the resource
manager|e.g., lesystem|and a list of (name, quantity) pairs that specify the desired
access permissions|e.g., (/home/rgray/test.dat, read). The require command is
actually just a link to a procedure in the trusted interpreter. This procedure sends the
list of desired access permissions to the appropriate resource manager. The procedure
waits for the response and then adds each access permission to the internal access
lists, indicating for each whether the request was granted or denied. Regardless of
whether a request is made with the require command or by invoking a Tcl command,
the resource manager will send back the most general access permissions possible,
eectively preloading the internal access lists and eliminating future requests. For
example, if an agent requests access to a particular le, but is actually allowed to
access the entire lesystem, the manager's response will grant access to the entire
lesystem. In addition, although an agent can contact the resource managers directly
in the current implementation, such contact accomplishes nothing since the response
will not go through the trusted interpreter and therefore will not have any eect on
the internal access lists.
Finally, an agent can impose access restrictions on itself with the restrict com-
mand. The restrict command takes two arguments: a list of access restrictions and
a Tcl script. The command executes the script under the given access restrictions. In
the case of the consumable resources, these access restrictions remain in eect even
when the agent migrates to a new machine. For example, the agent can restrict itself
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to a particular number of children, even if it is migrating and creating the children on
dierent machines. More usefully, perhaps, the agent can restrict itself to a specic
amount of CPU or wall time.
The Safe Tcl security module does not provide safe versions of all dangerous
commands. For example, an agent that arrives from another machine cannot use the
Tk send command, which sends a Tk event to another Tk interpreter.8 In addition,
there are no safe versions of the network and screen commands, since the resource
managers either grant complete access to the screen and network or no access at
all. The network and screen commands simply remain \hidden" until the resource
managers grant access. Since all of the annoyance security threats, including ringing
the bell, involve screen commands, only trusted owners should be given screen access
in the current system. Once the system provides a virtual screen, anonymous agents
can be given screen access as well, although the bell command will need to be handled
specially. Despite the coarse-grained access to the network and screen, the simple
kernel-user model of Safe Tcl protects the machine well. No direct access to system
resources is possible, and there is no way for an agent to subvert the resource manager
decisions, since the agent cannot modify the access lists in the trusted interpreter.
Java. The Java enforcement module is implemented as a Java security manager
[CH97]. A Java security manager is a class that provides a set of access-control
methods, such as checkExec, checkRead, and checkExit. The Java system classes
call these methods to see if the corresponding operation is allowed. For example, the
System.exec method calls checkExec to see if the Java program is allowed to execute
8It is likely that the Tk send command will never be available since it is dicult to make secure
and agents should communicate within the agent framework anyways.
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the specied external program.9 Our security manager for agents is exactly equivalent
to the Safe Tcl mechanism above: each checkXXX method contacts the appropriate
resource manager and then throws a security exception if the resource manager denies
access. Our security manager also provides the require and restrict operations.
The restrict operation is actually split into two methods addRestriction and
removeRestriction; the resource limits apply to whatever code appears between
the calls to these two methods. Implementation of the Java security manager is not
yet complete. Since the methods follow the same logic as the corresponding Safe Tcl
procedures, however, implementation will proceed rapidly.
Scheme. Scheme 48 has a module system [KR95]. A module is a set of Scheme
functions with some of those functions marked as exported or public; a program can
load the module and invoke any of the exported functions. Providing the Scheme
enforcement module is mainly a matter of redening the system modules so that they
no longer export dangerous functions, but instead export secure versions of those
functions that perform the same security checks as in Tcl and Java. Although im-
plementation work is just starting, it appears that the necessary module redenitions
can be accomplished without changing the Scheme 48 virtual machine.
6.1.3 Summary
The mechanisms for protecting the machine are nearly complete. There are two re-
maining implementation issues. First, the implementation of the Java and Scheme
enforcement modules is incomplete. The remaining implementation work is not dif-
cult, however, and involves little more than reimplementing the Safe Tcl security
checks. Second, screen and network access is controlled at the coarsest possible level,
9The lename of the external program is a parameter to checkExec.
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with an agent either getting complete access or no access at all. Instead, agents
should be given a virtual screen and restricted access to common high-level network
services such as RPC and HTTP.
There are also three remaining architectural issues. First, the current architecture
requires that a new enforcement module be written for each language. This approach
minimizes the changes to the standard interpreters, but is time-consuming and error-
prone. Eventually we will move to the Ara model in which the core provides secure
versions of all system functions [PS97]; these core functions would still contact the
resource managers to determine access rights.
Second, Agent Tcl uses discretionary access control, in which each resource has an
associated access list that species the allowed actions for each agent owner. Many
other security models exist, such as (1) mandatory access control, in which programs,
people and data are assigned classication levels, and information can not ow from
higher to lower levels, (2) security automata [Sch97a], in which a program's current
allowed actions depend on its past resource usage,10 and (3) computer immunology
[FHS97, Gre97b], in which a program is considered malicious if its current pattern of
resource usage does not match its normal pattern. Although none of these models are
incompatible with Agent Tcl's current architecture, architectural extensions would be
needed for all three. As it becomes clearer which of the three models are useful in a
mobile-agent environment, we will consider implementing one or more of them.
Finally, an agent can still mount several denial-of-service attacks: (1) it can sit in
a tight loop and consume CPU time as fast as possible; (2) it can ood the local agent
server with requests; (3) it can ood the local network by sending requests to remote
10For example, an agent might be permitted to communicate with a remote machine as long as it
has not read from a sensitive le.
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agent servers as fast as possible (or by using some network service such as RPC to
which it has been given direct access); (4) it can allocate all available virtual memory;
and (5) it can thrash the local disk by randomly reading from any le to which it
has been given access (or by allocating a data structure that is too large for main
memory and then accessing the data structure in such a way as to cause page fault
after page fault). Preventing these denial-of-service attacks is not dicult; preventing
them without articially reducing performance is dicult. Ideally the system would
specify how much CPU time, memory, network bandwidth and disk bandwidth should
be made available for all agents, and then allocate or schedule the available capacity
among the agents.11 Doing this with reasonable overhead will probably require tighter
system integration, with agents running in threads rather than in their own processes.
For this reason, we plan to start with xed, per-agent limits for each of these resources,
and then move on to the more exible resource \scheduling" at a later time. Once the
remaining denial-of-service attacks are eliminated, Agent Tcl will successfully protect
machines from malicious agents and agents from each other.
6.2 Protecting a group of machines
Protecting a group of machines divides two distinct subcases: (1) all the machines
are under single administrative control, such as in a departmental LAN, or (2) all the
machines are not under single administrative control, such as in the Internet.
When the machines are under single administrative control, protecting the ma-
chines is straightforward. An agent is assigned a maximum resource allowance when
11The exact scheduling algorithm is an open question. There probably should be at least two
classes of agents, stationary service agents and visiting agents, with service agents having higher
priority.
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it rst enters the machine group. The allowance and the amount that the agent has
used so far is propagated along with the agent as it migrates. If the agent exceeds
its group allowance, it is terminated.12 Agent Tcl already provides this kind of group
protection. The consumables resource manager imposes a limit on how many times
an agent can jump, how much CPU time it can use, etc., within an administrator-
specied group of mutually trusting machines; the limits and the amounts used so far
are included in the migrating agent.13 Although Agent Tcl enforces this group limit
on consumables, it does not yet enforce a separate per-machine limit. Per-machine
12Alternatively, the agent could be sent back to its home machine or to a designated proxy site,
although the current Agent Tcl system does not provide such functionality. An agent can inspect
its group allowance, however, and can migrate out of the machine group if it sees that it is about to
run out of some resource.
13(1) In network environments where there is no threat of packet tampering, the group allowance
can be enforced correctly based solely on the sending machine's address that is included in the
migration header, i.e., it can be enforced correctly without encryption or digital signatures. This is
simply because each machine within the group knows about the maximum allowance for each owner
and will reset an incoming agent's reported maximum allowance if it is above the actual maximum.
Thus, although a malicious agent that is entering the group for the rst time might have a group
machine's address in its migration header, it will end up with the same maximum allowance that it
would have gotten without lying. Then, once the agent is inside the group, it is impossible for the
address in the migration header to be wrong since the servers on the group machines are trustworthy
and no packet tampering can take place. (2) On the other hand, in network environments where
packet tampering is possible, each machine must digitally sign the agent so that a group allowance
can not be increased during transit. Of course, if packet tampering is possible, the agent must be
digitally signed for many other reasons as well, such as preventing the insertion of code, modications
to variables, etc. In this case, the Agent Tcl server on each machine can be congured to accept
only signed agents (the signer can be the owner or the sending machine).
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limits could be provided easily within the existing framework, however.
When the machines are not under single administrative control, matters become
much more complex. One solution would be to standardize on a maximum number
of migrations and children per agent. Each agent carries along a count of migrations
and children so far, and each agent server increments these counts when appropriate.
When the agent reaches the limit, its current server denies permission to create a new
child or to migrate again. Unfortunately, this solution has three major drawbacks.
It does not prevent someone from ooding the network with multiple agents, it is
vulnerable to a malicious machine that provides the \service" of resetting the counts
of any agent that passes through it to zero, and it imposes an absolute resource limit
on all agents, rather than allowing an agent to \pay" for as many network resources
as it needs.
A more attractive solution is to use a market-based approach in which agents
pay for their resource usage with cryptographically-protected electronic cash [CB97,
SD95]. When an agent is created, it is given a nite currency supply from its owner's
own nite currency supply. The currency does not need to be tied to legal currency,
but it must be impossible to spend a currency unit more than once, and it must be
impossible for a user to quickly accumulate an arbitrarily large supply. The agent pays
for its resource usage with its currency and shares its currency with any child agents
that it creates. Eventually the agent and all its children run out of currency and are
sent back to the home machine, which either provides more currency or terminates
the agent. This market-based approach raises two important issues.
 Payment granularity. An agent could pay to migrate onto a machine, but then
be subject to absolute resource limits while on that machine. Alternatively, an
agent could pay for every resource that it uses, such as CPU time, memory, disk
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space, and network bandwidth, obtaining as much capacity as it wants as long
as its nancial resources hold out.14 Both models have their advantages. The
rst model is more ecient since it involves only a single payment per machine.
In addition, since an agent knows the size of this single payment before it
migrates, it also knows exactly how much currency it should have left when
it leaves each machine, making it relatively easy to detect when a malicious
machine has stolen currency and to identify the exact machine responsible.15
The second model is more attractive from an economics standpoint since it
allows a machine to charge for exactly the resources that the agent uses. On
the other hand, it is less ecient and much harder to audit, After all, who is
to say aside from the machine itself whether an agent uses 0.5 CPU seconds or
0.6.
 Legal versus nonlegal currency. Using legal currency allows an agent owner to
send out as many agents as she can aord, and allows a service provider to make
real money, which can be given to its own agents, used to maintain the service,
or simply viewed as prot. On the other hand, a malicious machine that steals
electronic cash is stealing real money. Although this theft is not necessarily
harder to detect, an audit will be much more involved, since the auditor must
decide whether to return real money to an aggrieved agent (and must impose a
corresponding ne on the malicious service provider).
Using nonlegal (but universal) currency makes the audit process simpler. In
14There will still be absolute resource limits, of course, but they might be set much higher.
15Machines would be required to log all incoming agents and their current currency reserves and
to provide this information whenever an aggrieved agent requested an audit from an authorized
third-party. There would be a time limit on audit requests so that a machine could safely truncate
its logs.
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a borderline case, for example, the auditor could return a limited amount of
fake money to an aggrieved agent without imposing a corresponding ne on the
service provider, simply because the auditor would not be losing real money. On
the other hand, a machine can do nothing with collected currency aside from
distributing it to its own agents, since the currency has no meaning outside of the
agent system. In addition, fake currency opens up the issue of how to generate
and distribute the currency, such that each owner has sucient currency for
their legitimate tasks, but the global currency supply does not grow without
bound. Injecting a xed amount of currency into the system on startup and
relying on normal economic processes seems insucient, since some owners will
mainly have client agents that spend the currency for network services; the
currency supply of these owners will steadily shrink.
Since the sole purpose of electronic cash here is to prevent an owner from ooding
the network with agents, it seems that a hybrid subscription approach is best. An
owner subscribes to a trusted banking service, paying real currency to get a certain
amount of fake currency per day. The subscription rates might be nonlinear so that a
single user can obtain a modest amount of fake currency for free (or nearly free), but
cannot obtain a large amount without a signicant cash outlay. The agent spends
this fake currency to migrate onto service machines, but the spent currency is not
added to the service provider's supply. Instead, once the banking system veries
that the fake currency has not been spent before, the fake currency simply ceases
to exist.16 Otherwise, the obvious attack is to set up a fake (or real) service, collect
a large amount of currency, and then ood the network with agents. For a similar
16If an agent spends currency on its owner's machines, the currency can be collected and reused.
Alternatively, certain machines might not charge certain users.
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reason, currency that is unspent after a twenty-four hour period becomes invalid, so
that an owner can not hoard currency for a later ooding attack. Of course, using
fake currency to control agent propagation does not prevent a service from charging
real money at the application level.
Many other agent projects plan to use electronic cash to control agent propagation,
including Tacoma [JvRS95], Ara [PS97], and Messengers [BFD96]. Little implemen-
tation work has been done by any of these projects. Agent Tcl does have a simple
banking system that provides cryptographically-protected digital cash, but machines
do not yet charge agents for migration or other services.
6.3 Protecting the agent
Protecting an agent from a malicious machine is the most dicult security problem.
Unless \trusted (and tamper-resistant) hardware" is available on each agent server
[CGH+95], something which is extremely unlikely in the near future, there is no way
to prevent a malicious machine from examining or modifying any part of the agents
that visit it. Thus, the real problem is not to prevent theft and tampering, but
instead to prevent the machine from using stolen information in a meaningful way
and to detect tampering as soon as possible, ideally as soon as the agent migrates
onto the next machine. Unfortunately, there is no single mechanism that can solve
this problem, and it is unlikely that there will ever be a complete technical solution,
due to the unimaginable variety of theft and tampering attacks that can be mounted
against a visiting agent. Instead, some part of the solution will always be sociological
and legal pressures [CGH+95]. There are several partial technical solutions, however.
Hopefully, by picking and choosing from these partial solutions, most agents will be
able to protect themselves adequately for their current task, but still move freely
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throughout the network. Before considering some of these partial solutions, it is
worthwhile to consider two broad categories of tampering attacks.
 Normal routing. The malicious machine allows the agent to continue with its
normal itinerary, but holds the agent longer than necessary, charges the agent
extra money, or modies the agent's code or state. Holding the agent longer than
necessary prevents a time-critical agent from accomplishing its task. Modifying
the agent's code or state causes the agent to perform some work on behalf of the
malicious machine, take some dangerous action, or simply reach an incorrect
result. These modication threats are why Agent Tcl agents currently become
anonymous as soon as they migrate through an untrusted machine.
 Rerouting. The malicious machine reroutes the agent to a machine that it
would not have visited under normal circumstances, or prevents the agent from
migrating at all and pretends that it is the next machine on the agent's normal
itinerary. The latter attack might be used against an agent that is migrating
through a sequence of service providers, attempting to nd the best price for
some service or product. A service provider can hold the agent on its machine,
masquerade as the other service providers, and report higher prices than its own
price. Although such an attack requires the service provider to recognize what a
particular agent is doing and then update the agent's state as if it had actually
visited the other machines, many applications will involve pre-packaged agents
that users purchase from the application developers. Recognizing and fooling
these well-known agents will not be dicult.
Now, with both theft and these two tampering attacks in mind, we can consider
the partial solutions.
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 Trusted machines and noncritical agents. The rst solution is simply to realize
that many agents do not need protection at all, either because they are per-
forming some noncritical task (e.g., an anonymous agent interacting with a free
search engine), or because they operate entirely on trusted machines (e.g., an
agent that is installing new software on a department's machine). Trusted ma-
chines can include not only all the machines in your own department, but also
machines belonging to large, well-known corporations, such as America Online,
Microsoft, Netscape, and United Airlines.
 Partitioning. An agent can migrate through trusted machines only, such as a set
of general proxy sites under the control of a trusted Internet service provider.
Then it either interacts with untrusted resources from across the network using
standard RPC, or sends out child agents that contain no sensitive data and
will not migrate again, instead just returning their result. More complicated
partitioning schemes can be used if needed. In fact, partitioning can achieve
as much client protection as in traditional distributed computing, since the
sensitive portion of the agent can always be left on the home machine.
 Replication and voting. Tacoma uses a replication and voting scheme to han-
dle malicious machines that either terminate an agent outright or provide the
agent with incorrect information [MvRSS96]. Here, if the task requires a single
agent to visit n services in sequence, the application instead sends out several
agents, each of which visits distinct but supposedly equivalent copies of the n
services. The agents exchange results after each stage, each agent keeping the
majority result. Although this scheme prevents many kinds of attacks, it also
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has several drawbacks. First, there must be multiple copies of each service17; in
addition, since the copies might be functionally equivalent but not identical, the
agent must be able to handle dierent interfaces and dierent result formats.
Second, if the agents are spending money to access the services, the user will
spend much more money than if a single agent had migrated through a single
copy. Finally, the cryptographic overhead is large. Despite these disadvantages,
replication and voting schemes will be used in many agents, since they are the
only way to handle services that provide incorrect information (assuming that
the incorrectness cannot be easily detected). Tacoma also includes rear-guard
agents that restart a vanished agent.
 Components. Perhaps the most powerful idea is to divide each agent into com-
ponents [CGH+95]. Components can be added to the agent as it migrates, and
each component can be encrypted and signed with dierent keys. The agent's
static code and the variables whose values never change would make up one
component, and would be signed with the owner's key before the agent left the
home machine. If a malicious machine modies the code or variables, the digital
signature becomes invalid and the next machine in the migration sequence will
immediately detect the modication. In addition, if an agent obtains critical
information from a service, it can put this information into its own component.
Then the component is signed with the machine's key to prevent tampering, and
can even be encrypted with a trusted machine's key (e.g., the home machine or
a proxy site) so that other machines cannot examine it. Of course, the agent
must return to that trusted machine before it can use the information again
17And the copies cannot be under the control of a single organization. Otherwise all the copies
might have the same malicious behavior.
118
itself. Similarly, any code or data that is not needed until the agent reaches
a particular machine can be encrypted with that machine's key. For example,
an agent might encrypt the bulk of its electronic cash with a proxy site's key,
so that it could migrate through untrusted machines without worrying about
theft. The agent would return to the proxy site when it needed to spend the
cash. Depending on the migration model, this component approach also al-
lows a machine to place greater trust in an agent that has migrated through
untrusted machines. For example, if the code to be executed on the current
machine is in its own component, digitally signed with the owner's key, and this
code does not depend on any volatile variables, the code can be executed with
the owner's permissions, rather than as anonymous. Finally, components make
it easier for an agent to use the partitioning approach above; an agent can leave
a particular component behind on a trusted machine, or can create and send
out a child agent that includes only certain components.
 Self-authentication. In most agents, certain parts of the agent's state will change
as the agent migrates from machine to machine, such as the variable values and
the control information on the interpreter's stack. Although it is impossible
to detect all malicious modications to this state information, it is possible
to construct an authentication routine that will examine the state information
for any obvious inconsistencies or impossibilities [PS97]. The authentication
routine could also examine the current set of components. Such an authenti-
cation routine would be placed in its own component and digitally signed with
the owner's key. Each agent server would execute the authentication routine,
terminating the agent (and notifying the home machine) if the routine nds
any inconsistencies. The authentication routine would run as anonymous and
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would only have authority to examine the state image. Like the components
themselves, such an authentication routine allows a machine to place greater
trust in an agent that has migrated through untrusted machines.
 Migration history. It is possible to embed a tamper-proof migration history
inside a moving agent [MvRSS96]. This movement history allows the detection
of some rerouting attacks, particularly if an agent is following a xed itinerary,
and, in combination with additional digital signatures, makes it impossible for a
malicious machine to drop an entire component from the agent. The movement
history could also be examined inside the authentication routine above.
 Audit logs. Machines should keep logs of important agent events so that an
aggrieved agent or owner can request an audit from an authorized third-party
[CGH+95]. The auditor would seek to identify the machine responsible for a
theft or modication and penalize that machine appropriately. The exact con-
tents of the audit logs is largely an open question. It is clear that all electronic-
cash transfers must be logged, however, so that a machine cannot steal electronic
cash without providing the desired service. Of course, a malicious machine can
construct a false log, so the auditor must look for log entries that are inconsistent
with log entries from other machines, rather than just log entries that explicitly
indicate a malicious action. In addition malicious machines can collude in their
logging to make an honest, intervening machine look malicious. Thus, in some
situations, the auditor can impose serious sanctions only after it has observed
an apparent attack happening to multiple agents (that are following dierent
migration trajectories).
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 Encrypted algorithms. Recent work [San97, Hoh97] involves encrypting a pro-
gram and its inputs in such a way that (1) the encrypted program is directly
executable, (2) the encrypted program performs the same task as the original
program, and (3) the output from the encrypted program is also encrypted and
can only be decrypted by the program encrypter. Although this work is in its
infancy and remains either theoretical or unproven, it has great promise for
mobile-agent systems, since it would become much harder for a malicious ma-
chine to make a targeted modication, i.e., a modication with a known, useful
eect, to an agent or its state.
Even taken together, these techniques cannot provide complete protection. In
addition, many of the techniques involve substantial cryptographic and logging over-
head, forcing an agent to trade performance for protection. Most agents should be
able to realize adequate protection through some combination of these techniques,
however, while still maintaining reasonable performance. The overriding issue is how





Dierent applications have dierent performance constraints. Some applications need
to continue interacting with a user or resource even if a network link goes down; other
applications need to minimize network trac; and still others need to minimize total
completion time or per-operation completion time. By nature, mobile agents are an
attractive choice for the rst two kinds of applications, since they can move to the
other side of an unreliable link or closer to the necessary information sources. Whether
they are an attractive choice for the last kind of application, however, depends on
their migration latency, communication latency, and execution speed. In this chapter,
we examine exactly these three measures, comparing mobile agents against traditional
client-server systems based around TCP/IP and remote procedure call (RPC). The
current Agent Tcl system has not been turned for performance, and, as we will see, it
suers from high migration overhead and the slowness of interpreted languages. The
performance numbers are good enough, however, to suggest that a combination of
faster languages and additional system engineering will make Agent Tcl competitive
even for compute-intensive applications in high-performance networks.
We limit the scope of the performance analysis in three ways.
 Tcl agents. All agents are written in Tcl. Tcl is the only language for which im-
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plementation work is suciently complete. Java agents cannot establish meet-
ings, and Scheme agents cannot migrate, making it impossible to run a full set
of performance experiments for Java and Scheme agents.
 Anonymous agents. The agents do not use encryption; they are neither en-
crypted nor digitally signed. Agent Tcl currently uses a separate PGP process
for encryption and digital signatures. This approach is convenient and exible,
but also extremely slow, performing far worse than the encryption subsystems
found in secure client-server systems. Thus, since we are planning to replace
PGP with a faster encryption library later, it did not seem worthwhile to do
a detailed performance comparison of secure agents and secure client-server
computing now.
 Low-level operations. We measure the performance of low-level operations
rather than entire applications. Low-level operations include migration, send-
ing and receiving messages, and sending and receiving messages over a meeting.
Since there are several obvious performance enhancements that can be made
to Agent Tcl, and the low-level measurements all conrmed the need for these
enhancements, it did not seem worthwhile to devote time to higher-level mea-
surements. Instead, application measurements will wait until the two faster
languages, Java and Scheme, are in place, and a few of the major performance
enhancements are nished.
Despite this limited scope, the analysis highlights several areas of good perfor-
mance as well as several needed performance enhancements. The analysis is divided
into two sections. The rst section examines the base performance of Agent Tcl,
identies the needed performance enhancements, and compares mobile agents with
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traditional cross-network communication. The second section develop a simple for-
mula that, under simplifying assumptions about processor and language speeds, in-
dicates whether an application should be written as a stationary client process or as
a migrating Tcl agent.
7.1 Base performance
Two machines were used to measure base performance. The rst machine,
bald.cs.dartmouth.edu, is a 200 MHz Intel Pentium running Linux 2.0.0. It has 16
megabytes of physical memory and 128 megabytes of swap space. The second ma-
chine, q.cs.dartmouth.edu, is a 133 MHz Intel Pentium running FreeBSD 2.1.6.1. It
also has 16 megabytes of physical memory and 128 megabytes of swap space. The
two machines are connected with a 10 megabit Ethernet and one router. All single-
machine experiments were performed on bald. In the two-machine experiments, the
client or source machine was always q, and the server or destination machine was
always bald.
These two machines and their experimental roles are not meant to reect any
average or generic network. They are simply one particular example of a server
and lower-powered client connected with a reliable, low-latency, high-bandwidth net-
work. Such a network environment is the most interesting for the initial round of
performance measurements, since if a mobile agent has a performance advantage
over traditional client-server systems in a mid-performance network, this advantage
will usually increase as latency, bandwidth and reliability become worse. The two
exceptions relate to code size and processor power.
 If the agent's code size is greater than the size of the intermediate results, and
network bandwidth drops, the additional time needed to transmit the agent
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might become the dominant factor, increasing the total completion time.
 If the processor power of the server decreases or the processor power of the
client increases, an agent sent to the server might no longer outperform native
code on the client, even if the agent reduces network usage.
If the agent's code size is less than the size of the intermediate results, however, and
the client and server machines do not change, the relative performance of the mobile
agent must increase as network performance drops, since the agent transmits less
data across the network (and makes the same or fewer cross-network connections).
It is this observation that led us to do the initial performance measurements in a
mid-performance network.
7.1.1 Inter-agent communication
The two graphs in Figure 7.1 compare communication times for agents and tradi-
tional client-server techniques when the two communicating entities are on dierent
machines.1 The TCP/IP curve shows the time needed for a (non-agent) client and
server process to exchange a request and response over an already connected TCP/IP
connection. Each request begins with two four-byte integers, one that species the
size of request and another that species the size of the desired response; the rest of
the request is just dummy data. The server waits for a client connection and then
sits in a tight loop, receiving requests and sending back dummy responses of the ap-
propriate size. Then client connects to the server and then times how long it takes
to exchange one hundred request and responses (for each request and response size).
This process is repeated multiple times over a twelve-hour period 2. Then, If we end
1The data for Figure 7.1 was taken from Tables A.12, A.10, A.7, A.8 and A.6.

























































Figure 7.1: Time in milliseconds for two processes or agents on dierent machines to
exchange a request and a response. Each data point is an average of several timings;
the largest standard deviation is 5.3 percent. Note that the two graphs show the
same data; the top graph just shows the data for a smaller range of message sizes,
so that the details are clearly visible. Also the RPC curve ends at a message size of
8,192 bytes due to an argument-size limitation.
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up with n times for each request and response size, the longest n / 2 times are thrown
out.3 The remaining times are averaged and then divided by one hundred to get the
average per-request time. All of the average times are shown in Appendix A; the
graphs only plot the times for which the request and response sizes are the same.
The RPC curve is the same as the TCP/IP curve except that the client and server
process are using Sun RPC over UDP. Here, the request is the single argument to
the remote procedure, and the response is the result value. Both the argument and
result value are strings. The RPC curve only goes up to a request/response size of
8,192 bytes, since the RPC implementation on the client machine could not handle
arguments larger than that size.
The TCP/IP (messages) curve is the same as the TCP/IP curve except that
the client and server process are using the messaging subsystem from Agent Tcl.
The send operation in this message subsystem accepts a structure that contains the
message elements, serializes the message elements, and sends the resulting bytestream
across the connection. Similarly, the receive operation receives a bytestream from
the connection, unserializes the bytestream, and returns a structure that contains the
message elements. In this case, the message consists of a single buer of binary data.
TCP/IP (messages) is about 5 percent slower than TCP/IP. The slowdown is from
the serialization and unserialization routines and three dynamic-memory allocations;
the three allocations are a buer for the outgoing serialized message, a buer for the
incoming serialized message, and a buer for the single message component.
The Agent Tcl messages curve is the time needed for two agents to exchange a
request and response; the Agent Tcl meetings curve is the time needed for two agents
3The experiments were not run on an isolated network. Hopefully, by throwing out the longest
n / 2 times, we end up keeping only those times for which there was little other network trac.
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to exchange a request and response over an already established meeting.4 Although
meetings use TCP/IP and the same messaging subsystem as the TCP/IP (messages)
curve, the performance of meetings is about 20 percent worse than that of the TCP/IP
curve, rather than just 5 percent. There are three sources of additional overhead: (1)
parsing the Tcl commands that send and receive the message, (2) setting a time-
out on each receive (and removing the timeout when the message arrives), and (3)
using asynchronous I/O (rather than a blocking read or select) to detect when a
message has arrived over the meeting. Since the Tcl version is not multi-threaded,
asynchronous I/O is needed for event-driven agents, in which an incoming message
cause the immediate execution of some Tcl procedure.5 Although some optimization
is possible, these three sources of overhead cannot be reduced signicantly, except
that a compiled agent language will avoid most of the parsing overhead.
Messages, on the other hand, range from two to sixteen times slower than the
TCP/IP curve, even though they also use TCP/IP and the messaging subsystem.
Messages suer from the same three sources of overhead as meetings, but also have
two more critical ineciencies.
 Connections. Each message involves a new TCP/IP connection between the
sending agent and remote server. Worse, most TCP/IP implementations do
not acknowledge the rst packet sent over a new connection immediately, and
do not send the second packet until this acknowledgment is received [Ste94].6
Specically, once the rst packet arrives over a connection, the receiving ma-
4The time needed to establish the meeting will be considered later, when we look at the total
time needed for an agent to migrate onto a remote machine, interact with a service agent, and return
a result to the home machine.
5The Java version does not use asynchronous I/O. It creates a watcher thread for each meeting.
6This scheme is known as slow-start.
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chine waits for data going in the opposite direction along the connection. If data
shows up, the machine piggybacks the acknowledgment onto the data packet. If
data does not show up within a timeout interval (typically 200 milliseconds), the
machine sends a separate acknowledgment packet. The sending machine sends
the second packet only when it receives the acknowledgment. You can see this
eect in Figure 7.1 where the Agent Tcl messages time jumps from 4 millisec-
onds to 200 milliseconds when the message size goes from 1,024 bytes to 2,048
bytes. 1,024 bytes t in one packet, so the receiving server immediately gets
the entire message and immediately sends back the application-level response
indicating that the message was received and buered; the TCP/IP acknowl-
edgment is piggybacked on this response. 2,048 bytes require two packets, so
the server has to wait for 200 milliseconds before the second packet shows up
with the rest of the message. The reason that the delay is not 400 milliseconds
is that Linux 2.0.0. aggressively reduces the delayed acknowledgment timeout
based on packet inter-arrival times. In our environment, the timeout is already
near zero immediately after the connection has been established. Thus, only
the message sent from the Linux machine to the FreeBSD machine encounters
the 200 millisecond delay.
Eliminating the delayed acknowledgment simply requires an application-level
acknowledgment for the rst packet (if the rst packet does not contain the
entire message). This acknowledgment could be a single dummy byte or (more
likely) 4 zero bytes, since Agent Tcl's messaging subsystem interprets 4 zero
bytes as an empty message. The messaging subsystem can simply ignore any
empty messages that arrive before the real server response. Eliminating the
reconnection on every message is more dicult since Agent Tcl is currently
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based around multiple processes. Although two servers whose agents were com-
municating heavily could certainly cache the open connection, the time needed
to get an outgoing message onto that connection (either by transferring the
message or le descriptor to another local process) could easily outweigh the
reconnection time. It might reasonable, however, for each server to allow a few
remote agents to hold open a connection, much as if the agents had established
a meeting with the server rather than a specic agent. In addition, as more
and more of the system is multi-threaded, a dedicated connection between two
servers will become more attractive, since accessing that connection would not
require interprocess communication.
 Multiple processes. There are actually ve process involved in receiving a mes-
sage from a remote agent: (1) a server process that buers incoming messages,
(2) a server process that watches the server's TCP/IP port, (3) a server process
that is forked to handle the incoming message, (4) a \background" process that
serves as the interface between the server and the recipient agent, and (5) the
recipient agent itself. The process that is watching the server's TCP/IP port
sees the incoming message and forks a process to handle the message. This pro-
cess transfers the message to the main server process, which buers the message
in its internal queue. Eventually, the background process reaches an idle point
and asks the main server process for any new messages. The main server process
transfers the incoming message to the background process, which nally trans-
fers it to the recipient agent. The fork (and the corresponding process) can be
eliminated by replacing the single socket watcher with a pool of socket watchers.
A more complete solution, however, is to multi-thread the entire server and have
a pool of threads watching the TCP/IP port rather than a pool of processes.
130
The message is then transferred between processes only once, when it is trans-
ferred from the server buers to the recipient agent. Unfortunately, eliminating
this one last transfer (i.e., allowing the server to insert the message directly into
the agent's internal queues) requires either multi-threading the entire system
or far more exible shared-memory facilities than most systems provide. Both
approaches, however, are reasonable long-term implementation goals.
Although the eect of these two problems is reduced as message size increases
(since network transmission time dominates the total time), most messages are apt
to be small. Thus the two problems must be addressed. Our immediate plans are
to eliminate the delayed acknowledgment (through the application-level acknowledg-
ment), multi-thread the server, and then reexamine communication performance.
Figure 7.2 shows the communication times when the two agents or processes are
on the same machine.7 We ran the same experiments as before, except that we now
include a Unix domain socket, both with and without the Agent Tcl messaging sub-
system. In addition, Agent Tcl meetings and messages work slightly dierently when
the two agents are on the same machine. Meetings use a Unix domain socket rather
than TCP/IP, and the agent does not need to establish a connection for each mes-
sage, since each agent has a permanent connection with its local server. The message
still goes through three extra processes before nally reaching the recipient, however,
the background process for the sender, the main server process, and the background
process for the recipient. Thus, aside from the delayed TCP/IP acknowledgment, the
meetings and messages have the same sources of overhead as when the two agents
were on dierent machines. Since the transmission time over a Unix domain socket is
much lower than over TCP/IP, however, the eect of these overheads is much more
7The data for Figure 7.2 was taken from Tables A.11, A.9, A.4, A.2, A.5, A.3, and A.1.
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pronounced, with meetings twelve times slower than a bare Unix socket and messages
fty-two times slower.
With messages, multi-threading the server will again eliminate two of the extra
processes, making messages only twice as slow as meetings rather than four times as
slow. In addition, even with each agent in its own process, it is possible to bypass
the server entirely when sending a message. For example, each agent could have
its own Unix domain socket within some designated directory. Although such a
scheme would require careful access control to prevent one agent from masquerading
as another8, it is workable. The performance improvement when sending only a
single message is dicult to predict and will probably vary widely from machine to
machine; since the system could hold open the connection that is established for the
rst message, however, sending multiple messages to the same agent should be nearly
as fast as sending those same messages over a meeting. In fact, if it turns out that the
performance improvement is small for only a single message, we can dispense with
the special Unix domain socket and simply have the agents automatically establish
a meeting when sending more than one message. As before, improving performance
further will require more aggressive multi-threading or more exible shared-memory
facilities.
Finally, as before, a compiled agent language would not have the parsing overhead
of Tcl. For meetings, the current overhead (for parsing the Agent Tcl commands that
send and receive the messages) is 25 percent (220 milliseconds) for 64-byte messages
and 55 percent (33000 milliseconds) for 64-kilobyte messages. For messages, the
parsing overhead is 8 percent (300 milliseconds) for 64-byte messages and 28 percent
(34000 milliseconds) for 64-kilobyte messages. The parsing actually takes about the
























































Figure 7.2: Time in milliseconds for two processes or agents on the same machine to
exchange a request and a response. Each data point is an average of several timings;
the largest standard deviation is 4.7 percent. Note that the two graphs show the
same data; the top graph just shows the data for a smaller range of message sizes,
so that the details are clearly visible. Also the RPC curve ends at a message size of
8,192 bytes due to an argument-size limitation.
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same amount of time for both meetings and messages, but has a much greater relative
impact on meetings, which are much faster overall.
Figure 7.3 compares communication times for two agents on the same machine
with communication times for two client-server processes on dierent machines.9 Lo-
cal agent meetings are always faster than cross-network communication (e.g, TCP/IP),
ranging from two to six times faster as message size increases, with all but the smallest
message size three times faster or more. On the other hand, local agent messages are
slower than cross-network communication for data sizes below 400 bytes (due to the
high overhead of copying the message between server processes), but 50 percent faster
than cross-network communication for data sizes above 1024 bytes. Multi-threading
the server and thus eliminating two extra message copies will make local agent mes-
sages just as fast as cross-network communication for the smallest messages and more
than twice as fast for the largest messages. Bypassing the server altogether will im-
prove performance further, possibly making messages as fast as meetings if multiple
messages are sent to the same recipient. Finally, it is easy to believe that nearly 75
percent of the Tcl parsing overhead can be eliminated. For example, the stationary
service agent could be written in C or C++, and the migrating agent could be written
in Java. Then, local agent meetings would become three to seven times faster than
cross-network communication, with all but the two smallest message sizes four times
faster or more. Messages would see a similar (but smaller) improvement.
Thus, even though they are written in Tcl, two agents on the same machine
can communicate faster than two client/server processes on dierent machines (in
most cases), meaning that we can reduce communication time by dispatching an
agent to a remote machine. The question then is how much work the Tcl agent can
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Figure 7.3: The Agent Tcl messages and Agent Tcl meetings curves are communica-
tion times for two agents on the same machine; the TCP/IP and RPC curves are for
two client/server processes on dierent machines. As in the other gures, the two
graphs show the same data, just for a dierent range of messages sizes, and the RPC
curve ends at a message size of 8,192 bytes.
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perform before its CPU time exceeds the savings in communication time. As one
might expect, the answer depends entirely on the agent's task, especially since Tcl
is an interesting mix of high-level string and list commands and low-level control
commands such as if, for and while. To get a general impression, however, we
will consider two tasks: (1) see if a string contains a given substring (which can be
done with a built-in Tcl command called string that is implemented in C), and (2)
nd the minimum element in a list of integers (which must be done with a loop and
comparison statement written in Tcl). With meetings, local agent communication is
1.2 milliseconds faster than cross-network communication for 64-byte messages, 3.9
milliseconds faster for 512-byte messages, and 140 milliseconds faster for 64-kilobyte
messages. Within these time periods, the agent can determine that a 5K, 17K, or
512K string respectively does not contain a given 5-element substring.10 On the
other hand, it can nd the minimum integer in a list of only 11, 37 or 1200 integers
respectively. For comparison, within these same time periods, a compiled (but non-
optimized) C++ program on the same machine can determine that an 18K, 58K,
or 2,090K string respectively does not contain a given 5-element substring, and can
nd the minimum integer in a list of 4800, 15,600, or 560,000 integer respectively.
These measurements lead to two conclusions. First, a Tcl agent is interested in end-
to-end latency can do only a small amount of work between each resource access;
otherwise the Tcl agent will take longer than a traditional client/server system that
accesses the resource from across the network. Second, excluding the small amount of
CPU time that the agent-enabled server saves by not writing intermediate data onto
the network, an agent-enabled server might see a CPU load as much as 500 times
higher than a server that provides the desired high-level operation directly (rather
10The string and the given substring have no characters in common.
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then providing low-level primitives and allowing an agent to combine those primitives
itself).
Of course, the actual increase in CPU load depends entirely on the resources that
the server provides and the languages that it supports. For example, if a resource
maintains a large database and allows high-level queries against this database, the
additional CPU time for an agent that makes a few independent queries against
the database might be insignicant, even if the agent is written in Tcl. Also, Java
and Scheme 48, which have already been integrated into the system, are only ten to
twenty times slower than natively compiled code, an overhead that more servers will
be willing to accept. In addition, there are faster execution environments such as
Omniware that can execute an agent only 25 percent slower than natively compiled
code on average [ATLLW96]; if such an environment is incorporated into Agent Tcl,
the CPU load on the server (excluding migration overhead) will be about the same
regardless of whether the server provides low-level operations and accepts agents or
provides high-level operations and does not accept agents.11
7.1.2 Agent migration
Figure 7.4 shows the time needed to create a child agent on either the local machine
or a remote machine (and for the child agent to send a 64-byte dummy result to its
parent).12 As can be seen from the Agent Tcl messages curves in Figures 7.1 and
7.2, the time needed to send the result back to the home machine is relatively small.
11Of course, the server would need to discourage agents from using slower languages, such as
imposing a harsh CPU-time limit, charging those agents more money, or disallowing those agents
altogether. Agents that were then unwilling or unable to migrate onto the machine would have to
interact with the resource from across the network.
12The data for Figure 7.4 was taken from Tables A.14 and A.13.
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Thus, agent creation is currently an inecient operation, taking over a tenth of a
second for even the smallest agent. Most of the overhead comes from starting up
a Tcl interpreter in which to execute the new agent. On our destination machine,
it takes approximately 60,000 microseconds for the server to exec the interpreter
and for the interpreter to read its initialization les. In addition, when the agent is
created on a remote machine, the destination server must fork twice, once to create
the request handler and once again to exec the interpreter. When the agent is created
on the same machine, the local server must fork only once to exec the interpreter; the
request handler already exists. In both cases, the request handler must communicate
with the main server process to add the agent to the internal tables, and must copy
the registration information and the child agent's state information into the new
interpreter process.
Multi-threading the server will help here just as it helps with messages, eliminat-
ing one fork and the interprocess communication that registers the new agent with
the main server process.13 Clearly, however, the main point of attack must be the
interpreter startup time. One intermediate approach, which would cut startup time
approximately in half, is to embed the initialization les inside the Tcl interpreter's
code, so that they do not have to be read from disk. A more attractive approach,
however, is to maintain a pool of interpreter processes, each of which has already
read the initialization les. Then, an incoming agent is simply passed to one of these
available interpreters. In addition, to replenish the pool eciently (i.e., to provide
good migration times even under high load), one of the pool interpreters should al-
ways remain unused; when there are no other free interpreters left in the pool, this
unused interpreter forks to create new interpreters. It seems likely that, except for






















Creating a child agent
Different machines
Same machine
Figure 7.4: Time in milliseconds to create a child agent and for that agent to send
back a 64-byte dummy result. For small agent sizes, it takes longer to create a child
agent on the local machine, probably due to context switches and the impossibility
of any computational overlap. As before, each data point is the average of multiple
timings; the largest standard deviation is 10.4 percent (but the next largest deviation
is only 6.6 percent percent).
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the time needed to capture and restore the state information, agent creation can be
made nearly as ecient as sending a message.
Figure 7.5 shows the time needed for an existing agent to migrate from the home
machine to the destination machine and then back to the home machine.14 One im-
portant note is that, in contrast with the other experiments and plots, the initial and
nal sizes are just the size of the dummy variable that is used to pad the agent. Every
agent includes approximately 2K of additional identication and state information.
Thus, every agent encounters the delayed acknowledgment problem, which accounts
for 200 milliseconds of the migration overhead.15 The rest of the overhead is from
the forks and interprocess communication in the server and the time needed to start
up two interpreters, one when the agent journeys to the remote machine and another
when the agent returns to the home machine. The time needed to start the inter-
preter on the remote machine is 60 milliseconds as before; the time needed to start
the interpreter on the slower home machine is approximately 100 milliseconds. Fix-
ing the delayed acknowledgment, multi-threading the server, and maintaining a pool
of ready interpreters should reduce migration time to just the time needed to send
a message plus the time needed to capture and restore the state information. The
capture and restoration time ranges from about 3 milliseconds for a 64-byte agent to
about 76 milliseconds for a 64-kilobyte agent. Capture and restoration is inecient
in the current system, however, since the state information is packaged as a human-
readable Tcl list for implementation and debugging convenience. Packaging the state
14The data for Figure 7.5 was taken from Table A.15.
15Note the the delayed acknowledgment problem was not encountered when creating child agents
(Figure 7.4). The child agents were sent to the Linux machine, which does not implement the delayed






















Figure 7.5: Time in seconds for an agent to jump to a remote machine and then jump
back to the home machine. The \initial size" is the size of the agent when it leaves
the home machine; the \nal size" is the size of the agent when it returns to the home
machine. As before, each data point is an average of multiple timings; the largest
standard deviation is 6.8 percent.
information as a binary bytestream instead should reduce capture and restoration
time by more than a factor of two.
Combining the current creation and migration times with the 11.9 milliseconds
needed to establish a meeting, we have a somewhat negative result. When a 1-kilobyte
agent is created on a remote machine and then establishes a meeting with a service
agent, the agent must make at least 113 64-byte requests, 35 512-byte requests or 1
64-kilobyte request over the meeting before the time savings from the more ecient
local communication outweighs the creation time. Similarly, when a 1-kilobyte agent
migrates and establishes a meeting (and later migrates back), it must make at least
345 64-byte requests, 106 512-byte requests, or 3 64-kilobyte requests. Thus, in its
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current form, Agent Tcl cannot be used for applications in which end-to-end latency
is the primary concern, except if (1) the network is extremely slow, (2) the interme-
diate results are extremely large, or (3) the downtime of an unreliable network link
contributes signicantly to the end-to-end latency. The performance improvements
outlined above, however, should drop these thresholds to only a handful of requests.
More specically, if we eliminate interpreter startup time (60 and 100 milliseconds on
the two machines used in the experiments), eliminate the delayed acknowledgment
(200 milliseconds), improve the state capture and restoration routines (2 to 38 mil-
liseconds as agent size increases), and multi-thread the server to eliminate forks and
interprocess communication (tens of milliseconds for all agent sizes plus additional
time as agent size increases), we will reduce the creation times in Figure 7.4 by nearly
100 milliseconds for the smallest agents; similarly, we will reduce the migration times
in Figure 7.5 by nearly 400 milliseconds for the smallest agents. Conservatively as-
suming that this leaves us with 25 milliseconds to create a 1K child agent and 50
milliseconds to migrate a 1K agent to and from a remote machine, the child agent
only needs to make 21 64-byte requests, 7 512-byte requests, or 1 64-kilobyte request,
and the migrating agent only needs to make 42 64-bytes, 13 512-byte requests, or 1
64-kilobyte request.
A nal performance note is that there is currently no overlapping of communi-
cation and processing. With both incoming agents and messages, the system rst
receives the entire bytestream, then unserializes the bytestream, and nally processes
the agent or message. Overlapping these activities could lead to a signicant perfor-
mance improvement (when the agent or message is coming from a dierent machine),
since at least some of the processing time would be hidden inside the transmission
time. Unfortunately, although conceptually straightforward, such overlapping re-
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quires signicant implementation work.
7.1.3 Summary
Although several optimizations can be made to the communication subsystem, the
current communication times are promising and are sucient for many applications.
Instead the main problem in the current system is the migration overhead. Reducing
the migration overhead and integrating faster languages should allow Agent Tcl agents
to be at least competitive with traditional client-server computing in mid-performance
networks such as our 10 megabit Ethernet, and signicantly better in slower or less
reliable networks.
7.2 When to migrate
Migration only makes sense under certain network and resource conditions. In this
section, we consider an application that needs to access a network resource to perform
its task and that wants to minimize its total completion time. We derive a formula
that indicates whether the application should be written as (1) a stationary client
process that interacts with the resource over a standard TCP/IP connection or (2) a
mobile agent that migrates to the location of the resource, interacts with the resource
using the Agent Tcl communication primitives, and then migrates back to the home
machine. To simplify the formula, we make four assumptions.
 The stationary client and the mobile agent are written in the same language.
 All machines in the network are the same and are lightly loaded.
 Links between machines never go down.
 Machines never go down.
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With these four assumptions, the formula does not have to take into account
machine speeds, machine loads, the expected downtimes of machines and links, or
the relative execution speed of native and mobile code.
The data used to derive the formula was obtained experimentally in an isolated
network of two machines. Each machine was a 133 MHz Pentium laptop running
Linux 2.027. Each machine had 16 MB of physical memory and 64 MB of swap
space. Depending on the experiment, the two machines were connected with a 28.8
Kb/s modem link, a 2.0 MB/s wireless Ethernet link, or a 10.0 MB/s wired Ethernet
link.
Figure 7.6 shows the time needed for two agents on the same laptop to exchange
a request and response, either over an Agent Tcl meeting or with the send and
receive primitives.16 The time is plotted as a function of the total number of bytes
transferred, i.e., the request size plus the response size. As in the previous section,
the meeting data does not include the time needed to establish the meeting.
Computing the best-t linear functions with discrete least-squares approximation,
we see that the time t in milliseconds for the two agents to exchange an S-byte request
and an R-byte response over an Agent Tcl meeting is
t = 0:00066(S +R) + 0:65 (7.1)
Similarly, the time for the two agents to exchange a request and response using
the send and receive primitives is
t = 0:0013(S +R) + 4:3 (7.2)
16The data for Figure 7.6 was taken from Tables B.2 and B.1.
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The top graph in Figure 7.7 shows the time needed for a client and server process
on dierent laptops to exchange a request and response over a 28.8 Kb/s modem
connection.17 As before, the time is plotted as a function of the total number of bytes
transferred. The bottom graph in Figure 7.7 shows the time needed for a Tcl agent
to migrate from one laptop to the other and back, again over a 28.8 Kb/s modem
connection. As in the client/server case, the time is plotted as a function of the
total number of bytes transferred, i.e., the agent's initial size (its size when it leaves
the home machine) plus the agent's nal size (its size when it returns to the home
machine). Similarly, the graphs in Figure 7.8 show the client/server and mobile-agent
times for a 2.0 Mb/s wireless Ethernet connection, and the graphs in Figure 7.9 show
the times for a 10.0 Mb/s wired Ethernet connection.18 As in the previous section,
the client/server data does not include the time needed to establish the connection.
Once again approximating the data with a best-t linear function, we obtain
three equations for the time that it takes the client and server processes to exchange
a request and response.
t = 0:1785(S +R) + 272 (28.8 Kb/s modem) (7.3)
t = 0:0070(S +R) + 17 (2.0 Mb/s wireless Ethernet) (7.4)
t = 0:0011(S +R) + 1 (10 Mb/s wired Ethernet) (7.5)
Similarly, we obtain three equations for the time that it takes the Tcl agent to
make its round-trip migration. In these three equations, I is the initial size of the
17The data for Figure 7.7 was taken from Tables B.3 and B.4.
18The data for Figure 7.8 was taken from Tables B.5 and B.6. The data for Figure 7.9 was taken
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Agent Tcl messages (same machine)
Figure 7.6: The top graph shows the time in milliseconds for two agents on the same
laptop to exchange a request and response over an Agent Tcl meeting; the bottom
graph, with Agent Tcl messages. The points are the actual data; the lines are the
best-t linear functions (least-squares approximation). Each data point is the average
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Initial size plus final size (bytes)
Round-trip migration over a 28.8 Kb/s modem
Figure 7.7: The top graph shows the time in milliseconds for two client/server pro-
cesses on dierent laptops to exchange a request and response over a 28.8 Kb/s
modem link; the bottom graph, for an agent to migrate from one laptop to the other
and back. The points are the actual data; the lines are the best-t linear functions
(least-squares approximation). Each data point is the average of multiple timings;
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Initial size plus final size (bytes)
Round-trip migration over a 2.4 Mb/s wireless Ethernet
Figure 7.8: The top graph shows the time in milliseconds for two client/server pro-
cesses on dierent laptops to exchange a request and response over a 2.0 Mb/s wireless
Ethernet link; the bottom graph, for an agent to migrate from one laptop to the other
and back. The points are the actual data; the lines are the best-t linear functions
(least-squares approximation). Each data point is the average of multiple timings; the
largest standard deviation is 13.4 percent (but the deviation is less than 5.1 percent
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Initial size plus final size (bytes)
Round-trip migration over a 10 Mb/s Ethernet
Figure 7.9: The top graph shows the time in milliseconds for two client/server pro-
cesses on dierent laptops to exchange a request and response over a 10 Mb/s Ethernet
link; the bottom graph, for an agent to migrate from one laptop to the other and back.
The points are the actual data; the lines are the best-t linear functions (least-squares
approximation). Each data point is the average of multiple timings; the largest stan-
dard deviation is 24.0 percent (but the deviation is less than 5.2 percent for all but
nineteen data points).
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agent, and F is the nal size of the agent.
t = 0:1786(I + F ) + 1581 (28.8 Kb/s modem) (7.6)
t = 0:0091(I + F ) + 360 (2.0 Mb/s wireless Ethernet) (7.7)
t = 0:0035(I + F ) + 337 (10 Mb/s wired Ethernet) (7.8)
In general, these equations match our expectations. The constant in each migra-
tion equation is larger than the constant in the corresponding client/server equation,
since migration involves the additional overhead of establishing a TCP/IP connection
between the migrating agent and the destination server, forking a request handler,
and starting up the Tcl interpreter, all of which are constant across all agent sizes.
Similarly, the coecient in each migration equation is larger than the coecient in
the corresponding client/server equation, since migration involves the additional over-
head of capturing and restoring a state image and copying the state image from the
request handler to the new Tcl interpreter, both of which are linear in the agent size.
Now assume that an application needs to invoke n operations against some net-
work resource; the expected request size is S bytes and the expected response size is
R. Using Equation 7.3, the time for the stationary client process to invoke these n
operations over the 28.8 Kb/s modem connection is
tn = n(0:1785(S + R) + 272) (7.9)
Using Equations 7.1 and 7.6, and noting that it takes 19 milliseconds to establish
an Agent Tcl meeting on the laptops that were used in the experiments, the time for
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the mobile agent to invoke the same n operations is
tn = 0:1786(I + F ) + 1581 + n(0:00066(S +R) + 0:65) + 19 (7.10)
This equation simply sums the time to migrate to and from the resource location,
the time to invoke the n operations over an Agent Tcl meeting, and the time to
establish the meeting. Assuming the agent carries only the result of the last operation
back to its home machine, we have F = I +R and can rewrite Equation 7.10 as
tn = 0:1786(2I +R) + n(0:00066(S +R) + 0:65) + 1600 (7.11)
Combining Equations 7.9 and 7.11, we see that when the two machines are con-
nected with the 28.8 Kb/s modem link, the mobile agent outperforms the stationary
client process whenever
0:1786(2I +R) + n(0:00066(S +R) + 0:65) + 1600 < n(0:1785(S +R) + 272)
(7.12)
Solving for n, we have
n >
0:1786(2I +R) + 1600
0:1778(S +R) + 271
(7.13)
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Following the same process, when the two machines are connected with the 2.0
Mb/s wireless Ethernet link, the mobile agent outperforms the stationary client pro-
cess whenever
n >
0:0091(2I +R) + 379
0:0063(S +R) + 16
(7.14)
Finally, when the two machines are connected with the 10.0 Mb/s wired Ethernet
link, the mobile agent outperforms the stationary client process whenever
n >
0:0035(2I +R) + 356
0:0004(S +R) + 2
(7.15)
With these three equations, we can calculate the minimum number of operations
that a migrating Tcl agent must invoke against a particular resource for it to out-
perform stationary client/server processes. Figure 7.10 shows the minimum number
of operations for a 1KB agent. If the agent is performing fewer operations, it should
remain on the home machine. If it is performing more operations, it should migrate
to the resource location and then back to the home machine.
We can combine our three equations into a single equation easily. The time for
a client and server process to exchange n requests and responses over a TCP/IP
connection is




























10.0 Mb/s wired Ethernet
2.0 Mb/s wireless Ethernet
28.8 Kb/s modem
Figure 7.10: Minimum number of operations that a migrating 1KB Tcl agent must
invoke against a remote resource for it to outperform stationary client/server pro-
cesses. Each line corresponds to a dierent type of network connection between the
home machine and the resource machine. The minimum number of operations was
calculated from equations 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15.
153
where TB and TL are the network-specic parameters that we determined experimen-
tally in each of the three cases (e.g, TB = 0:1785 and TL = 272 for the 28.8 Kb/s
modem connection as seen in Equation 7.3. Similarly, the time for an agent to migrate
to a remote machine and then back home is
tn = AB(2I +R) + AL + n(0:00066(S +R) + 0:65) + 19 (7.17)
(As before, the last two terms are the time to exchange n requests and responses
over a local Agent Tcl meeting and the time to establish that meeting.) Combining
these two equations, we nd that the agent should migrate whenever
n >
AB(2I +R) + AL + 19
(TB  0:00066)(S +R) + TL   0:65
(7.18)
Although this equation is a useful starting point, it must be improved in several
ways. First, although the four parameters, AB, AL, TB and TL, can be calculated
easily from network measurements, they are too high-level. For example, the equation
should be recast in terms of the observed network bandwidth, rather than the observed
round-trip migration time. Second, the equation applies only to a specic machine
architecture, and only when each machine is lightly loaded. For example, the time
to establish an Agent Tcl meeting and to exchange a request and response over that
meeting is \hard-coded" into the equation. Although each machine might measure the
meeting times experimentally (and then make the measurements available to agents),
the equation should be extended to include machine loads and relative speeds. Finally,
the equation applies only to a very specic agent behavior, i.e., the agent migrates
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to the remote machine, interacts with a resource, and migrates back to the home
machine. Many other agent behaviors are possible. The equation should be turned
into a set of equations that will help an agent pick the best behavior for its current
environment.
7.3 Performance studies from other projects
Although few performance studies are reported for any mobile-agent system, there
are a few interesting results from other projects.
Agent languages. Omniware programs are compiled into intermediate code for
a RISC-based virtual machine and then into software-fault-isolated (SFI) native code;
this code runs only 25 percent slower than natively compiled code on average [LSW95,
ATLLW96]. Java programs are compiled into intermediate code for a stack-based
virtual machine and then either interpreted or compiled on-the-y into native code.
When interpreted, Java programs run 10 to 20 times slower than natively compiled
C or C++ [CH97]. When compiled on-the-y into native code, Java programs run
2 times slower than natively compiled C or C++ if they are compute-intensive.19
Since Omniware and Java both protect the local machine from malicious code, these
performance numbers mean that agents can be executed nearly as fast as native code
(as long as the agents are compiled for the appropriate virtual machine). In turn, this
means that, excluding migration overhead, a server will see about the same CPU load
regardless of whether it provides a high-level operation directly or provides low-level
primitives and allows a migrating agent to implement the high-level operation itself.
19The author has not been able to nd any formal performance study of just-in-time compilation
for Java. The statement is based on marketing information for the various Java virtual machines as
well as informal benchmarks such as the CaeineMarks.
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Sumatra. One application of Sumatra is an Internet chat server that positions
itself so as to minimize the maximum latency between itself and its clients [RASS97].
The chat server can migrate to any machine that is participating in the chat conver-
sation. Resource monitors continually monitor the maximum latency between each
machine and others and periodically sends the latency information to the chat server.
If another machine has a better maximum latency than the server's current machine,
and this better maximum latency remains stable for some period of time, the chat
server migrates to the other machine. The Sumatra developers tested their mobile
chat server in a local area network, but added delays to each network link from Inter-
net latency traces, producing a rough approximation of the Internet. In the tests, the
average maximum latency between the mobile chat server and its clients was nearly
four times less than between a stationary chat server and its clients.
Tacoma. Within the context of the StormCast weather-monitoring system, the
Tacoma group compared two dierent ways of determining the maximum temper-
ature within a particular range of days [Knu95]. In the rst approach, the entire
temperature record for the days of interest is downloaded to the client machine. In
the second approach, a mobile agent is sent to the machine where the temperature
record is stored; the agent then extracts and returns only the desired maximum tem-
perature. The mobile agent was written in either Tcl or compiled C. Due mainly to
migration overhead and the slowness of Tcl, they found that the mobile agent had
better performance only when the agent was written in compiled C, and the tempera-
ture record for the desired period took up nearly one hundred kilobytes [Knu95]. This
particular task, however, is probably the worst possible use of Tcl, as we saw above
when nding a minimum integer in some set of integers. Reducing migration over-
head and using a faster language such as Java might provide competitive performance
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without resorting to compiled code.
A second Tacoma performance study [JSvR97] found that it takes 21.7 millisec-
onds to start a null agent on a remote machine. The code for the agent was already
on the remote machine, the parameters to the agent were 42 bytes of dummy data,
and both the local and remote machines were 160 MHZ Hewlett-Packard C-160 work-
stations. In contrast, Agent Tcl takes 128 milliseconds to submit a 64-byte null agent
to a remote machine and then receive a 64-byte result message from that agent. The
code for the agent was part of the 64 bytes, the local machine was a 133 MHz Intel
Pentium workstation, and the remote machine was a 200 MHz Intel Pentium worksta-
tion. The Tacoma time is much lower because it measures only how long it takes for
the remote machine to acknowledge the correct startup of the new agent. In contrast,
the Agent Tcl time measures how long it takes for the new agent to send back its
result message, which includes not only the time needed to send the message but also
the time needed for the Tcl interpreter to read and evaluate a set of initialization
scripts. In addition, Agent Tcl must add the new agent to its server tables, which
involves additional interprocess communication. Once these dierences are taken into
account, the Tacoma and Agent Tcl times are comparable.
Network management. Steward and Appleby use lightweight mobile agents
to control trac congestion in a circuit-switched telecommunications network [SA94,
AS94]. There are two kind of agents: load-management agents, which nd routes
that have the highest spare capacity and adjust routing tables accordingly, and em
parent agents, which randomly walk around the network and launch load-management
agents when an overload is detected. None of the agents communicate directly but
instead leave messages at each node that other agents can read; old messages are
given less weight and eventually purged. The messages indicate whether a load agent
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has recently been launched on that node, whether a parent agent has recently visited,
and so on. In their experiments, the mobile agents reduced maximum node utilization
by between 39 and 50 percent, in addition, there were no overloaded nodes and no
unused nodes [SA94, AS94]. The authors acknowledge that the same eect could be
achieved with a more traditional distributed algorithm, but argue that mobile agents
provide an extremely fault-tolerant solution without undue programmer eort. In





Mobile agents are best viewed as a tool for implementing distributed applications,
rather than as an enabling technology. In other words, their advantage lies not so
much in making new distributed applications possible, but rather in providing a uni-
ed programming model and improving the performance of existing applications. Per-
formance can be a matter of network utilization, completion time, programmer con-
venience, or simply availability (during a period of network disconnection). Like most
mobile-agent systems, therefore, Agent Tcl is intended for use in general distributed
applications. In this chapter, we rst describe applications of other mobile-agent sys-
tems, briey considering whether each application can be implemented eectively in
the current Agent Tcl system. Then we present the existing applications of Agent
Tcl.
8.1 Other systems
Kali Scheme. [CJK95] suggests several applications for Kali Scheme: load balanc-
ing, where executing threads are moved to a lightly loaded machine; incremental
distributed linking, where a new procedure (such as a debugging or monitoring pro-
cedure) is dynamically inserted into a distributed computation; parameterized client-
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server applications, where a client and server ooad work to each other in the form
of shipped procedures; distributed data mining and information retrieval, where an
arbitrary search procedure is sent to a database rather than bringing large amounts
of data across the network; and executable content in messages, where a message
includes a program that performs some useful action on the local machine, such as
installing new software or presenting an application front-end to the user. Using
mobile agents for load balancing is questionable, since existing mobile-agent systems,
including Agent Tcl and Kali Scheme, use interpreted languages that run at least
several times slower than native code. Thus, the price of load balancing with mobile
agents is a signicant increase in the required CPU time, leading to longer comple-
tion times unless a large number of lightly loaded machines are available. As agent
languages become faster1, general load balancing will be a more reasonable applica-
tion. At the same time, if mobile agents are chosen for other reasons, the agents can
be load-balanced easily, since they can migrate at will from one machine to another.
Incremental linking is also questionable since, as with load balancing, the price of the
dynamic code insertion is interpretive overhead. In fact, such dynamic code insertion
can be achieved easily in natively compiled code [HG97]. Again, if mobile agents
are used for other reasons, such dynamic code insertion would be a useful capability.
We do not have any immediate implementation plans, however, since code insertion
introduces additional security issues and is only useful in a few applications; most
applications can be organized as collections of small, cooperating agents that are re-
placed when needed. The last three applications are all variations on the same theme,
1Omniware, for example, uses on-the-y compilation and software fault isolation to securely
execute a C++ program only 25 percent slower than natively compiled code [LSW95]; similar
approaches are just starting to nd their way into mobile-agent systems.
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either moving computation from client to server (e.g., a query against a database) or
from server to client (e.g., a graphical front-end for a database), eliminating all inter-
mediate network transmission and reducing either overall or per-operation latency.
Whether migrating a query reduces overall latency depends on the number of cross-
network calls eliminated, the amount of data per call, the relative speed of agents
versus native code, and the relative speed of the client and server machines. On the
other hand, migrating a graphical front-end almost always reduces per-operation la-
tency, since the amount of processing per user event (e.g., a mouse click) is typically
small. This client-server \customization" is one of the main applications for Agent
Tcl, although migrating a Java or Scheme agent is more often a performance win
than migrating a Tcl agent, due to the slowness of Tcl.
Messengers. Messengers are oriented towards communication protocols and dis-
tributed operating systems [DiMMTH95]. If a machine wants to communicate with
a remote machine that does not understand the desired communication protocol, it
dispatches a messenger that implements the protocol; this messenger lives on the
remote machine and handles the communication channel on its behalf. Agent Tcl
can be used in a similar manner. Like the Messenger system, however, Agent Tcl
is more suited to application-level rather than network-level protocols due to the in-
terpretive overhead. For example, an application can dispatch a graphical front-end
to a remote machine, replacing the transmission of individual screen updates with
application-specic requests and responses. In the case of a distributed operating
system, each machine would have a small microkernel; the rest of the operating sys-
tem would be implemented as messengers that dynamically distribute themselves as
needed [TDiMMH94]. Although this is an interesting use of mobile agents, no ex-
isting mobile agent system (including Messengers) seems ecient enough to be used
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for arbitrary system-level components, which means that the native \microkernel"
must be relatively large. Agent Tcl certainly cannot be used at the system level in
its current state. It must either provide a language that can be compiled on-the-y
into native code, or accept native code directly from certain highly trusted sources.
Of course, accepting native code directly makes it much more dicult to handle a
heterogeneous environment.
Sumatra. [RASS97] suggests several applications for mobile programs: searching,
ltering and combining \periodically generated large-volume datasets"; positioning
a video or Internet chat server to minimize the average latency between the server
and its clients; prefetching web pages; and more generally moving a network-intensive
computation from a mobile computer to a dynamically selected proxy site within the
permanent network. Agent Tcl can be used eectively in all of these applications,
although most of them would need to use Java rather than Tcl to achieve sucient
speed; the chat server is a possible exception since it does relatively little processing
per message.
Tacoma. The Tacoma system is used primarily in StormCast, a distributed
weather-monitoring system in which the data volumes are so immense as to make
data movement impractical [JvRS95]. Mobile agents allow new ltering and monitor-
ing operations to be rapidly constructed and deployed to the data and sensor loca-
tions. The Tacoma project found that Tcl was too slow for their compute-intensive
operations, but did not experiment with a more ecient interpreted language such
as Java or with on-the-y compilation. If Java is fast enough, Agent Tcl can be used
\as-is" for the StormCast simulation; otherwise we must wait until Agent Tcl pro-
vides on-the-y compilation for at least one of its languages. Tacoma is also used in
active documents and to manage software installation within a networked collection
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of machines [JvRS96]. Agent Tcl can be used eectively in both, although active
documents require additional infrastructure to inject an agent embedded inside a
document into the local agent system.2
Telescript. Telescript was used primarily in active mail, network and platform
management, and electronic commerce [Rei94]. In active mail, a Telescript agent
is embedded inside an e-mail message; the agent is executed when the message is
received or viewed. Typically such an agent might allow the user to sign up for
some service, asking the user for needed information and then contacting the service
provider. One platform-management application is automatic software updates. An
agent carries the necessary les onto a machine, installs the les itself and then
disappears. In electronic-commerce applications, a Telescript agent might leave a
personal digital assistant (PDA), search multiple electronic catalogs for a certain
product, return to the PDA with the best vendor and price, and then optionally leave
the PDA again to actually purchase the product. Agent Tcl can be used for all of
these applications, although active mail requires additional infrastructure, specically
a MIME type for Agent Tcl agents and a corresponding \viewer" that injects the agent
into the local agent system.3
Mobile Service Agents (MSA). The Mobile Service Agent (MSA) system is
used primarily for \follow-me" computing in which an application moves to the lo-
cation of the user for more ecient interaction. The main MSA demo involves a
conference proceedings [TLKC95]. When a user connects his laptop to the confer-
ence's machines, an agent containing the conference proceedings, site map and local
points of interest is sent to the laptop. The user interacts with the conference proceed-
ings via this agent and can continue interacting even when the laptop is disconnected.
2This infrastructure is easy to implement.
3This infrastructure is also easy to implement.
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Other suggested applications include active e-mail, distributed information retrieval,
software updates in telecommunications switches, software updates for general user
applications (that are organized as a collection of cooperating agents), and auto-
matic introduction of new components into a computer-aided manufacturing system
[TLKC95, Kna96]. Except for telecommunications software, which demands code
speed that existing mobile-agent systems cannot deliver, all of these applications are
reasonable uses for mobile agents in general and Agent Tcl in particular.
Network management. As discussed in the performance analysis section, Stew-
ard and Appleby use lightweight mobile agents to control trac congestion in a circuit-
switched telecommunications network [SA94, AS94]. Load-management agents nd
the routes that have the highest spare capacity and adjust routing tables accordingly;
parent agents randomly walk around the network and launch load-management agents
when an overload is detected. Agent Tcl is not yet suited for such an application since
its migration overhead is large; however, once migration overhead is reduced, Agent
Tcl's Java agents should provide sucient performance, since the agents are perform-
ing only a small amount of computation per node. Agent Tcl also does not allow a
migrating agent to leave messages behind at a node, but such a mechanism can be
added easily.
8.2 Agent Tcl
Due to the research interests of the other Agent Tcl project members, Agent Tcl
is used primarily in workow, notication, and information-retrieval applications.
Before describing these applications, it is useful to examine the code for a simple,
complete Tcl agent that determines which users are logged onto some set of machines.
This \who" agent is shown in Figure 8.1. The agent accepts a list of machines as
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input and then migrates from machine to machine with the agent jump command,
executing the Unix who command on each one. Once the agent has migrated through
all the machines, it uses agent jump one last time to return to the home machine,
where it presents the list of users to its owner.
Although its task is simple and can be accomplished easily without a mobile agent,
the \who" agent illustrates the general form of any agent that migrates sequentially
through a set of machines. Existing Agent Tcl agents that fall into this category
are a workow agent that carries an electronic form from user to user [CGN96] and
a medical agent that retrieves distributed medical records based on certain criteria
[Wu95]. The workow agent must migrate sequentially since the users need to ll
out the sections of the form in order. The medical-retrieval agent chooses to migrate
sequentially since the agent can discard potential candidates as it travels through the
distinct databases; spawning one child agent per remote database or interacting with
the databases using the traditional client/server approach increases the total network
trac even when only a single operation is being performed against each database.
In addition, the workow and medical agents do not require continuous contact
with the home machine and will continue their task even if the home machine becomes
temporarily disconnected. The agents are also extremely easy to implement. The
code is written as if every resource is local to the agent; the only dierence is that the
agent jump command is used to move the agent from one machine to the next. The
agent jump command is not strictly necessary since we could continually resubmit
a Tcl procedure that was parameterized according to the current status of the task;
the procedure would use the parameters to determine what it needed to do on the
current machine [JvRS95]. Such an approach, however, requires that the programmer
explicitly collect the necessary state information. In the \who" agent, this state
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      agent_jump $machine              # jump to each machine
      append output [exec who]        # any local processing
}
agent_jump $agent(home)              # jump back home
# display output window
agent_end                                        # unregister
agent_begin           # register with the local agent server
set output {}
set machineList {muir tenaya ...}
    
A






Figure 8.1: The \who" agent migrates through a set of machines and gures out who
is logged onto each one. Although the \who" agent is not the most useful agent, it
illustrates the general form of any agent that migrates sequentially through a set of
machines (and is short enough to t on one page). The exec who can be replaced
with any desired processing.
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information is nothing more than an index into the machine list, but more and more
state information is required as the agent becomes more complex.4 The agent jump
command captures all the state information automatically.
An example notication agent is the \alert" agent that monitors a specied set
of remote resources and noties its owner of any change in resource status. Figure
8.2 shows an \alert" agent that monitors a set of les and noties the user if the
status of a le changes signicantly (monitored characteristics include the Unix rwx
bits and the le size). The agent creates one child agent for each remote lesystem
using agent submit. Each child agent monitors one or more les in its lesystem
and sends a message to the parent when the status of a le changes signicantly. The
parent then contacts the owner's \mail" agent to send an e-mail message.
Since the child agents know which status changes are \signicant", only the sta-
tus changes that the user actually wants to see are transmitted across the network.
Without mobile agents, either the remote machine would have to send back a noti-
cation of every change (which the application would lter on the home machine),
or the appropriate monitoring routines would have to be pre-installed on the remote
machine, limiting the application to the changes that the remote administrator con-
siders signicant. With mobile agents, the application can monitor for status changes
according to any desired criteria while minimizing the ongoing network trac.
A recent information-retrieval agent is the technical-report searcher that was dis-
cussed in the motivation section and that is shown again in Figure 8.3. The agent's
task is to search a distributed collection of technical reports for information relevant
to the user's query. The agent rsts asks the user to enter a free-text query. Then,
4The workow agent, for example, must carry along all user-entered information. The medical-





















set machines "bald moose"
set directory "~rgray"
  # get a name from the server
agent_begin 
set email_agent "bald rgray_email"      # machine and name of email agent
  # submit the "file" agents that watch for changes in file size
  # by asking the user’s email agent to send a message to its owner
while {1} {
}
  agent_receive code string -blocking
  set alert [construct_alert $string]
  agent_send $email_agent {SEND OWNER $alert}
for each m $machines {
  agent_submit $m -vars directory -proc file_watch {file_watch $directory}
}
  # wait for one of the "file" agents to send a message saying that the
Figure 8.2: The \alert" agent monitors a set of les and sends an e-mail message
to the user when the status of a le changes signicantly. A simplied version of
the \alert" agent appears at bottom; procedure file watch, which polls the les
at regular intervals using the file stat command, and procedure construct mail,
which constructs a readable mail message, are not shown. The network location of
the various agents is shown at top.
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if the connection between the home machine and the network is reliable and of high
bandwidth, the agent will stay on the home machine. If the connection is unreliable
or of low bandwidth, such as if the home machine is a mobile device, the agent will
jump to a proxy site within the network. This initial jump reduces the use of the
poor-quality link to just the transmission of the agent and the transmission of the
complete result, allowing the agent to proceed with its task even if the link goes down.
The proxy site is dynamically selected according to the current location of the home
machine and the document collections.
Once the agent has migrated to a proxy site if desired, it must interact with the
stationary agents that serve as an interface to the technical-report collections. If
these stationary agents provide high-level operations, the agent simply makes RPC-
style calls across the network (using the agent-communication mechanisms). If the
stationary agents provide only low-level operations, the agent sends out child agents
that travel to the document collections and perform the query there, avoiding the
transfer of large amounts of intermediate data. Once the agent has the results from
each child agent, it merges and lters these results, returns to the home machine
if necessary, and presents the results to the user. Finally, although the behavior
exhibited by this agent is complex, it requires surprisingly little code; the decisions
whether to jump and create children involve little more than two if statements that
check the information returned from the network monitor on the home machine and
from the directory services.
The salesman agent shown in Figure 8.4 is similar to the technical-report searcher
except that it operates in two phases. First, the user enters a description of the
desired product. Then the agent queries the yellow page directory services to identify





















proxy site where agent




Figure 8.3: Technical report searcher. Here an agent searches a distributed collection
of technical reports for information relevant to a user query. Depending on current
network conditions and the granularity of the search engine interfaces, the agent might
move to a proxy site within the permanent network and/or send child agents to each
collection site.
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availability and pricing. During this process, the agent might migrate to a proxy
site, and might send child agents to each vendor, depending on the network links and
vendor interfaces. Once the agent has the list of vendors and prices, it returns to
the home machine and allows the user to select one or more products to purchase. If
the user does select a product, she provides the agent with the appropriate amount
of electronic cash, and the agent journeys into the network again to exchange the
electronic cash for the product (or for some non-repudiable proof of purchase).
Agent Tcl has also been used to retrieve three-dimensional drawings of mechanical
parts from distributed CAD databases [CBC96], to track purchase orders [CGN96],
and in several information-retrieval applications at external sites.
8.3 Summary
None of these applications require mobile agents. Mobile agents, however, allow the
applications to be implemented easily within a single, general framework, without
such things as application-specify proxies and server operations, queued RPC, or au-
tomated installation facilities. We have not done any performance analysis on these
applications yet, choosing instead to implement some of the more obvious perfor-
mance improvements rst. Since the existing agents are all written in Tcl, however,
their end-to-end latency is worse than alternative implementation techniques, due to
the migration overhead, the slowness of Tcl, and the moderate data volumes involved
in our applications. On the other hand, the existing agents do reduce network uti-
lization signicantly and can continue with their task if the network link with the
home machine is down. In addition, with faster languages and additional system















Figure 8.4: Salesman. Here an agent accepts a user-entered description of a desired
product, queries the yellow page directories to identify vendors who might sell the
product, queries these vendors, returns the possible purchase locations and prices to




The Agent Tcl project includes many other graduate and undergraduate students
from the Thayer School of Engineering and the Department of Computer Science.
In this chapter, we present some of the components that these students have imple-
mented, both to highlight their excellent work and to provide a complete picture of
Agent Tcl's current capabilities.
9.1 Debugging
One of the main challenges facing an agent developer is debugging a broken agent,
especially since the agent physically moves from machine to machine during its execu-
tion and does not necessarily stay in contact with the home machine. In the absence
of debugging tools, the developer has to manually add debugging code that sends
constant status updates to the home machine, since otherwise the rst indication of
a problem would be when the agent either disappeared forever1 or returned with in-
correct information. The addition and maintenance of this debugging code becomes
tedious extremely quickly (as in the more common case of debugging a stationary pro-
1Of course, the agent's owner can never know that the agent has disappeared, only that it has
not returned within some expected worst-case time.
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gram). Therefore Melissa Hirschl2 wrote an interactive, graphical debugger for Agent
Tcl [HK97]. The debugger tracks the agent as it moves from machine to machine,
monitors its communication with other agents, and provides the traditional debugger
features such as breakpoints, watch conditions, and line-at-a-time execution. Figure
9.1 shows the debugger interface while debugging the \who" agent from Figure 8.1.
The agent's code appears in the top half of the window, and an execution history
appears in the bottom half. A breakpoint can be associated with any line or with
any agent event (such as migration or incoming communication from other agents).
In this case, the agent has been told to break on migration and has suspended its
execution at the agent jump command, right before jumping to the next machine in
its list. While the agent is suspended at the breakpoint, the user can add new break
points or watch conditions and can inspect all dened variables and procedures.
There are several issues that must be addressed. First, the debugger currently
works for Tcl agents only. The debugging routines must be separated into language-
dependent and language-independent modules and appropriate language-dependent
modules must be written for Java and Scheme. Second, there is no debugging sup-
port built into the Agent Tcl system itself. Instead the debugger simply instruments
the agent so that the agent sends back constant status reports and drops into an
\inspect-and-evaluate" mode at each breakpoint. Although not requiring any debug-
ging support from the Agent Tcl system is advantageous in its own way, it does lead
to a much more complex debugger. Moving some of the debugging functionality into
the Agent Tcl core would allow a cleaner and more ecient implementation. Likely
work along this line is to (1) make Agent Tcl optionally call debugger-specied code
2Melissa Hirschl graduated in 1997 with a Master's degree in computer science. She has taken a
job in the SunScript group at Sun Microsystems.
174
Figure 9.1: The Agent Tcl debugger. The debugger tracks the agent as it travels
through the network, monitors its communication with other agents, and provides
traditional features such as breakpoints, watch conditions and line-at-a-time execu-
tion. Here we are debugging the \who" agent and have told the debugger to break
before each jump.
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before and after agent events and (2) make the system aware of the identity and lo-
cation of the debugger so that the system itself can contact the debugger if the agent
dies due to some exceptional condition. Finally, the debugger interface is still heavily
text-based. Current work is aimed at providing various graphical representations of
an agent's path through the network and its communication with other agents.
9.2 Docking
Mobile agents are particularly useful when dealing with mobile hosts that do not have
a permanent network connection. By migrating to or from a mobile host, an agent
can continue interacting with a user or network resource respectively, even if the link
between the host and network goes down. A basic problem, however, is what to do
when an agent tries to visit or leave a mobile host that is currently disconnected from
the network. The naive solution of having the agent poll the network connection
is extremely inecient. Instead Ting Cai, Saurab Nog, Vishesh Khemani and Jun
Shen3 have developed a docking system that allows agents to simply go to sleep until
the network connection is available again [GKN+97]. This docking system is shown
in Figure 9.2. Each mobile host has an associated dock, which is some permanently
connected machine within the network. A stationary agent called the dockmaster
runs on each dock machine. If an agent wants to visit the mobile host, it rst tries
to migrate directly to the host. If the migration fails, the agent transfers itself to the
3Ting Cai graduated in 1996 with a Master's degree in computer science and is currently working
at Bay Networks. Saurab Nog graduated in 1996 with a Master's degree in computer science and is
currently working at Microsoft. Vishesh Khemani and Jun Shen are undergraduates in the computer
science department. Both have spent several semesters working on the Agent Tcl project and will
graduate in 1998.
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dock, adds itself to the dockmaster's queue of waiting agents, and goes to sleep. The
dockmaster waits until it makes contact with the mobile host. This contact happens
in one of two ways. First, the mobile host noties the dockmaster of its current
network address whenever it reconnects to the network. Second, the dockmaster
periodically polls the last known location of the mobile host (at long intervals). This
polling is required since the initial migration will occasionally fail due to network
congestion, even though the mobile device was actually connected to the network. In
either case, once the dockmaster makes contact with the mobile host, it forwards all
waiting agents onto the host. In addition to the dockmaster on the dock, there is also
a dockmaster on the mobile host itself. This second dockmaster handles agents that
are trying to leave the host. If an agent tries to leave while the network connection
is down, it adds itself to the local dockmaster's queue and goes to sleep. As soon as
the host reconnects to the network, the local dockmaster forwards all waiting agents
to the appropriate destination.
The docking system is implemented entirely at the agent level and is completely
transparent to the agents that use it. It has two notable weaknesses, however. First,
it handles only migration. It must be extended to handle inter-agent communication
as well, so that an agent does not have to continually resend a message if its or the
recipient's network connection is down. Second, Agent Tcl itself has no knowledge of
a device's temporary IP address; it knows only the device's permanent IP address;
Thus agents and messages are always directed to the permanent IP address, leading
to an unnecessary trip through the dock if the device is actually connected but is at a
dierent address. To x this problem, each migrating agent should include both the
permanent and current address of its sending machine and the permanent and last-
known address of its home machine. In addition, each message should include both
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Figure 9.2: The Agent Tcl docking system. Each mobile host (M)has an associated
dock (M Dock). When an agent cannot reach the mobile host directly, it goes and
waits at the dock. The dockmaster on the dock periodically polls the mobile host,
and the mobile host noties the dockmaster whenever it reconnects to the network.
In either case, once the dockmaster makes contact with the mobile host, all waiting
agents are forwarded.
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the permanent and current address of the sending machine. Finally, the dockmasters
should report the last-known IP address of the mobile machine, either on demand
or whenever they accept an agent or message for later delivery. With the current
and last-known IP addresses included in agent communication whenever possible,
the servers can maintain a cache of last-known IP addresses and direct outgoing
agents and messages to the last-known address of the destination machine, making
the docking system much more ecient and exactly analogous to mobile IP [Joh95].
In fact, once mobile IP is widely available, the implementation of the docking system
will become much simpler.4
9.3 Yellow pages
In a real-world environment, an agent must identify, locate and use previously un-
known services. To this end, Dawn Lawrie, Mark Hoagland and Joseph Edelman5
have developed a hierarchical service index [GKN+97]. This hierarchical index is im-
plemented as a set of stationary yellow page agents, which maintain a set of entries
that refer to specic service agents as well as other yellow page agents. Each entry
contains a set of named elds. Each eld contains either a keyword list or a denition
of the interface that the server agent supports. Possible interface denitions include
a set of KQML queries [GSS94] or a set of Agent RPC functions [NCK96]. To nd a
service, an agent contacts a yellow page agent and does an exact or ranked search on
the contents of one or more elds. If this search returns other yellow page agents, the
agent can optionally recurse and make the same query of these other agents. In any
4The docking system is still necessary so that agents do not have to poll the network connection.
5Dawn Lawrie graduated with a B.A. in computer science in 1997. Mark Hoagland and Joseph
Edelman are both undergraduates in the computer science department and will graduate in 1998
and 1999 respectively. All three have spent several semesters working on the Agent Tcl project.
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event, once the agent has a list of service agents, it will proceed to interact with one
or more of those agents. To notify other agents of an available service, a service agent
posts a description of its service to one or more yellow page agents. This description
is simply the named elds, keyword lists, and interface denitions that should be
added to the yellow page databases.
The yellow page system is used in most of our example applications, most notably
the salesman application that was shown in Figure 8.4. Work is underway to (1)
develop a standardized set of elds for describing agent services and (2) make the
yellow pages more ecient, robust and maintainable, using techniques from other
hierarchical service indices such as those in the Harvest information retrieval system
[BDH+94].
9.4 Network sensing and path planning
Under certain network conditions, it is more ecient for an agent to remain stationary
and interact with a resource from a remote location, rather than migrating to that
resource. Unfortunately, the exact conditions depend entirely on the resource and
the agent's current task. For example, in most networks, an agent that needs to
invoke only a single operation against a remote resource should almost always remain
stationary, so that it avoids the migration overhead.6 On the other hand, even in
high-performance networks, an agent that needs to invoke hundreds of operations
should almost always migrate, so that it avoids the overhead of the cross-network
calls. Of course, although making a migration decision based solely on the expected
6One notable exception is if the operation produces an extremely large result of which the agent
needs only a small fragment. The agent can lter the result on the remote machine, rather than
transmitting the entire result across the network.
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number of operations is a useful \rule of thumb", it is too simplistic in many cases.
Also aecting the migration decision are the machine loads, the relative speed of agent
versus native code, the reliability, latency and bandwidth of the network links, the
average size of each operation's result, the specic performance constraints that the
agent is trying to meet, and whether the resource's machine even allows third-party
agents.
Clearly, to decide if, when and where to migrate, an agent must examine ma-
chine and network conditions and then combine the current status information with
knowledge of the resource and its own task. Eorts along these lines fall into three
subareas: (1) provide ecient network sensors and an eective description of a re-
source's behavior (expected result size, expected operation latency under light load,
etc.); (2) provide a library of routines that accept the current network status, the
resource description, and a simple description of the agent's task and return an ap-
propriate migration decision; and (3) make agent code independent of whether the
agent migrates or remains stationary, so that the programmer does not have to write
two intertwined versions. Agent Tcl addresses the third issue already, since the com-
munication primitives are the same whether the agent is communicating with a local
or remote agent. Typically, an agent would decide whether to create a child agent on
the local or remote machine and then use the same code, or would decide whether to
migrate and then use the same code. On the other hand, the rst two issues, network
sensing and a decision-making library, are much more complex and are the subject of
ongoing work.
Wilmer Caripe, Katsuhiro Moizumi7 and several undergraduates in the computer
science department are working on various network-sensing and decision-making tech-
7Wilmer Caripe and Hiro Moizumi are both Ph.D. students in the Thayer School of Engineering.
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niques [GKN+97, Car97]. Both passive and active network-sensing techniques are
under development. Passive techniques include piggybacking bandwidth and latency
information onto existing agent trac as well as taking round-trip timings for existing
agent trac. In the latter case, for example, the round-trip time for a request sent
to an agent server gives a rough approximation of the network transit time plus the
server processing time. Active techniques revolve around a set of network monitoring
agents, one per site, which store the passively-collected data and actively update this
data by sending out \ping" packets on request or at periodic intervals. In particular,
each network monitor keeps track of the expected latency, bandwidth and uptime of
the link that connects its machine with the rest of the network. When an agent is
deciding whether to migrate, it asks one or more network monitors about the current
conditions. Stationary agents also make use of the network monitors. The docking
system, for example, relies on the local network monitor to tell it when the machine's
network connection is back up. Sumatra uses a similar system of network monitors
called Komodo [RAS96].
Machines have their own characteristics, most notably CPU speed and current
load. Although this information can also be handled in the network monitors, we are
planning to use the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) instead [Car97].
The SNMP protocol associates a simple database (or MIB) with each network de-
vice. The network device lls these elds with information about its inherent and
current characteristics; applications run queries against the MIB to identify the de-
vice's current status. In our case, each machine would have a MIB that included CPU
speed, current load, current number of agents, and so on. The advantage of SNMP
is twofold. First, it is an existing, widespread protocol, which reduces the amount of
code that needs to be written for a mobile-agent system. Second, it is external to the
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mobile-agent system, which allows non-agent applications to query the same device
information.
Once network and machine monitors are available, the remaining task is to provide
the decision-making routines. There are several broad approaches, most notably
mathematical models and machine-learning techniques. Our current applications use
machine learning, specically the new Q-learning algorithm [CMG95]. Here each
agent reports its observed performance to a Q-learning agent on each visited site;
later agents query the Q-learning agents to obtain a performance prediction based
on the past observations and the current network conditions [Car97]. The current
prototype considers only agent size, result sizes, observed latencies, and time of day.
There are several important research questions, but the question of immediate
interest to us is how much extra network trac the network monitors must generate
to keep their performance estimates up-to-date. Initial work suggests that a sampling
rate of thirty seconds to several hours generates suciently accurate estimates; the
extra trac at this sampling rate should be only a small fraction of the overall trac
[RASS97].
9.5 Mobile Agent Construction Environment
Although both Tcl and Java are generally regarded as easy to learn, they are still
languages that fall within the realm of a capable programmer, rather than a nonpro-
grammer. Therefore most end users of Agent Tcl are limited to pre-packaged agents
that simply ask for certain parameters (such as which document collections to search,
how many results to report, and so on). The Mobile Agent Construction Environment
(MACE) is a rst step towards removing this limitation and allowing end users to
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construct their own useful agents [Sha97]. MACE, which Rohit Sharma8 developed as
part of his thesis work, is a simple visual programming environment in which a user
assembles a mobile agent from a set of predened components. The MACE environ-
ment is shown in Figure 9.3. It is oriented towards workow applications where an
agent guides a work item through a series of steps, but there is no reason that it can-
not be used for other applications, provided that those applications can be expressed
in the current visual programming interface. Essentially the user is provided with a
set of domain-specic components that perform various operations, such as querying
a parts database, ltering a list of parts according to price, or presenting the list of
parts to a user. These components appear as boxes in Figure 9.3. The user selects
the desired components and connects them by clicking and dragging within the main
window. Each connection represents a one-way ow of data; the target component
uses the result from the source component and cannot start its task until the source
component nishes. Each component is annotated with either a specic machine on
which the task should be performed or a routine that selects an appropriate machine
based on some application criteria. Certain components also take parameters.
Once the user nishes, the graphical representation is compiled into a Tcl agent.
This agent makes heavy use of Agent Tcl's migration, cloning and communication
facilities to send results from one component to another and to execute each compo-
nent on the appropriate machine as soon as the necessary results are available. The
agent can be launched immediately or stored on the local machine for later execu-
tion. MACE needs to be extended in several ways. First, the current set of predened
components is extremely small. A more ambitious component library needs to be de-
veloped for and tested in some selected application domain. Second, MACE allows
8Rohit Sharma graduated in 1997 with a Master's degree in computer engineering.
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Figure 9.3: The Mobile Agent Construction Environment (MACE) allows a nonpro-
grammer to graphically construct an agent. This gure appears in [Sha97] and was
used with permission.
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limited interaction between components, namely the forwarding of a result from one
component to another. A much wider range of interactions is possible, only some of
which can be expressed easily in a visual programming environment. Finally, MACE
generates only Tcl code. It should generate Java or Scheme code as well.
9.6 Agent RPC
Agent Tcl's builtin communication mechanisms are low-level bytestreams and mes-
sage passing. The idea is to allow agents that have simple requirements to commu-
nicate with minimal overhead, while providing a base on top of which more complex
communication protocols can be implemented eciently at the agent level. Possible
protocols include whiteboards, KQML [GSS94], remote procedure call (RPC) [BN84]
and remote method invocation [YD96]. Agent RPC, which Saurab Nog and Sumit
Chawla9 developed as a course project, is an RPC mechanism for Agent Tcl [NCK96].
The architecture of Agent RPC is shown in Figure 9.4. Agent RPC is exactly anal-
ogous to traditional RPC and allows an agent to invoke exported operations from
another agent as if those operations were local procedures. An interface denition
is compiled into client and server stubs, which are included in the client and server
agents. On startup, the server agent registers its location, keyword description and
interface denition with one or more nameserver agents. To nd a server agent that
provides a particular service, a client agent queries the nameservers, either by name
or by interface denition. In the case of interface denition, the nameservers match
the desired interface against the interface of all registered server agents, returning
9Saurab Nog graduated in 1996 with a Master's degree in computer science and is now working
at Microsoft. Sumit Chawla graduated in 1997 with a Ph.D. degree in computer science and is now
working at SGI.
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those agents that provide the same interface. The interface matching is quite exible,
ignoring parameter order and considering only the function name, the result type,
and the number, names and types of the parameters. Once the client agent has iden-
tied an appropriate server agent, it connects to the server agent and invokes the
exported server operations by calling the client stubs. Each client stub converts the
procedure arguments into a message and sends this message along the connection to
the server agent. The corresponding server stub unpacks the arguments, invokes the
appropriate sever operation, and then sends back the result. Agent RPC has three
main areas of future work. First, although Agent RPC is language-independent, the
current stub compilers only generate Tcl stubs. The stub compilers should generate
Java and Scheme stubs as well.10 Second, as will be discussed further in the future
work chapter, it must be possible to include arbitrary binary data in Agent Tcl mes-
sages (rather than just strings), which would make communication protocols such as
Agent RPC more ecient. Finally, the separate nameservers can be eliminated by
including the RPC interface denitions in the yellow pages.
10In addition, the stubs should work across languages so that client and server agents can be
written in dierent languages. Since the stubs use the existing agent communication mechanisms,
which work across languages already, this interoperability can be achieved without any extra work.
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Figure 9.4: The architecture of the Agent RPC system. First a stub compiler trans-
forms an interface denition into client and server stubs that are included in the client
and server agents respectively. The server agent registers its interface with the name-
servers on startup. The client agent nds the desired server agent by querying the
nameservers, either by name or by interface denition. The client agent then connects
to the server agent and calls its local client stubs to invoke server operations. This




Performance analysis and performance improvements. When network con-
ditions are good, i.e., when bandwidth and reliability are high and latency is low,
traditional RPC exhibits signicantly better performance than mobile Tcl agents,
mainly due to the slowness of Tcl, the migration overhead, and the simplistic imple-
mentation of the agent servers and the communication subsystem. The performance
of the Tcl agents is good enough, however, to suggest that a combination of faster
languages and additional system engineering will lead to competitive performance
under even the best network conditions. Other performance studies such as [Knu95]
and [RASS97] bear out this contention.
Two faster languages, Java and Scheme, have already been added to Agent Tcl.
In addition, there are several obvious improvements that can be made in the system
implementation. First, the amount of dynamic memory allocation in the messaging
subsystem can be reduced signicantly. Second, shared memory, rather than Unix
domain sockets, can be used for communication among agents on the same machine,
although the resulting performance improvement will be much greater on some ar-
chitectures than others. Third, every agent and every server request is currently
executed in a separate process, which requires process creation, interprocess commu-
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nication and interprocess synchronization, all of which have high overhead. Although
we do not feel that it is worthwhile to multithread the entire system as in Ara [Pei96],
the server itself should be multithreaded, eliminating most process creation and sev-
eral extraneous communication steps. We will also consider limited multithreading
in the interpreters themselves. For example, given that Java and Scheme are al-
ready multithreaded, it would be reasonable to run all Java agents inside one process,
all Scheme agents inside another, and each Tcl agent in its own process as before.
Fourth, even without any multithreading of the interpreters, migration latency can be
reduced signicantly with a pool of ready interpreter processes and application-level
caching of needed initialization les, particularly in the case of Tcl. Finally, when
both the source and target agent of a communication are on the same machine, the
server should always be bypassed.
Once the system enhancements are nished, we need to reevaluate performance
under a wider range of network conditions. Depending on the performance of Java
agents relative to native code, we will consider either \just-in-time" compilation or
software-fault-isolation of native code (or more likely of code for a low-level virtual ma-
chine that is immediately compiled into native code) [ATLLW96, WLAG93, LSW95].
Alternatively, the system could accept native code only from certain trusted users,
eliminating the need for software fault isolation, but limiting untrusted agents to the
slower, interpreted languages. Finally, once we have replaced PGP with a more ef-
cient and exible encryption subsystem, we need to compare secure mobile agents
with secure versions of the traditional distributed computing paradigms. To our
knowledge, no such performance comparison has been done; our own performance
analysis was limited to anonymous agents that required neither encryption nor digi-
tal signatures. It seems reasonable to expect, however, that authenticating a mobile
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agent should involve roughly the same overhead as authenticating a cross-network
call, and that we will see the same relative performance whether or not the agents
are encrypted.
Security. The immediate task is to replace PGP with a faster and more exible
encryption library, nish the security enforcement modules for Java and Scheme,
allow untrusted agents to have limited screen access, and eliminate the remaining
denial-of-service attacks, such as an agent that sends messages to another agent as
fast as possible or an agent that sits in a tight loop and uses its allocated CPU time as
fast as possible. Eliminating the denial-of-service attacks requires additional resource
limits and rate throttles. Once this initial work is complete, we can move on to
protect a group of machines from a malicious agent and an agent from a malicious
machine. To protect a group of machines, we are looking at electronic cash schemes
where each resource has an associated price; agents must spend electronic cash from
their nite reserve to access the desired resources and thus cannot survive forever
within the network [JvRS95, DiMMTH95].1 To protect an agent, we are looking at
a combination of audit trails [CGH+95], replication and voting schemes [MvRSS96],
a component model in which an agent is divided into pieces that are encrypted and
signed at dierent times and with dierent keys [CGH+95], limited forms of proof-
carrying or self-authenticating code [PS97], and a tamper-proof movement history
embedded inside a migrating agent [MvRSS96].
1Most electronic cash schemes involve signicant network communication. In a mobile-agent
system, it is critical to eliminate as much communication as possible and defer the rest so that it
does not lie on a critical path.
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Fault tolerance. Although mobile agents allow an application to make minimal
use of a low-quality network link, they do not eliminate all of the fault-tolerance
issues associated with traditional distributed computing and introduce some of their
own. Agent Tcl currently does not address any of these issues, making fault tolerance
one of the most critical areas of future work. Most importantly, both migratory and
stationary agents must be able to live past a machine failure, restarting with the most
current state image possible as soon as the machine comes back up. Such recovery
requires a persistent store in which the server can store the agent's administrative
information and in which the agent itself can store its current state information. One
such persistent store is the Gamelon File I/O library from the Menai corporation,
which provides object-oriented persistent storage through a familiar le-access API
[Men96]. Work is underway to integrate this library into the Agent Tcl system. The
server's internal tables will be mirrored into the persistent store; an agent's complete
state will be saved at startup or upon arrival; and initially the agent will be able to
save its complete state at additional times of its choosing. Since the complete state
image is already captured during migration, no new code needs to be written; the
same state image is simply written to the persistent store rather than transmitted
across the network. If the server crashes and restarts, it will reload its internal tables
from the persistent store and restart all agents with their saved state images. Due
to the overhead involved in writing the entire state image to disk, even if it is just
written once upon agent arrival, persistent state backup will be an optional feature, so
that a noncritical agent can get better performance at the risk of suddenly vanishing
due to machine failure.
Requiring the agent to checkpoint its complete state is inecient and often un-
necessary. The agent should be able to perform an incremental checkpoint of its
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complete state or a partial checkpoint of some desired subset of its state. Incremen-
tal checkpoints save only the changes in the agent's state, either automatically or at
agent-specied times, maintaining a complete state image in persistent store with-
out the overhead of recapturing the entire state image. Unfortunately, incremental
checkpointing require either substantial support from the interpreters or a general
mechanism for incrementally capturing the state of arbitrary native processes, both
of which are beyond the scope of the project. Partial checkpointing, however, is much
more straightforward and, in its simplest form, requires no language-specic support.
Each agent is allocated a xed amount of space within the persistent store and al-
lowed to write arbitrary data into that space. When an agent restarts after a machine
crash, Agent Tcl raises an exception within the agent, so that the agent knows about
the restart and can check the persistent store for previously saved data.2
Of course, it would also be useful to integrate partial state capture more closely
with each agent language. Tcl traces, for example, provide a way to automatically
detect and save any change in the value of a Tcl variable; Ara uses traces for just
this purpose [Pei96]. Similarly, persistent objects can be implemented easily with
Java's existing object serialization facilities [CH97]. Although such higher-level state
capture is more convenient for the programmer, we plan to focus on the more general
mechanism, and implement the language-specic mechanisms as time allows.
Allowing an agent to survive machine failure is a rst step towards a robust mobile-
agent system, but is not sucient in and of itself. If a migrating agent temporarily
disappears due to a machine crash, the overall application might not be able to wait
2Such an exception should always be raised after a machine crash so that a restored agent can
take whatever action is appropriate for its task. For example, a time-dependent agent might report
failure to its home site and then terminate if too much time has elapsed between crash and restart.
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until the machine comes back up and the agent reappears. Therefore the application
must be able to detect a machine failure so that it can spawn a new agent to carry on
with the task. One approach is illustrated in Tacoma where a migrating agent leaves
behind rear guard agents [JvRS95]. A rear guard concludes that the migrating agent
has disappeared if it loses contact with the agent for a suitably long period of time.
Once this happens, the rear guard sends out a new copy of the agent. In Tacoma,
failed machines do not restart the agents that were executing on the machine, so the
rear guards does not need to worry about the original agent's reappearance. In Agent
Tcl, where a failed machine will restart the agents, any such rear guard mechanism
must take the original agent's reappearance into account. One simple approach is to
have a restarted agent terminate immediately if the crash lasted longer than the rear
guard timeout interval. In either case, duplicate copies of the same agent are certainly
possible if contact is lost due to a network rather than machine failure; preventing
such duplicates is an open problem.
From a similar viewpoint, if a stationary service agent disappears due to a machine
failure, having the service remain unavailable until the machine comes back up is no
more reasonable than in any distributed computing environment, demanding tradi-
tional service replication with a backup service agent taking over for an unavailable
primary [Mul93]. Mobile agents do allow an interesting enhancement to traditional
replication schemes, however, namely on-the-y replication in which a new copy of
the service agent can be dynamically deployed to any desired network location, either
in response to machine and network failures or to changing load [RASS97]. Finally,
cooperating mobile agents are vulnerable to all the same communication failures as co-
operating stationary processes, which means that some mobile-agent applications will
need reliable group communication, transactions, voting schemes, and so on [Mul93].
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As with replication, there are three interesting questions: (1) which existing tech-
niques are the more natural t for a mobile-agent system, (2) how can techniques
intended for stationary processes be extended to handle the fact that the commu-
nicating entities are moving from machine to machine, and (3) how much of each
technique can be implemented eciently at the agent level so that the agent servers
remain lightweight.
Mobile computing. Agent Tcl is meant to work seamlessly with both mobile
computers and wireless networks. The existing docking system brings us a long ways
towards this goal and will be our near-term focus [GKN+97]. The docking system
must be re-implemented in a faster agent language, must be extended so that it han-
dles inter-agent communication in addition to migration, and must actively exchange
information about a machine's current network location so that as few agents as
possible are actually routed through the docks.
Even with these enhancements, however, the docking system may prove too inef-
cient in wireless networks with rapidly changing congurations3, since the machines
will be unreachable frequently but often for only short periods. Buering all agents
and messages on some remote dock machine during these short periods of discon-
3An example of a \rapidly changing" network would be some number of moving vehicles and
people, each with a wireless device that can communicate only with the other wireless devices (i.e.,
there is no central tower or satellite to serve as an intermediary). Network connectivity will change
quickly as vehicles and people move in and out of range with each other. Such a network is in
marked contrast to an essentially wired network, in which a laptop is unplugged from one location
and later plugged in at a dierent location, or a tower- or satellite-based network, in which the only
changes are infrequent cell handos. Cellular networks with small cells, where handos are frequent,
fall somewhere in the middle.
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nection could produce unacceptably high latencies. Since it is our intention to work
with o-the-shelf networks rather than implementing our own network protocols, the
rst issue is to make all the information that the network is already exchanging
about its current conguration visible to Agent Tcl, so that Agent Tcl will know a
machine's current location whenever possible. In addition, the docks must be far
more hierarchical and distributed, so that an agent or message can be buered as
close as possible to the suspected location of the target machine, even if this means
buering the agent or message on one or more machines that are themselves wireless.
Of course, if a network already supports ecient location-independent addressing of
the physical machines (e.g., a slowly changing network with mobile IP), the docking
system becomes much simpler, since it no longer needs to keep track of temporary
network locations. Instead it simply needs to buer agents and messages at the most
advantageous network locations. Although some networks can handle the buering as
well, relying on the network for buering would eliminate several convenient features,
such as the ability to wake up an agent and have it proceed with some alternative
task if it is unable to reach the target machine within a specied timeout.
Standardization. There have been some recent eorts towards developing stan-
dards for mobile-agent systems, most notably by a multi-company coalition consist-
ing of Crystaliz, General Magic, GMD FOKUS, IBM, and The Open Group. The
coalition has developed a Mobile Agent Facility (MAF) specication in response to
the Object Management Group's Common Facility Task Force RFP3 [MAF97]. The
specication \focuses on the interoperability of dierent agent systems" [MAF97].
The specication does not allow an agent from one system to execute inside another
system; such a cross-execution mechanism is simply impossible due to the wide range
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of programming languages that are used in dierent systems. Instead the specica-
tion (1) provides a uniform management interface, so that the system administrator
can manage multiple agent systems via the same interface, and (2) allows an agent to
locate and communicate with agents from dierent systems, so that clients and server
providers do not have to have the same system. In the latter case, an agent would
typically migrate to the system that had the same type as its home system and that
was as close as possible to the desired resource, and then interact with the resource
from across the network. Systems that were suciently similar could adopt additional
standards to allow an agent to actually migrate from one system to another.4
Although Agent Tcl, like all current mobile-agent systems, does not support the
MAF standard, it has most of the same functionality and can be extended easily to
provide the rest. If the standard is accepted and gains acceptance in the developer
community, supporting the full standard will allow Agent Tcl to interoperate with
other systems, accelerating the acceptance of Agent Tcl and providing a much larger
and more interesting environment in which Agent Tcl agents can be developed and
used.
Modeling and simulation. Organizations are justiably hesitant to install a pro-
totype mobile-agent system on their machines, due to the security risks associated
with the execution of untrusted code. Thus a mobile-agent system expands its in-
stalled base extremely slowly, with organizations rst testing the system on internal,
isolated networks and slowly making the system available to external agents. Al-
though the slow spread of mobile-agent systems is acceptable in the long run, it does
4
At a minimum, \suciently similar" means that the systems must support the same agent
language, since there is not yet any adequate way to automatically translate an agent from one
language to another.
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signicantly complicate the development and testing process, since it is nearly impos-
sible to obtain a large testbed. Most testing and development is done in small, local
networks, leaving open questions about the scalability of security and fault-tolerance
algorithms. There are two partial solutions. The rst solution is to construct a larger
testbed by cooperating with other mobile-agent research groups, each of which is fac-
ing the same problem. Currently Dartmouth, Cornell and the University of Tromso
in Norway are setting aside a few machines each. Each group's mobile-agent system
will be installed on each machine, allowing experimentation across a much wider area
although still on a small number of machines. We hope to extend this testbed to
other universities and eventually a few commercial research labs.
The second solution is to develop a formal model of a mobile-agent system and
then simulate system execution on as many virtual machines as desired. Although
simulation would never be able to predict the performance of an actual system exactly,
it would allow a relative comparison of dierent security and fault-tolerance strategies.
Many potential strategies could be eliminated from consideration without the need
to test each one within an actual network. Appropriate simulation environments are
critical to future success and must be developed soon. Although other groups may
be working on such simulation environments, none had been made public at the time
of this writing.
Binary messages. Agent Tcl messages are currently null-terminated ASCII strings.
Although strings are an appropriate transmission unit for some applications, such as
those in which the agents exchange KQML messages [GK94], strings introduce extra
overhead in many other applications, such as those in which the agents exchange
numeric data. The overhead comes from converting the data into a string and then
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parsing the string to recover the data. To eciently support a wider range of com-
munication styles, Agent Tcl must be extended so that a message can include either
a string or arbitrary binary data. Helper routines would be provided to add and
extract standard RPC data types [BN84] from a binary data buer. The ability to
transmit binary data would eliminate the parsing overhead, and in particular, would
be a much more ecient lower-layer for the Agent RPC system [NCK96]. The mes-
saging subsystem in Agent Tcl can already handle binary messages; we just need to
implement a binary data type and the helper routines for each language.
Unmodied interpreters. The jump command requires modications to the Tcl,
Java and Scheme interpreters since the unmodied interpreters do not allow the cap-
ture of an executing program's (or thread's) complete state. These modications are
not a major concern yet, since both the binaries and source code of the modied Tcl
and Scheme interpreters and the binaries of the modied Java interpreter can be dis-
tributed freely for academic use. However, the modied interpreters increase the size
of the Agent Tcl code base and lead to a signicant amount of extra work when port-
ing Agent Tcl to a new platform or when moving to a new version of the interpreter.
In addition, some users have already objected to installing another version of the
interpreter on their system when the standard version is already available. The most
immediate need is to create a version of Agent Tcl that does not provide the jump
command and thus can run with the unmodied interpreters. Such a version would
use migration techniques similar to those found in Aglets [Ven97], Odyssey [Gen97],
Concordia [WPW+97] or Tacoma [JvRS95]. At the same time, we need to decide
whether the convenience of the jump command outweighs the additional burden that
it places on the system programmer. If it does, we need to work with the interpreter
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developers to get the necessary state capture routines added to the standard inter-
preters. Due to the growing interest in mobile computation, the developers are likely
to agree.
Administration tools. Agent Tcl currently does not provide a machine's owner
or administrator with an eective view of the agents running on that machine, sup-
porting little more than the forcible termination of a particular agent. This does
not represent any conceptual fault with the Agent Tcl system, but rather a lack of
time for implementing administration tools. However, as Agent Tcl moves into wider
release, such tools are becoming more and more critical. The administrator needs
a graphical tool that shows the status and identity of all the agents running on the
current machine and allows her to terminate, suspend, resume or adjust the security
parameters for any and all agents. To support such a tool, the server needs to report
on the allowances that the resource managers have assigned to each agent and how
much of each allowance an agent has left; the resource managers must accept tempo-
rary or permanent security policy changes for individual agents or agent owners; and
the agent core must respond to suspend and resume messages sent from the server.
Aside from suspend and resume, all the necessary information and mechanisms al-
ready exist within the Agent Tcl system, but cannot be accessed through a single
point of control.
Web access. One way to bring Agent Tcl into much wider use is to make the
system accessible via the Web. There are two approaches. Most or all of the system
can be rewritten in Java and downloaded on demand to Java-enabled web browsers,
essentially turning these browsers into temporary agent servers [Ven97]. Alternatively,
the system can provide a much simpler Java applet or CGI script that interfaces with
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an agent server on the same machine as the web server. A user would give an agent to
the applet or CGI script, which would pass the agent on to the agent server [JvRS96].
Although the rst approach is more exible, it is much more complex and is mainly
a matter of porting code, making it more suited to a commercial product rather than
a research project. Instead we will take the second approach.
Operating system support. The security and resource scheduling mechanisms
in most operating systems are a poor match for mobile agents. For example, a
mobile-agent system must impose a limit on disk accesses per unit time so that an
agent can not thrash the local disk. Most operating systems do not support such a
limit, forcing the mobile-agent system to implement the limit itself, something that
is awkward at best since the mobile-agent system is executing in application space. If
the operating system did support such limits, however, and could schedule available
capacity among competing entities, the mobile-agent implementation would be more




Agent Tcl is a simple but powerful mobile-agent system that distinguishes itself from
other mobile-agent systems with (1) its combination of multiple languages, a simple
migration mechanism, and both low- and high-level communication protocols, (2) its
simple but eective security model, and (3) its extensive support services and tools.
 Multiple languages. Agent Tcl supports multiple, o-the-shelf languages,
Tcl, Java and Scheme, and allows the straightforward addition of new languages.
The agent programmer can select the language that is most appropriate for her
task.
 Migration. Agent Tcl reduces migration to a single instruction, jump, which
automatically capture the complete state of the agent and sends the state image
to the new machine. The agent continues from the point of the jump on the
new machine. Although the system programmer must implement the jump
instruction for each supported language, once the instruction is available, the
agent programmers do not need to explicitly collect state information before
migration.
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 Communication. The base Agent Tcl system provides two low-level commu-
nication mechanisms, messaging passing and direct connections (for bulk data
transfer), which work the same regardless of whether the communicating agents
are on the same or dierent machines. Higher-level communication mechanisms,
such as a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanism [NCK96], are implemented
at the agent level on top of the two low-level services. With this approach, the
agent programmer can choose from a range of communication mechanisms, but
the base system remains lightweight.
 Security. Agent Tcl protects an individual machine against malicious agents
with a straightforward security model that cleanly separates policy and en-
forcement. Agents are digitally signed during migration so that their owner can
be identied. Resource manager agents use the identity of the agent's owner
to decide which screen, network, disk, etc., accesses are allowed for that agent.
Lightweight enforcement modules for each supported language enforce the man-
ager decisions.
 Support services. Agent Tcl provides numerous support services, most no-
tably (1) a debugger that tracks an agent as it moves through the network and
provides traditional debugger features such as breakpoints, watch conditions
and line-at-a-time execution [HK97], (2) a docking system that allows an agent
to transparently migrate to or from a mobile computer [GKN+97], (3) hierarchi-
cal yellow pages that provide a keyword-indexed directory of available services
[GKN+97], (4) several network sensing and planning modules that allow an
agent to determine the best route through the network [GKN+97, Car97], and
(5) a Mobile Agent Construct Environment (MACE) that allows a nonprogram-
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mer to graphically construct an agent [Sha97].
The main weaknesses of Agent Tcl are its lack of fault-recovery mechanisms and
its poor performance relative to traditional client-server techniques. The poor perfor-
mance is due to to the large migration overhead and the slowness of Tcl (which was the
only language considered in the performance analysis). In a mid- or high-performance
network, an Agent Tcl agent is an attractive choice only if (1) the client-server so-
lution would perform a hundred or more cross-network calls or (2) link reliability or
the latency of each individual call is the overriding performance concern. The per-
formance numbers are good enough, however, to suggest that a combination of faster
languages and additional system engineering will make an Agent Tcl agent compet-
itive with or better than the corresponding client-server solution in a much wider
range of applications, including those where the client-server solution performs only
a handful of cross-network calls. Two faster languages, Scheme and Java, are already
in place, and we are working to make the messaging system more ecient and to
eliminate most of the migration overhead.
Once performance and fault tolerance are addressed (as well as some of the less
critical issues that were discussed in Chapter 10), Agent Tcl will become an attractive
platform for most distributed applications, not because it makes radically new appli-
cations possible, but because applications can be implemented eciently and easily
within a single, general framework.
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Appendix A
Performance data - Base
performance
Tables A.1 through A.15 contain the timing data from the experiments that were done
to measure Agent Tcl's base performance. Each data point is an average of between
2 and 180 measured times, where each measured time was obtained by timing 100
or 1000 iterations of the event in question and then dividing by 100 or 1000.1 More
iterations and trials were done for those experiments in which each iteration took
a short time; fewer iterations and trials were done for those experiments in which
each iteration took a longer time. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of the standard
deviations for the data points, where each deviation is expressed as a percentage of
the corresponding average. The data and the experiments are discussed further in
Chapter 7.
1Between 4 and 360 times were obtained for each data point. All times above the median were
thrown out, and the remaining 2 to 180 times were averaged. The intent was to keep only those
times that correspond to periods of light network load.
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Figure A.1: Histogram of the standard deviations for the average times in Tables







64 128 256 512
64 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
128 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
256 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08
512 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
1024 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10
2048 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
4196 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23
8192 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
16384 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61
32768 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.34
128 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.34
256 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.35
512 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.36
1024 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.37
2048 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.41
4196 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.48
8192 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.61
16384 0.63 0.67 0.74 0.87
32768 1.17 1.21 1.28 1.41





64 0.57 1.03 2.20
128 0.58 1.04 2.21
256 0.58 1.04 2.21
512 0.59 1.05 2.23
1024 0.60 1.07 2.24
2048 0.64 1.12 2.30
4196 0.71 1.21 2.38
8192 0.85 1.34 2.53
16384 1.09 1.57 2.82
32768 1.63 2.08 3.27
65536 2.85 3.33 4.48
Table A.1: Time in milliseconds for two processes on the same machine to exchange






64 128 256 512
64 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.27
128 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.28
256 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.30
512 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.32
1024 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.40
2048 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.56
4096 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.86
8192 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.44
16384 2.60 2.61 2.63 2.67
32768 4.99 5.01 5.02 5.06




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 0.34 0.49 0.79 1.37
128 0.35 0.50 0.80 1.38
256 0.36 0.51 0.81 1.39
512 0.39 0.55 0.85 1.42
1024 0.46 0.62 0.92 1.50
2048 0.64 0.78 1.06 1.64
4096 0.93 1.07 1.34 1.93
8192 1.51 1.66 1.94 2.51
16384 2.74 2.89 3.18 3.76
32768 5.14 5.29 5.59 6.20





64 2.61 5.08 12.33
128 2.62 5.08 12.34
256 2.64 5.12 12.37
512 2.68 5.15 12.39
1024 2.75 5.22 12.47
2048 2.89 5.38 12.62
4096 3.19 5.68 12.91
8192 3.76 6.26 13.55
16384 4.98 7.53 14.86
32768 7.49 9.92 17.25
65536 14.82 19.12 24.42
Table A.2: Same as the previous experiment except that we are using the messaging






64 128 256 512
64 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
128 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
256 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20
512 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
1024 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23
2048 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
4196 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39
8192 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.61
16384 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94
32768 1.73 1.74 1.75 1.76




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.57
128 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.58
256 0.22 0.27 0.38 0.58
512 0.23 0.28 0.39 0.59
1024 0.24 0.29 0.40 0.61
2048 0.29 0.34 0.45 0.64
4196 0.41 0.45 0.57 0.75
8192 0.63 0.66 0.77 0.96
16384 0.96 0.99 1.10 1.30
32768 1.78 1.82 1.94 2.15





64 0.91 1.72 3.37
128 0.92 1.72 3.36
256 0.92 1.74 3.38
512 0.93 1.74 3.39
1024 0.95 1.76 3.42
2048 0.98 1.81 3.47
4196 1.09 1.93 3.59
8192 1.30 2.14 3.80
16384 1.64 2.48 4.17
32768 2.50 3.32 5.01
65536 4.20 5.05 6.70
Table A.3: Time in milliseconds for two processes on the same machine to exchange






64 128 256 512
64 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.41
128 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.42
256 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.43
512 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.47
1024 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.55
2048 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70
4096 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.04
8192 1.64 1.65 1.67 1.70
16384 2.96 2.96 2.99 3.02
32768 5.76 5.76 5.79 5.83




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 0.48 0.63 0.97 1.64
128 0.48 0.64 0.98 1.65
256 0.51 0.66 1.00 1.67
512 0.54 0.70 1.04 1.71
1024 0.62 0.78 1.11 1.78
2048 0.78 0.93 1.25 1.93
4096 1.11 1.26 1.59 2.26
8192 1.77 1.92 2.25 2.91
16384 3.09 3.25 3.58 4.24
32768 5.90 6.05 6.39 7.06





64 3.01 5.89 13.32
128 3.02 5.89 13.34
256 3.04 5.91 13.36
512 3.08 5.95 13.41
1024 3.15 6.02 13.51
2048 3.30 6.16 13.65
4096 3.64 6.50 13.96
8192 4.29 7.16 14.62
16384 5.62 8.49 15.99
32768 8.44 11.27 18.79
65536 15.96 20.70 26.39
Table A.4: Same as the previous experiment except that we are using the messaging






64 128 256 512
64 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.34
128 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.35
256 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.35
512 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36
1024 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.42
2048 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.52
4096 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.85




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 0.39 0.51 0.84 1.36
128 0.40 0.52 0.85 1.36
256 0.41 0.53 0.86 1.38
512 0.43 0.55 0.88 1.40
1024 0.45 0.59 0.92 1.44
2048 0.57 0.67 1.00 1.51
4096 0.90 1.01 1.33 1.88
8192 1.39 1.51 1.87 2.38
Table A.5: Time in milliseconds to make an RPC call when the client and server are






64 128 256 512
64 2.11 2.36 2.80 3.58
128 2.61 2.84 3.26 4.07
256 2.80 3.03 3.44 4.21
512 3.62 3.84 4.25 5.06
1024 5.20 5.41 5.92 6.74
2048 7.43 7.74 8.19 8.93
4196 9.91 10.26 10.73 11.29
8192 14.23 14.59 14.75 15.26
16384 24.65 24.83 25.40 25.45
32768 47.76 48.03 48.99 49.21




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 5.15 7.46 9.25 14.14
128 5.67 7.95 9.65 14.29
256 5.92 8.19 9.94 14.37
512 6.59 8.97 10.61 15.27
1024 8.21 10.55 12.17 17.07
2048 10.50 12.88 14.45 19.10
4196 12.97 15.36 17.00 21.38
8192 17.01 19.24 21.31 25.64
16384 27.11 29.21 31.77 35.82
32768 50.35 52.85 54.57 59.25





64 22.30 60.12 107.15
128 22.95 61.11 109.00
256 22.90 60.37 107.59
512 23.50 60.16 110.15
1024 25.49 61.77 110.92
2048 27.62 60.53 113.67
4196 29.72 67.41 113.08
8192 33.64 71.09 114.25
16384 43.83 78.26 140.78
32768 69.61 102.96 160.42
65536 113.82 147.83 195.18
Table A.6: Time in milliseconds for two processes on dierent machines to exchange






64 128 256 512
64 2.50 2.69 3.14 3.97
128 3.00 3.12 3.64 4.36
256 3.13 3.32 3.75 4.56
512 3.99 4.14 4.58 5.46
1024 5.69 5.83 6.24 7.17
2048 8.34 8.55 8.92 9.72
4096 10.59 10.92 11.54 12.07
8192 15.55 15.58 16.38 16.93
16384 27.38 27.53 27.74 28.96
32768 54.00 53.78 53.25 54.98




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 5.62 8.00 9.99 15.14
128 6.00 8.42 10.15 15.45
256 6.22 8.55 10.46 15.66
512 7.09 9.51 11.67 16.51
1024 8.75 11.16 13.09 18.28
2048 11.53 13.81 15.96 20.75
4096 13.81 16.05 18.15 23.37
8192 18.64 21.06 22.90 28.46
16384 30.11 32.49 34.41 39.88
32768 56.33 57.99 61.47 65.95





64 24.19 60.25 113.40
128 24.54 60.74 112.48
256 25.13 60.63 114.81
512 25.95 62.20 116.88
1024 27.62 69.24 112.90
2048 30.20 72.37 111.88
4096 32.77 73.17 114.87
8192 38.03 74.94 141.85
16384 48.96 92.73 148.10
32768 74.34 109.62 167.90
65536 125.00 164.53 210.57
Table A.7: Same as the previous experiment except that we are using the messaging






64 128 256 512
64 2.50 2.72 3.13 3.96
128 2.74 2.95 3.37 4.22
256 3.14 3.36 3.76 4.61
512 3.96 4.19 4.59 5.40
1024 5.60 5.81 6.22 7.04
2048 7.80 8.03 8.44 9.25
4096 10.34 10.68 10.98 11.78




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 5.67 7.46 9.73 13.81
128 5.84 7.68 9.97 14.08
256 6.25 8.11 10.36 14.45
512 7.09 8.99 11.17 15.31
1024 8.68 10.56 12.78 17.01
2048 10.89 12.73 15.06 19.33
4096 13.46 15.31 17.53 21.64
8192 17.64 19.48 21.75 25.94







64 128 256 512
64 0.90 0.93 0.97 1.06
128 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.09
256 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.14
512 1.07 1.09 1.13 1.19
1024 1.26 1.28 1.32 1.40
2048 1.62 1.67 1.71 1.79
4096 2.33 2.37 2.41 2.51
8192 3.81 3.85 3.89 3.98
16384 6.94 6.97 7.02 7.12
32768 13.09 13.13 13.18 13.27




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 1.27 1.62 2.34 3.85
128 1.29 1.67 2.38 3.88
256 1.33 1.71 2.43 3.92
512 1.40 1.79 2.51 4.01
1024 1.55 1.95 2.70 4.21
2048 1.99 2.28 3.05 4.58
4096 2.69 3.04 3.72 5.29
8192 4.17 4.54 5.26 6.73
16384 7.31 7.68 8.41 9.88
32768 13.48 13.85 14.58 16.11





64 6.93 13.11 31.07
128 6.98 13.17 31.10
256 7.03 13.20 31.16
512 7.11 13.30 31.23
1024 7.29 13.48 31.42
2048 7.67 13.87 31.88
4096 8.40 14.60 32.59
8192 9.90 16.12 34.18
16384 12.98 19.35 37.36
32768 19.17 27.17 43.16
65536 37.14 43.23 59.98
Table A.9: Time in milliseconds for two agents on the same machine to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 3.04 3.26 3.70 4.60
128 3.47 3.69 4.13 5.03
256 3.71 3.93 4.36 5.26
512 4.62 4.84 5.27 6.14
1024 6.42 6.64 7.08 7.96
2048 9.17 9.41 9.84 10.74
4096 11.79 12.00 12.44 13.33
8192 17.63 17.82 18.27 19.20
16384 31.17 31.37 31.79 32.71
32768 59.75 60.10 60.57 61.36




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 6.38 8.92 11.20 17.25
128 6.80 9.34 11.62 17.70
256 7.03 9.58 11.85 17.96
512 7.93 10.47 12.75 18.85
1024 9.70 12.25 14.58 20.64
2048 12.50 14.96 17.26 23.39
4096 15.10 17.61 19.98 26.10
8192 20.96 23.48 25.88 31.92
16384 34.53 36.86 39.37 45.46
32768 63.19 65.85 68.09 74.14





64 28.39 69.11 139.27
128 28.79 70.81 136.79
256 29.03 68.90 136.91
512 29.90 70.56 139.59
1024 31.71 71.18 139.77
2048 34.49 71.35 141.44
4096 37.20 70.57 140.61
8192 43.00 84.97 148.11
16384 56.61 96.97 161.01
32768 85.32 127.80 186.25
65536 145.13 185.54 263.28
Table A.10: Time in milliseconds for two agents on dierent machines to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 3.87 3.92 4.00 4.20
128 3.90 3.96 4.06 4.26
256 4.01 4.09 4.18 4.34
512 4.21 4.24 4.32 4.52
1024 4.57 4.62 4.71 4.88
2048 5.36 5.41 5.50 5.68
4096 6.84 6.89 6.99 7.15
8192 9.82 9.88 9.97 10.09
16384 16.10 16.16 16.26 16.47
32768 28.45 28.51 28.59 28.79




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 4.59 5.37 6.82 9.85
128 4.63 5.42 6.90 9.89
256 4.74 5.52 7.02 9.98
512 4.91 5.69 7.18 10.18
1024 5.26 6.03 7.51 10.59
2048 6.04 6.80 8.31 11.35
4096 7.50 8.31 9.72 12.83
8192 10.56 11.36 12.82 15.76
16384 16.83 17.57 19.09 22.08
32768 29.16 29.95 31.43 34.47





64 16.21 28.46 63.26
128 16.23 28.50 63.36
256 16.38 28.67 63.43
512 16.57 28.82 63.61
1024 16.93 29.21 64.10
2048 17.67 29.96 64.86
4096 19.16 31.51 66.41
8192 22.18 34.49 69.56
16384 28.18 40.72 75.74
32768 40.67 54.92 87.96
65536 76.16 88.75 120.76
Table A.11: Time in milliseconds for two agents on the same machine to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 28.28 31.15 33.50 33.28
128 27.48 33.22 37.53 37.49
256 27.96 32.87 37.58 34.15
512 28.08 31.56 33.72 33.59
1024 29.68 33.12 33.80 34.62
2048 32.76 35.40 36.52 36.77
4096 36.04 38.62 38.70 39.38
8192 43.28 44.78 44.98 46.17
16384 60.11 61.35 61.85 61.95
32768 95.96 95.69 96.87 96.87




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 34.72 199.87 200.01 200.01
128 34.67 199.84 200.01 200.00
256 35.45 199.86 200.01 200.02
512 35.17 199.84 200.01 200.01
1024 35.69 199.89 200.01 200.01
2048 38.49 199.89 200.01 200.01
4096 40.12 199.86 200.01 200.01
8192 46.38 199.92 200.01 200.01
16384 62.40 199.91 200.01 200.01
32768 96.95 199.91 200.01 200.01





64 200.02 200.85 400.47
128 200.03 200.05 399.87
256 200.02 200.05 398.67
512 200.02 200.44 399.67
1024 200.01 200.04 400.07
2048 200.02 200.45 399.88
4096 200.02 200.05 399.86
8192 200.02 200.04 399.86
16384 200.02 200.05 399.87
32768 200.22 242.65 400.07
65536 399.82 400.05 401.28
Table A.12: Time in milliseconds for two agents on dierent machines to exchange a


















Table A.13: Time in milliseconds to submit an empty agent to the same machine and






64 128 256 512
64 118.03 118.51 118.48 119.00
128 119.01 119.32 119.30 119.73
256 119.68 119.97 120.09 120.56
512 120.63 120.78 120.80 121.25
1024 122.67 122.64 122.63 122.91
2048 125.27 125.30 125.26 125.65
4096 130.57 130.66 130.66 131.14
8192 143.03 143.07 142.82 143.33
16384 168.56 168.43 168.33 168.74
32768 221.85 221.52 221.85 221.86




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 119.44 197.77 200.89 201.37
128 120.18 195.20 200.85 201.34
256 121.00 195.53 200.85 201.36
512 121.57 201.15 200.85 201.30
1024 123.58 197.42 200.85 201.35
2048 126.09 201.59 200.84 201.28
4096 131.46 197.61 200.78 201.25
8192 143.67 197.19 200.63 201.16
16384 169.34 202.76 200.40 234.10
32768 222.57 388.82 399.84 400.36





64 203.21 386.12 410.94
128 203.22 386.08 410.76
256 203.21 386.13 410.83
512 203.21 386.06 410.98
1024 203.22 386.12 410.88
2048 204.88 386.12 410.92
4096 219.22 405.70 410.82
8192 382.91 405.68 444.14
16384 402.43 405.48 590.42
32768 402.18 405.03 589.94
65536 465.32 600.38 623.70
Table A.14: Time in milliseconds to submit an empty agent to a remote machine and






64 128 256 512
64 390.55 401.24 401.48 401.55
128 390.59 401.86 401.52 401.76
256 390.45 401.52 401.59 401.41
512 390.83 401.34 401.55 401.62
1024 390.62 401.21 401.34 401.76
2048 390.79 401.00 401.31 401.90
4096 391.17 401.10 401.21 401.90
8192 409.76 401.07 401.48 401.66
16384 410.38 401.62 401.41 401.83
32768 584.55 575.41 575.83 578.86




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 401.66 401.90 402.07 404.03
128 401.55 402.00 401.97 404.00
256 401.62 401.59 401.55 403.76
512 401.72 402.03 401.93 403.90
1024 401.83 401.69 402.38 403.83
2048 401.38 401.72 402.45 403.69
4096 401.76 401.07 401.79 403.93
8192 401.59 401.86 401.97 403.93
16384 401.86 401.90 402.21 466.41
32768 584.72 589.86 595.17 603.62





64 406.07 597.79 827.66
128 405.86 597.83 833.62
256 405.93 597.90 839.48
512 406.03 597.79 837.86
1024 406.93 597.83 835.17
2048 411.48 597.72 842.93
4096 428.10 597.90 837.07
8192 585.48 610.93 832.69
16384 585.66 797.55 855.55
32768 605.72 797.48 854.41
65536 782.83 941.59 1048.07
Table A.15: Time in milliseconds for an agent to jump to a remote machine and then
jump back with a dummy result.
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Appendix B
Performance data - Migration
versus client/server
Tables B.1 through B.8 contain the data from the experiments that were done to
compare mobile agents with traditional client/server computing. Each data point
is an average of between 4 and 23 measured times, where each measured time was
obtained by timing 100 or 1000 iterations of the event in question and then dividing
by 10, 100 or 1000.1 More iterations and trials were done for those experiments
in which each iteration took a short time; fewer iterations and trials were done for
those experiments in which each iteration took a longer time. Figure B.1 shows the
distribution of the standard deviations for the data points, where each deviation is
expressed as a percentage of the corresponding average. The data and the experiments
are discussed further in Chapter 7.
1Between 8 and 46 times were obtained for each data point. All times above the median were
thrown out, and the remaining 4 to 23 times were averaged. The intent was to keep only those times
that correspond to periods of light network load.
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Standard deviation (percentage of average)
Figure B.1: Histogram of the standard deviations for the average times in Tables B.1







64 128 256 512
64 1.61 1.66 1.73 1.89
128 1.66 1.70 1.77 1.93
256 1.73 1.76 1.83 1.99
512 1.87 1.91 1.98 2.12
1024 2.18 2.22 2.29 2.41
2048 2.74 2.78 2.85 2.96
4096 3.83 3.89 3.97 4.11
8192 6.04 6.09 6.17 6.32
16384 10.77 10.81 10.88 11.04
32768 20.02 20.07 20.13 20.28




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 2.18 2.75 3.84 6.11
128 2.23 2.80 3.88 6.15
256 2.29 2.87 3.96 6.22
512 2.43 3.01 4.11 6.39
1024 2.71 3.30 4.41 6.67
2048 3.27 3.81 4.95 7.22
4096 4.39 4.96 5.94 8.34
8192 6.62 7.18 8.26 10.51
16384 11.32 11.92 13.00 15.23
32768 20.58 21.18 22.25 24.55





64 10.83 20.02 45.99
128 10.87 20.04 46.06
256 10.95 20.22 46.11
512 11.10 20.31 46.25
1024 11.37 20.58 46.60
2048 11.97 21.17 47.06
4096 13.04 22.25 48.44
8192 15.29 24.59 50.73
16384 19.95 29.38 55.49
32768 29.24 38.33 63.54
65536 55.19 64.36 87.46
Table B.1: Time in milliseconds for two agents on the same laptop to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 6.09 6.19 6.31 6.65
128 6.20 6.25 6.38 6.70
256 6.34 6.42 6.53 6.84
512 6.68 6.75 6.86 7.15
1024 7.28 7.35 7.44 7.77
2048 8.35 8.42 8.58 8.90
4096 10.61 10.67 10.81 11.14
8192 15.18 15.25 15.41 15.72
16384 24.33 24.42 24.55 24.90
32768 42.93 42.97 43.11 43.40




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 7.24 8.35 10.58 15.23
128 7.32 8.46 10.68 15.32
256 7.47 8.58 10.82 15.47
512 7.73 8.89 11.14 15.78
1024 8.33 9.48 11.60 16.35
2048 9.42 10.52 12.79 17.43
4096 11.69 12.79 14.93 19.70
8192 16.31 17.40 19.60 24.06
16384 25.48 26.61 28.78 33.40
32768 44.01 45.09 47.34 51.96





64 24.44 42.95 93.07
128 24.54 43.08 93.16
256 24.67 43.17 93.34
512 24.95 43.43 93.64
1024 25.54 44.03 94.27
2048 26.62 45.14 95.51
4096 28.89 47.45 97.87
8192 33.45 52.05 102.59
16384 42.49 63.45 111.80
32768 61.13 82.77 129.98
65536 112.78 131.60 178.04
Table B.2: Time in milliseconds for two agents on the same laptop to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 152.83 160.34 277.01 359.67
128 166.67 168.34 288.67 369.34
256 187.51 196.00 303.17 395.00
512 268.01 279.17 400.34 476.34
1024 390.84 400.34 517.51 600.17
2048 691.00 719.83 830.34 897.34
4196 1117.17 1124.17 1239.33 1322.00
8192 1820.00 1724.17 1840.00 1930.00
16384 3151.34 3170.51 3276.00 3361.51
32768 6679.01 6313.00 6439.84 6502.17




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 431.51 566.34 950.18 1647.67
128 442.34 572.17 958.67 1665.18
256 465.67 601.00 985.34 1684.17
512 549.18 674.01 1051.84 1750.17
1024 672.17 787.17 1167.51 1872.01
2048 976.17 1097.67 1478.17 2189.51
4196 1397.84 1530.50 1889.68 2594.17
8192 1996.35 2123.17 2503.51 3200.51
16384 3429.68 3570.38 3931.84 4650.01
32768 6539.17 6692.51 7079.51 7798.51





64 3081.34 5957.01 11735.85
128 3094.18 5975.01 11738.01
256 3115.34 6002.17 11759.52
512 3187.68 6068.18 11831.18
1024 3295.18 6174.52 11942.18
2048 3619.17 6491.00 12254.85
4196 4029.67 6879.41 12674.35
8192 4639.84 7496.84 13264.17
16384 6069.85 9124.51 14702.49
32768 9175.68 12076.68 17943.85
65536 14945.67 17802.01 23629.68
Table B.3: Time in milliseconds for two processes on dierent laptops to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 1521.50 1556.00 1545.50 1591.67
128 1560.50 1571.50 1578.00 1616.50
256 1550.33 1595.50 1599.00 1616.83
512 1611.67 1659.50 1657.00 1702.50
1024 1708.50 1747.50 1751.50 1799.50
2048 1926.83 1948.50 1958.33 1985.33
4096 2319.17 2328.83 2367.17 2394.17
8192 3087.17 3115.67 3129.33 3169.50
16384 4584.17 4620.17 4647.83 4662.67
32768 7462.00 7501.20 7465.20 7533.80




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 1747.00 1916.83 2284.00 3039.50
128 1752.00 1920.67 2286.17 3048.50
256 1760.67 1934.17 2303.67 3049.00
512 1813.17 2003.67 2408.00 3126.00
1024 1910.50 2100.00 2488.17 3227.67
2048 2106.00 2312.17 2711.00 3424.17
4096 2529.00 2709.17 3098.67 3824.33
8192 3287.50 3471.67 3829.17 4604.67
16384 4797.83 4985.33 5387.50 6104.17
32768 7631.60 7830.80 8292.60 9058.60





64 4563.17 7402.00 13280.33
128 4577.17 7427.17 13322.17
256 4599.00 7434.67 13350.83
512 4648.17 7465.00 13378.50
1024 4735.67 7561.67 13449.00
2048 4924.00 7735.50 13664.17
4096 5359.00 8160.33 13999.00
8192 6086.33 9032.83 14704.33
16384 7442.67 10499.40 16191.00
32768 10492.40 13310.40 18963.60
65536 16112.20 18947.00 24746.00
Table B.4: Time in milliseconds for an agent to jump from one laptop to another






64 128 256 512
64 4.57 5.02 5.95 7.80
128 5.03 5.48 6.40 8.24
256 5.94 6.38 7.32 9.15
512 7.80 8.25 9.16 10.94
1024 11.46 11.91 12.84 14.68
2048 38.38 38.83 39.39 41.23
4196 72.65 75.18 70.58 72.59
8192 100.75 103.43 98.05 99.78
16384 160.18 159.09 153.01 153.37
32768 263.06 269.82 245.23 246.88




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 11.45 18.67 33.76 61.92
128 11.90 19.11 67.59 62.37
256 12.82 20.05 35.09 63.45
512 14.66 21.88 37.02 65.27
1024 18.33 25.53 40.64 68.85
2048 44.87 52.09 75.10 95.33
4196 76.79 84.10 104.19 126.90
8192 103.59 110.48 131.57 154.88
16384 156.34 157.24 180.92 207.67
32768 250.44 257.56 272.84 300.77





64 119.63 234.35 459.58
128 120.08 234.80 460.04
256 121.00 235.73 460.95
512 122.84 237.55 462.80
1024 126.49 241.23 466.44
2048 153.14 268.12 493.31
4196 185.03 300.55 529.73
8192 211.33 328.32 555.15
16384 266.11 382.78 612.49
32768 358.51 494.06 723.30
65536 574.51 694.40 942.16
Table B.5: Time in milliseconds for two processes on dierent laptops to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 358.08 361.92 364.54 364.00
128 362.00 362.62 365.00 370.69
256 363.54 366.23 363.08 365.85
512 367.54 365.54 368.54 370.54
1024 370.77 370.69 372.62 371.00
2048 381.69 381.46 381.23 384.69
4096 399.92 397.62 401.54 402.77
8192 435.23 434.62 436.69 438.46
16384 507.00 505.08 507.69 506.62
32768 662.31 652.77 653.77 662.08




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 378.08 377.92 400.00 436.31
128 369.15 384.23 397.46 433.85
256 374.54 383.31 401.00 434.08
512 373.77 384.38 403.00 433.77
1024 380.15 385.38 407.31 446.23
2048 388.85 400.15 416.00 454.08
4096 406.92 417.69 445.46 469.62
8192 444.15 455.77 473.77 508.00
16384 519.85 521.62 548.08 576.77
32768 662.54 674.62 693.15 734.54





64 505.54 652.77 958.31
128 506.92 658.54 946.85
256 508.08 659.00 956.54
512 511.46 667.31 960.08
1024 515.46 665.54 962.62
2048 525.00 674.69 974.23
4096 549.77 693.15 996.92
8192 582.54 730.08 1028.85
16384 652.15 810.62 1103.92
32768 804.85 961.69 1244.54
65536 1097.54 1246.69 1553.77
Table B.6: Time in milliseconds for an agent to jump from one laptop to another






64 128 256 512
64 0.72 0.83 1.05 1.48
128 0.83 0.94 1.15 1.59
256 1.05 1.15 1.37 1.80
512 1.48 1.59 1.80 2.23
1024 2.36 2.46 2.68 3.11
2048 3.43 3.54 3.75 4.19
4196 5.35 5.45 5.67 6.10
8192 8.62 8.73 8.95 9.38
16384 16.22 16.39 16.60 16.96
32768 51.12 51.91 50.18 42.19




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 2.35 3.22 5.11 8.60
128 2.46 3.33 5.21 8.70
256 2.68 3.55 5.42 8.93
512 3.11 3.98 5.86 9.36
1024 3.97 4.84 6.71 10.20
2048 5.08 5.94 7.80 11.29
4196 6.97 7.81 9.69 13.15
8192 10.25 11.07 12.92 16.42
16384 17.87 18.68 20.33 24.06
32768 44.27 44.09 42.76 47.31





64 16.17 51.59 70.63
128 16.32 51.54 71.74
256 16.42 51.03 72.66
512 16.89 50.39 72.41
1024 17.71 43.36 73.85
2048 18.70 46.08 75.96
4196 20.60 45.02 74.91
8192 23.88 49.23 78.63
16384 31.50 55.60 87.76
32768 54.28 81.61 113.48
65536 84.16 110.71 140.13
Table B.7: Time in milliseconds for two processes on dierent laptops to exchange a






64 128 256 512
64 335.60 336.50 337.80 335.40
128 337.30 335.40 335.50 338.80
256 337.40 334.70 340.90 338.80
512 337.90 336.00 335.40 339.70
1024 339.80 338.10 343.80 342.00
2048 339.20 341.60 339.50 347.20
4096 350.30 346.60 351.20 351.30
8192 368.50 370.30 364.10 371.30
16384 400.00 396.20 395.90 399.80
32768 457.40 458.00 457.90 462.50




1024 2048 4196 8192
64 342.30 339.90 350.10 366.50
128 336.50 344.20 351.20 366.10
256 338.50 342.50 348.10 369.80
512 340.00 345.10 353.40 369.40
1024 341.10 348.10 352.50 373.60
2048 346.40 348.70 360.60 378.00
4096 355.30 355.00 362.60 382.10
8192 368.70 377.80 383.70 398.80
16384 403.20 403.60 413.10 428.30
32768 461.60 468.50 469.80 490.20





64 397.30 457.50 564.50
128 399.60 459.60 567.30
256 399.70 459.20 565.60
512 401.10 458.60 566.00
1024 399.70 463.80 568.90
2048 405.90 465.70 570.10
4096 410.60 471.40 580.20
8192 428.20 492.40 598.20
16384 461.40 521.80 626.80
32768 519.00 589.30 691.00
65536 620.56 686.00 802.44
Table B.8: Time in milliseconds for an agent to jump from one laptop to another
(and back) over a 10 Mb/s Ethernet link.
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Appendix C
A tutorial on Agent Tcl
This appendix is a tutorial on how to write Tcl agents for Agent Tcl. First, we give a
brief overview of the Tcl scripting language and the special agent commands. Then
we write two versions of the \who" agent.
C.1 Tcl and Tcl agents
Tcl has two components. The rst component is a shell, usually called tclsh, that
is used to execute stand-alone Tcl scripts and interactive commands. The second
component is a library of C functions. The library provides functions to \create" a
Tcl interpreter, dene new Tcl commands in the interpreter, and submit Tcl scripts
to the interpreter for evaluation. This library allows Tcl to be embedded inside a
larger application; any application that needs a scripting language can include the
library and allow its users to write Tcl scripts.
A tutorial on Tcl is beyond the scope of this document. Tcl is easy to learn,
however, and is similar to other scripting languages such as Perl and the various Unix
shells. The following Tcl script, for example, asks the user for a number and then
displays the factorial of that number. The script keeps asking for numbers until the
user enters Q to stop. For now, we simply examine the key features of the script; we
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describe how to actually run the script in the next section.
# Procedure ``factorial'' recursively computes a factorial.
proc factorial x {
if {$x <= 1} {
return 1
}
return [expr $x * [factorial [expr $x - 1]]]
}
# Repeat until the user enters "Q" to quit.
set number ""
while {$number != "q"} {
# Get the integer for which we want the factorial
# (or "Q" to quit).
puts -nonewline \
"Enter a nonnegative integer (or \"Q\" to quit): "
gets stdin number
# Convert to lowercase in case it's a "Q".
set number [string tolower $number]
# Compute the factorial if we're not quitting.
if {$number != "q"} {
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puts "$number! is equal to [factorial $number]"
}
}
There are several important things to note about Tcl in general. First, Tcl stores
all data as strings. The number variable, for example, can be used to hold both a
number and the letter Q because Tcl stores numbers as strings. Commands that
expect numbers, such as expr (which evaluates general mathematical expressions),
convert the given strings into an internal numeric representation.
Second, Tcl has no xed grammar that \denes" the language [Ous94]. The Tcl
interpreter does not treat the while construct above, for example, as a reserved word,
followed by an expression, followed by a repeatedly-executed subprogram. Instead
the Tcl interpreter treats the construct as a command name, while, followed by two
argument strings; the curly bracket characters, { and }, represent nothing more than
a kind of string quotation. The two arguments are passed to the handler for the while
command which interprets them as it sees t. The standard while handler does, in
fact, treat the rst argument as an expression, and if the expression is true, passes the
second argument back to the Tcl interpreter for evaluation as a Tcl script. If the while
handler is replaced, however, the behavior of the while command changes. Thus,
although many Tcl commands look and act like traditional programming constructs,
it is important to remember that Tcl parses everything as a command name and
arguments.
Finally, there are two types of special syntactic constructs that can appear inside
the argument strings. These constructs are called substitutions. In the command
expr $x * [factorial [expr $x - 1]], for example, $x is a variable substitution,
and [expr $x - 1] is a command substitution. When the command is parsed, $x
will be replaced with the contents of variable x, and [expr $x - 1] will be replaced
254
with the result of executing the command expr $x - 1, namely the value of $x - 1.
The quotation characters around the string determine whether these substitutions
are actually performed. Curly brackets, for example, mean that substitutions are not
performed and that the string is passed unchanged to the command handler. Dou-
ble quotes (") or no quotes means that substitutions are performed. In the while
command, above, we use curly brackets around the rst argument, $number != "q",
so that the string is passed unchanged to the while handler. The variable substitu-
tion $number is then performed once per iteration, each time that the while handler
checks the value of the expression. If we had used double quotes instead, the variable
substitution would have been performed when the while command was rst parsed,
and the string passed to the while handler would have been "" != "q". This ex-
pression is always true so the loop would have run forever. Proper quoting is the
most dicult aspect of Tcl; it will be easier if you remember that the Tcl interpreter
parses everything as a string, and that the dierent quotation characters aect the
parsing process.
Keeping these three points in mind, it becomes straightforward to understand the
script. First, the proc command is used to create a new command called factorial
that takes a single argument x and computes x! by making recursive calls to itself.
Then, the puts and gets commands are used to interact with the user and obtain
a number; the factorial command is called with this number as its argument; and
puts is used to display the factorial result. The while command repeats this process
until the user enters Q rather than a number. This script highlights the main features
of Tcl but uses only a small fraction of the Tcl commands. More information on Tcl
can be found in the books by Ousterhout [Ous94] and Welch [Wel95], in the Tcl man
pages, and in the comp.lang.tcl usenet group.
In addition to the standard Tcl commands, Agent Tcl agents use a special set
of commands to migrate from machine to machine and to communicate with other
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agents. These commands are provided as a Tcl extension, but can be treated as a
native part of the Tcl language when writing an agent. In the remainder of this
section, we briey dene each command. In the next section, we use the commands
to develop two agents. The commands can be divided into three main categories.
The rst category of commands allow an agent to register itself with an agent server
and to obtain an identier in the agent namespace.
 agent begin [machine]. The agent begin command registers the agent with
the agent server on the specied machine (or on the local machine if no machine
is specied) and returns the agent's new identier within the agent namespace.
In the current system, this identier consists of the symbolic name of the server,
the IP address of the server, a symbolic name that the agent chooses for itself,
and a unique integer that the server assigns to the agent. So if an agent issues
the command agent begin bald, for example, the command might return the
four-element Tcl list bald.cs.dartmouth.edu 129.170.192.98 {} 15. The
129.170.192.98 is the IP address of bald. The empty curly brackets indicate
that the agent initially has no symbolic name; a symbolic name can be chosen
at a later time with the agent name command. The 15 is the integer id that
the server on bald has assigned to the new agent; this integer is unique among
all agents executing on bald but not among all agents everywhere. The agent's
current identier is stored in element local of the global Tcl array agent. This
array is always available inside an Agent Tcl script and is read-only; it contains
other useful information as we will see in the programming examples below.
Once the agent has issued the agent begin command, it can use the other
agent commands.
 agent name name. The agent name command selects a symbolic name for the
agent. If the agent in the example above issues the command agent name
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FtpAgent, its complete name will become
bald.cs.dartmouth.edu 129.170.192.98 FtpAgent 15.
 agent end. An agent calls the agent end command when it is nished with its
task and no longer requires agent services.
The second category of commands allow an agent to migrate from machine to
machine and to create child agents.
 agent jump machine. An agent calls the agent jump command when it wants
to migrate to a new machine. This command captures the internal state of the
agent and sends the state to the agent server on the specied machine. The
server restores the state and the agent continues execution immediately after
the agent jump. Certain components of the state, such as open les and child
processes, are intrinsically tied to a specic machine and are not transferred to
the new machine. The agent receives a new 4-element identication when it
jumps, which again is stored in element local of the global Tcl array agent.
The agent also loses its symbolic name when it jumps and must request it again
if needed.
 agent fork machine. The agent fork command is roughly analogous to Unix
fork. It creates a copy of the agent on the specied machine. Both the original
agent and the copy continue execution from the point of the agent fork. The
agent fork command returns the 4-element identication of the copy to the
original agent and the string CHILD to the copy.
 agent submit machine -procs names -vars names -script script.
The agent submit command creates a completely new agent. The parameters
to agent submit are a machine, a list of Tcl variables, a list of Tcl procedures,
and a startup script. A new agent is created on the specied machine. This
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agent contains copies of the specied variables and procedures and begins exe-
cution by evaluating the startup script. The agent submit command returns
the 4-element identication of the new agent.
The nal category of commands allow agents to communicate with each other.
 agent send id code string. The agent send command sends a message to
another agent. A message consists of an integer code and an arbitrary string.
The recipient agent is specied by its 4-element id or by any subset of the 4-
element id that uniquely identies the agent, such as the server name and the
unique integer. The recipient receives the message using the agent receive
command, or if it is using Tk, by establishing an event handler for incoming
messages using the mask command.
 agent event id tag string. The agent event command is a variant of
agent send that sends a tag and a string rather than an integer code and a
string. A tag is just an arbitrary string itself. The advantage of agent event is
that the recipient can associate event handlers with specic tags using the mask
command. The event handler is called automatically whenever a message arrives
with the corresponding tag. If the recipient is not using Tk or chooses not to use
event handlers, it must receive these tagged messages with the agent getevent
command.
 agent meet id. The agent meet command is used to request a meeting with
the specied recipient. The recipient accepts the connection request either by
issuing its own agent meet command or with the agent accept command.
Once the connection request has been accepted, and the meeting has been es-
tablished, arbitrary data can be sent along the connection using the tcpip read
and tcpip write commands. The names of these commands reect the current
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link between direct connections and TCP/IP; they should be changed but have
been left alone for backward compatibility. Meetings are more ecient than the
two message-passing variants since they bypass the agent servers.
There are several miscellaneous commands that do not fall into the three main
categories. The agent info command, for example, is used to obtain information
from a server about the agents executing on its machine; the retry command retries
a block of Tcl code until no error occurs or the maximum number of tries has been
reached; and the restrict command imposes resource restrictions on an arbitrary
block of Tcl code. The Agent Tcl documentation describes these commands, along
with all of the commands listed above, in more detail.
C.2 Programming examples
The Unix who command lists all the users who are logged into a machine. In this
section, we develop two versions of an agent that will travel from machine to machine,
execute the Unix who command on each machine, and then return to the home site and
show the complete list of users to its owner. These examples are a simplistic use of an
agent, but they illustrate the general structure of itinerant agents, they do not require
support agents at each network site, and they t conveniently on a few pages while
demonstrating most of the agent commands. As you work through these examples,
you should keep in mind that the application-specic section of each agent|i.e., the
invocation of the Unix who command|can be replaced with any desired processing.
The rst step in developing the examples is to install the Agent Tcl system on two
or more machines (the examples work with only one machine but are somewhat bor-
ing). Detailed installation instructions are included in the Agent Tcl documentation.
Once the Agent Tcl system is installed, you will have three executable les, agentd,
agent and agent-tk. agentd is the agent server, agent is the agent interpreter, and
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agent-tk is the agent interpreter that includes the Tk toolkit. You should start the
server agentd on each machine on which you installed the Agent Tcl system. Again
detailed instructions are included in the Agent Tcl documentation.
Once the server is running on each machine, you can execute Agent Tcl agents
or any Tcl script that is fully compatible with Tcl 7.4 and Tk 4.0. Tcl scripts that
require Tcl 7.5 and Tk 4.1 will not work with this version of Agent Tcl. There are
three ways to execute a Tcl script using the agent interpreters. Suppose that the
factorial script above is in a le called factorial.tcl. The rst execution method
is to start the agent interpreter by typing agent at the Unix prompt. Then you type
source factorial.tcl at the Tcl prompt. You will return to the Tcl prompt after
the factorial script nishes executing; you can type in additional Tcl commands or
type exit to leave the agent interpreter and return to the Unix prompt. The second
execution method is to type agent factorial.tcl at the Unix prompt; you will
return to the Unix prompt when the factorial script has nished executing. The third
execution method is to turn on the Unix execution permissions for le factorial.tcl
and add the line
#!/usr/local/bin/agent
at the beginning of factorial.tcl. This assumes that the agent interpreter is in
directory /usr/local/bin; you will need to change this line if you installed agent is
in a dierent directory. Then you simply type factorial.tcl at the Unix prompt;
you will return to the Unix prompt once the factorial script nishes executing. If the
agent uses Tk, you use the same three execution methods, only with agent-tk rather
than agent. Since the Agent Tcl system uses a modied Tcl interpreter, you must
execute agents with either agent or agent-tk. It is impossible to execute an agent
with the standard Tcl interpreters, tclsh and wish, even if you recompile them so

















Figure C.1: The rst version of the \who" agent. The parent agent (P) submits a
child agent (C) that migrates through a sequence of machines and executes the Unix
who command on each. Then the child (C) sends the complete list of users to the
parent (P) for display to the user. In the specic case shown, the child agent (C)
migrates through four machines at Dartmouth, cosmo, lost-ark, temple-doom, and
tuolomne.
Now we develop the two versions of the \who" agent. The rst version is text-
based. It asks the user for a list of machines. Then it submits a single child agent
using the agent submit command. This child agent migrates through the specied
machines using the agent jump command, executes the Unix who command on each
machine, and records the users of each machine. Once the child agent nishes, it
sends the complete list of users to its parent using the agent send command. The
parent displays the list of users and exits. Figure C.1 illustrates the behavior of this
agent.
The Tcl code for this agent is actually quite simple. You can enter the code using
any standard Unix text editor. Once you have entered the code, you should save it in
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a le with extension .tcl. The discussion below assumes that you use the lename
who.tcl. The Tcl code for the agent appears below. The code is interspersed with
discussion. The code is indented and appears in a xed-width font; the discussion is
ush with the left margin and appears in the normal font. Make sure that you do
not type in the discussion as part of the agent. In addition, certain lines end with a
backslash (\) which is the Tcl line-continuation character. There should not be any






# This agent executes the "who" command on multiple machines.
# It submits a SINGLE child agent. The child jumps from
# machine to machine and executes the WHO command on each
# machine. Then the child returns the complete list of users
# to the parent for display.
The rst line species the location of the agent interpreter. This line allows you
to execute the agent simply by typing who.tcl at the Unix prompt. You will have
to change this line if you installed agent in a dierent directory. The other lines are
comments which are indicated by a pound sign (#).
The second piece of code is the procedure that implements the child agent.
# Procedure `who' is the child agent that does the jumping.
proc who machines {
global agent
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# start with an empty list
set list ""
# loop through the machines and jump to each
foreach m $machines {
# if we do not jump successfully, append an error message
# otherwise append the list of users
if {[catch {agent_jump $m} result]} {
append list "$m:\nunable to JUMP here ($result)\n\n"
} else {




# send back the list of users and finish
agent_send $agent(root) 0 $list
exit
}
There are several important things to note about this procedure. First, the pro-
cedure takes a single argument machines which contains the list of machines that
the child agent should visit. For the purposes of the examples, a Tcl list is just a
string that contains one or more whitespace-separated substrings|e.g., the string
bald cosmo lost-ark is a Tcl list that contains three elements, bald, cosmo and
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lost-ark. Second, the command global agent tells the Tcl interpreter that we
want to access the global array agent from inside the procedure; this array contains
information about the location of the agent. Third, the foreach command loops
through each element in the list of machines; the variable m is set to the next ma-
chine on each iteration. Fourth, the agent jump command is used to jump onto each
machine m. The agent jump command is enclosed within a catch command. Tcl
commands raise exceptions if an error occurs; these exceptions are caught with the
catch command. If the agent jump command fails, the catch command catches the
exception, puts the associated error message in the variable result, and returns 1.
The if clause of the if statement is executed and the agent records an error message.
If agent jump succeeds, the catch command returns 0. The else clause is executed
so the agent invokes the Unix who command and records the list of users. Finally,
once the child agent has migrated through each machine, it sends the list of users
(and error messages) back to its parent using the agent send command.
When agents create other agents, a parent-child hierarchy arises with a single
agent at the top. The agent at the top is called the root agent and, in both itself
and all of its descendents, its 4-element identication is found in element root of the
agent array. Thus, since the parent of the child agent is also the root agent in this
case, we can just send the list of users to agent(root). A current limitation of the
Agent Tcl system is that it does not record the complete parent-child hierarchy. If
we wanted to send the message to the parent and the parent was not a root agent,
we would have to explicitly record the 4-element identication of the parent in an
auxiliary variable before creating the child agent.
The next piece of code is the start of the parent agent. It asks for the list of
machines and registers the agent with the agent server.
# get the machines
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puts -nonewline "Please enter the list of machines: "
gets stdin machines
# register the agent
if {[catch {agent_begin} result]} {
return -code error "ERROR: unable to register on \
$agent(actual-server) ($result)"
}
The gets and puts commands let the user enter the list of machines. The
agent begin command registers the agent with the server on the local machine.
The agent begin command is enclosed within a catch command in case the server
is not available on the local machine for some reason (element actual-sever of the
agent array always contains the name of the local machine). The agent cannot use
any of the other agent commands until it successfully registers using the agent begin
command.
The nal piece of code is the rest of the parent agent. It creates the child agent,
waits for the child agent to send the message containing the list of users, and nally
displays the list of users.
# catch any error
if {[catch {
# submit the child agent that does the jumping
agent_submit $agent(local-ip) -vars machines -procs who \
-script {who $machines}
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# wait for the list of users
agent_receive code message -blocking
# output the list of users
puts "\nWHO'S WHO on our computers\n\n$message"
# cleanup
agent_end
} error_message]} then {
# cleanup on error
agent_end
# throw the error message up to the next level
return -code error -errorcode $errorCode \
-errorinfo $errorInfo error_message
}
First, the parent creates the child agent using agent submit. The child agent is
specied with the -script parameter and consists only of a call to procedure who
with parameter machines. Since the child makes this call, it must have copies of
procedure who and variable machines, so this procedure and variable are specied
after the -procs and -vars parameters respectively. Once the child agent is created,
the parent waits for the child's message using the agent receive command. The
-blocking parameter indicates that the agent will wait until the message arrives
rather than timeout. Once the message arrives, the integer code is placed in variable
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code and the string is placed in variable string. Finally, the puts command displays
the list of users and the agent end command ends the agent. This whole sequence
is enclosed in a catch command in case an error occurs. The agent is now complete
and can be run with any of the three methods described above. So if you type agent
who.tcl at the Unix prompt, you will see the request
Please enter the list of machines:
You should type in the desired machine names with one or more spaces between
names. The agent server must be running on the specied machines. As an example,
if the agent were executed at Dartmouth and you entered the same machine names
shown in Figure C.1 (as well as one machine that does not exist), you might see the
output
Please enter the list of machines:
cosmo lost-ark xxx temple-doom tioga
WHO'S WHO on our computers
cosmo.dartmouth.edu:
lost-ark.dartmouth.edu:
lwilson ttyq0 Apr 29 08:16
pascalb ttyq2 Apr 29 09:11
pascalb ttyq3 Apr 29 09:11
xxx:
unable to JUMP here (unable to get IP address of "xxx")
temple-doom.dartmouth.edu:
rgray ttyq0 Apr 29 08:55
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rgray ttyq2 Apr 29 09:08
tioga.cs.dartmouth.edu:
rgray ttyp2 Apr 29 09:07
There will be a short delay before the child agent nishes its travels and the list
of users is displayed. Note that the nonexistent machine xxx causes no diculties
due to the catch command surrounding the agent jump command. Detecting and
handling errors when the agent is moving is no more dicult than when the agent is
stationary. Uncaught errors cause the agent to terminate, although an error message
will be automatically sent to the root agent
The second version of the \who" agent expands on the rst. First, it uses the Tk
toolkit to display a window in which the user enters the names of the machines. Then,
the agent itself jumps from machine to machine and executes the Unix who command
on each machine. Once the agent has migrated through each machine, it jumps again
to return to its home machine where it displays a second window that contains the
results. As an additional feature, the agent leaves behind a tracker agent on the home
machine; the agent communicates with the tracker agent to provide a continuous up-
date of its current status and network location. This behavior is shown in Figure C.2.
A sample screen dump is shown in Figure C.3. This agent is much longer so you will
probably want to use the copy in systems/agent-tcl/book-examples/winwho.tcl
rather than typing it in yourself. All of the code should be placed in one le although
logically there are two agents (the \who" agent creates the \tracker" agent just before
it starts to migrate). The rst piece of the \who" agent is again a comment header.
The only dierence is that the rst line must specify the location of the agent-tk



















Figure C.2: The second version of the \who" agent. The agent (A) migrates through
the machines itself, returns to the home machine, and displays the list of users in
a Tk window. Before it begins migrating, the agent (A) creates a child agent that
will serve as a tracker (T). The agent (A) communications with the tracker (T) as it





# This agent executes the "who" command on multiple machines.
# It displays a Tk window in which the user enters a list of
# machines. Then it jumps from machine to machine and executes
# the Unix "who" command on each machine. Finally it returns
# to the home machine and displays a Tk window that contains
# the complete list of users. While traveling, it leaves
# behind a tracker agent; it communicates with the tracker
# agent to display continuous information about its progress.
The second piece of the \who" agent are procedures GetMachines and
DisplayList. Procedure GetMachines creates the window in which the user en-
ters the machine names; this window is the top window in Figure C.3. Procedure
DisplayList creates the output window in which the list of users is displayed; the
output window is the bottom window in Figure C.3. Procedure GetMachines is called
before the agent starts migrating; procedure DisplayList is called when the agent
returns to the home machine with the list of users. These procedures use standard
Tk commands and do not use any agent commands, so we do not describe them in
detail. The only nonstandard commands are main create and main destroy, which
create and destroy a main window for the application. The standard Tk interpreter,
wish, automatically creates a main window. Agents, however, do not always need
a main window so we introduce the command main create to explicitly create the
main window when desired. In addition, an agent can not migrate if it is currently
displaying a window. For this reason main destroy is used to destroy the main win-
dow before migration. Unlike wish, destroying the main window does not terminate
the agent. Because of the need to destroy windows before migrating|and because
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agents cannot jump from inside a Tk event handler|Tk agents make heavy use of
the tkwait command. The agent displays the desired interface, uses tkwait to stay
in the event loop until the agent needs to migrate, and then destroys the interface
and jumps to the next machine. This approach imposes a useful structure on the
agent and is more convenient than it might seem.
# Procedure GetMachines creates the Tk window in which the
# user enters the list of machines. It returns "OK" if the
# user enters a list of machines and selects the "GO" button
# It returns "FORGET" if the user selects the "FORGET" button.
proc GetMachines {} {
# The global variable "machines" holds the list of machines
# and the global variable "status" is either "GO" or
# "FORGET" depending on which button the user hits. The
# global variable "display" holds the name of the display




# create the main window
main create -name "List of machines" -display $display
# fill in the main window with an entry box and two buttons
entry .entry -width 40 -relief sunken -bd 2 \
-textvariable machines
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button .go -text "Go!" -command {set status GO}
button .forget -text "Forget it!" -command {set status FORGET}
pack .entry -side top -fill x -expand 1
pack .go -side left -padx 3m -pady 3m -expand 1
pack .forget -side left -padx 3m -pady 3m -expand 1
bind .entry <Return> {set status GO}
focus .entry
# wait for the user to fill in the entry box correctly,
# first making sure that the "status" variable does not yet
# exist
catch {unset status}
while {![info exists status]} {
# wait for the user to hit a button
tkwait variable status
# if the user hit button "GO", see if the entry box is
# filled in
if {($status == "GO") && ([string trim $machines] == "")} {
tk_dialog .t "No machine!" \




# return the status --- e.g., "GO" or "FORGET" --- but first
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# Procedure DisplayList creates the window in which the list
# of users is displayed. The "users" argument contains the
# list of users.
proc DisplayList users {
# The global variable "display" contains the name of the
# display and the global variable "status" will be set to
# DONE when the user finishes looking at the results.
global display
global status
# create the main window
main create -name "WHO'S WHERE?" -display $display
# make the placeholder frames
frame .top -relief raised -bd 1
frame .bot -relief raised -bd 1
pack .bot -side bottom -fill both
pack .top -side bottom -fill both -expand 1
# make a text box that will hold the list of users
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text .text -relief raised -bd 2 -width 60 \
-yscrollcommand ".scroll set"
scrollbar .scroll -command ".text yview"
pack .scroll -in .top -side right -fill y
pack .text -in .top -side left -fill both -expand 1
# make the "DONE" button
button .done -text "Done!" -command {set status DONE}
pack .done -in .bot -side left -expand 1 -padx 3m -pady 2m
# fill in the text area
.text delete 1.0 end
.text insert end $users
# wait for the user to finish looking at the results, first
# making sure that the "status" variable does not yet exist





The next piece of the \who" agent is actually the tracker agent that displays
the progress of the \who" agent through the network. The \who" agent uses the
agent event command to send tagged messages back to the tracker. Rather than
explicitly receiving these messages with the agent getevent command, the tracker
uses the mask command to establish two message handlers. These handlers are au-
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tomatically called when a tagged message arrives. Procedure messageHandler is
automatically called if the message tag is MESSAGE. The source parameter is lled in
with the 4-element identication of the sender; the tag parameter is lled in with the
message tag; and the string parameter is lled in with the message string. Similarly
procedure errorHandler is called if the message tag is ERROR. Procedure Tracker
is the main body of the tracker agent. It creates a simple text window, establishes
the two message handlers using the mask command, and calls tkwait to sit in the
event loop. The two handlers are automatically called whenever a message arrives
and simply insert the status information into the text window. This text window is
the middle window in Figure C.3. The tracker agent illustrates that agents can use
the Tk event model eectively. In fact Tk agents should almost always establish event
handlers for incoming messages; otherwise the agent will not respond to user events
while it sits at an agent receive or agent getevent command (or it will have to
continuously poll). Procedure LeaveTracker actually starts up the tracker agent us-
ing agent submit; it is called by the \who" agent just before the \who" agent starts
migrating. The procedure returns the 4-element identication of the tracker so that
the \who" agent knows where to send its status messages.
# Procedure errorHandler, messageHandler and Tracker make up
# the tracker agent. Procedure LeaveTracker starts the
# tracker agent and returns either the 4-element id of the
# tracker or the string "FAILED".
proc messageHandler {source tag string} {
.text insert end "$string\n"
}
proc errorHandler {source tag string} {
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.text insert end "\nERROR: $string\n\n"
bell
}
proc Tracker {} {
# The global variable "display" holds the name of the
# display. The global variable "status" will be set to
# DONE when the user decides to exit. The global array
# "mask" --- which is available inside every agent ---




# create the tracker window
main create -name "Tracker agent" -display $display
# make the placeholder frames
frame .top -relief raised -bd 1
frame .bot -relief raised -bd 1
pack .bot -side bottom -fill both
pack .top -side bottom -fill both -expand 1
# make a text box that will hold the list of users
text .text -relief raised -bd 2 -width 60 \
-yscrollcommand ".scroll set"
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scrollbar .scroll -command ".text yview"
pack .scroll -in .top -side right -fill y
pack .text -in .top -side left -fill both -expand 1
# make the "DONE" button
button .done -text "Done!" -command {set status DONE}
pack .done -in .bot -side left -expand 1 -padx 3m -pady 2m
# turn on the event handlers
mask add $mask(event) "ANY -tag MESSAGE \
-handler messageHandler"
mask add $mask(event) "ANY -tag ERROR -handler errorHandler"
# wait for the user to finish looking at the results, first





proc LeaveTracker {} {
global agent
global display




agent_submit $agent(local-ip) -vars display \








The next piece of the \who" agent is procedure who, which routes the agent
through the specied machines using agent jump and executes the Unix who command
on each. This procedure is almost the same as the who procedure from the rst version.
The only dierence is that it reports its current location and status to the tracker
agent by calling the report and reportError procedures. These two procedures use
agent event to send a tagged message back to the tracker. When the tracker receives
the tagged message, either procedure messageHandler or procedure errorHandler is
automatically called, and the status information is inserted into the tracker window.
# Procedure who executes the Unix "who" command on each
# machine. Procedure report sends normal information back to
# the tracker agent whereas Procedure reportError sends error
# information back to the tracker agent.
proc report message {
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# The global variable "tracker" holds the 4-element id of
# the tracker agent.
global tracker
# send the message, ignoring errors
catch {
agent_event $tracker MESSAGE $message
}
}
proc reportError error {
# The global variable "tracker" holds the 4-element id of
# the tracker agent.
global tracker
# send the message, ignoring errors
catch {
agent_event $tracker ERROR $error
}
}




# start with an empty list
set list ""
# jump from machine to machine
foreach m $machines {
# if we do not jump successfully, append an error message
# otherwise append the list of users
if {[catch "agent_jump $m" result]} {
reportError "Failed to jump to machine $m ($result)"
append list \
"$m:\nunable to JUMP to this machine ($result)\n\n"
} else {
report "Jumped to machine $agent(actual-server)"






The last piece of the \who" agent simply calls the procedures above. First, the
\who" agent calls procedure GetMachines to get the machine names from the user; the
machine names are stored in the global variable machines. Once the machine names
have been obtained, the agent calls agent begin to register the agent with the local
agent server, and then calls procedure LeaveTracker to start up the tracker agent.
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Then the \who" agent jumps through the specied machines by calling procedure
who; procedure who returns the list of users. Once procedure who is nished, the
agent calls agent jump one more time to return home. Once the agent is home, it
calls procedure DisplayList to show the list of users in an output window. Finally
the agent calls agent end and exits.
# remember the display





# get the list of machines
if {[GetMachines] == "FORGET"} {
exit
}
# register the agent with an agent server and remember the
# home machine
if {[catch {agent_begin} result]} {




# try to leave behind the tracker agent
281
set tracker [LeaveTracker]
if {$tracker == "FAILED"} {
puts "Unable to leave behind the tracker agent!"
exit
}
# jump from machine to machine, executing the "who" command on
# each machine, and then jump back home
set users [who $machines]
agent_jump $home




The agent is now complete. It can be run with any of the three methods discussed
above except that you must use agent-tk rather than agent. One important note
is that, if you followed the installation instructions carefully (which is highly recom-
mended), an agent will start running under a special userid as soon as it jumps for
the rst time. On most Unix machines, you will need to use the xhost command (or
equivalent) to allow this special userid to create windows on your screen; otherwise
the agent will not be able to create the output and tracker windows. The reference
documentation for your Unix machine will have more details about screen access.
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Once the agent starts executing, you will rst see the entry form where you enter
the names of the machines. Once you hit \GO!" to send the agent on its way, the
entry form will disappear, and the tracker window will appear. Lines will appear in
the tracker window one at a time as the \who" agent makes its ways through the
network and reports back its current location. Finally the \who" agent will return
and the output window will appear showing the list of users. A sample run is shown
in Figure C.3; the machine names are the same as were used before.
Although these two versions of the \who" agent perform a simple task, they use
most of the agent commands and can serve as building blocks for more complex agents.
There is no reason for the agent to be self-contained, for example. There might be ser-
vice agents on each machine with which the agent communicates as it migrates. These
service agents should be given well-known names with the agent name command so
that client agents can communicate with them easily. In one of our information-
retrieval applications, for example, there is an agent named TechReports on each
machine which provides a low-level search interface to a collection of technical re-
ports. Agents, migrating from collection to collection, combine the low-level search
primitives into complex queries.
One area of diculty for new agent programmers is debugging a moving agent.
Agent Tcl includes a visual debugger called \agdb" that tracks an agent as it moves
through the network, monitors its communication with other agents, and provides





Figure C.3: A sample run of the second \who" agent. The rst window that the user
sees is the entry box at top where the machine names are entered. Once the machine
names are entered, the agent uses agent submit to create the tracker agent in the
middle. Then the agent jumps from machine to machine, eventually returning to the
starting machine and displaying the list of users at bottom. As the agent migrates,
it communicates its position to the tracker agent; the text in the tracker window
appears one line at a time.
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